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INTRODUCTION
Two basic fees---contingent and hourly-dominate the variety
of fees that lawyers charge clients for pursuing damage claims.
Each of these two types has its advantages; each is plagued with
substantial disadvantages. This Article proposes a new type of fee,
one that preserves the respective advantages of the two present
fees while minimizing their distinct disadvantages. In essence, the
proposed fee calls for the payment, on a contingent basis, of an
amount computed by adding one component tied to hours worked
and another component linked to amount recovered. The prefera-
bility and feasibility of this proposed fee argue for the abolishment,
or at least for the severe restriction, of the contingent fee as it is
now known; the hourly fee should continue as a client's option.
In detailing and evaluating the proposal, this Article
* (1) examines the two present fee systems;
* (2) focuses on a serious problem common to both of these
present fee systems-economic conflict of interest be-
tween lawyer and client;
* (a) illustrates this conflict of interest problem through
the use of an economic model, describes the proposed
fee in detail, and then shows that in the model the
proposed fee aligns the economic interests of lawyer
and client;
530 [Vol. 63:529
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(b) relaxes the idealized assumptions underlying the
economic model in order to analyze how much the
conclusions regarding alignment of interests depend
on those assumptions;
* (3) reexamines the two present fee systems with an eye for
problems other than economic conflict of interest;
(4) evaluates the proposed fee;
* (a) demonstrates the preferability of the proposed fee in
view of those problems other than economic conflict
of interest;
* (b) shows the feasibility of implementing the proposed
fee;
(c) explores the side effects such implementation might
cause throughout the legal system; and
(5) compares the proposed fee with fee reforms suggested
by others.
The topics starred above mark an expedited route through this
Article. The unstarred topics, although essential for both theoreti-
cal development and proof, are the more technical discussions.
I
PRESENT FEE SYSTEMS
This Article concerns the realm of legal practice where the
contingent fee is currently in use.' To provide a context for discus-
sion, however, we shall speak in terms of the one-time representa-
tion by a lawyer of a plaintiff in a potential personal-injury litiga-
tion.
The lawyer and the client in such a situation usually agree on a
contingent fee.2 Under this fee the lawyer receives a percentage,
say 33Y3%, of the settlement or judgment; if there is no recovery,
I See generally F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 25-28, 45-53
(1964).
2 The contingent fee is almost the exclusive method of financing personal-injury litiga-
tion. See M. BLOom, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 140-41 (1968); F. MACKINNON, supra
note 1, at 116, 209; D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 96-97 (1974);
Franklin, Chanin, & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal
Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 & n.103, 33 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Columbia
Study]. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 32 (1973) (contingent fee almost exclusive method
in medical malpractice cases) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT]; Dietz, Baird, & Berul,
The Medical Malpractice Legal System, in HEW REPORT: APPENDIX 113-14 (1973) (same).
1978]
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his client pays nothing.3 The current alternative at least theoreti-
cally available is the hourly fee. 4 Here the lawyer receives an
' The contingent fee receives grudging approval in ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 2-20, 2-24, 5-7, & DR 2-106, 5-103, but must meet the restrictions of these
and other provisions of the Code. For example, the fee must be reasonable in amount. See
id. EC 2-17, 2-18, & DR 2-106(A) & (B). This general restriction may be enforced by
self-restraint, contract, custom, bar associations, courts, and, to a lesser extent, legislatures
and agencies. Also, this restriction sometimes spawns related rules, most of which simply
require that the fee not be "excessive," "exorbitant," or "unconscionable." But in some
places and for certain situations rules provide specific restrictions, such as maximum per-
centage fees. See generally V. COUNTRYMAN, T. FINMAN, & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN
MODERN SOCIETY 198-99 (2d ed. 1976); F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 20-24, 65-66; NEW
YORK STATE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 194-97
(1976) [hereinafter cited as McGILL REPORT]; L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFES-
SION OF LAW 269-72 (1971); Special Subcomm. of Defense Research Comm., International
Ass'n of Insurance Counsel, A Study of Contingent Fees in the Prosecution of Personal Injury
Claims, 33 INS. COUNSEL J. 197, 201-02, 209-13 (1966); Special Project--Recent Developments
in Attorneys' Fees, 29 VAND. L. REV. 685, 710-14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Special Project].
Accordingly, the contingent fee in personal-injury suits is most commonly 33V3% of the
recovery, or slightly higher. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 65-66, 116-19; Note, Con-
tingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Controls, and Enforceability, 47 IOWA L. REV. 942, 947 & n.27
(1962); note 182 infra. Cf. HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 32 (medical malpractice); Dietz,
Baird, & Berul, supra note 2, at 114 (same).
The expenses of litigation, other than the lawyer's overhead and services, present a
separate problem. In the event of victory, the attorney might deduct these expenses from
the recovery before or after he computes his percentage share. This difference in computa-
tion affects how lawyer and client split the fruits of victory. The latter computation
technique raises the attorney's effective percentage rate relative to the former. See F. MAC-
KINNON, supra note 1, at 66-67. In the event of defeat, the client theoretically must refund
all of these litigation expenses advanced by the lawyer. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B). This obligation removes the "purity" from the contingency
aspect of the fee, which may or may not make good policy sense. On the one hand, this
departure from purity helps to close courthouse doors to the poor and risk-averse, thus
partially defeating one purpose of contingency. On the other hand, such token client liabil-
ity may have symbolic value, since bringing suit no longer appears "painless" to the client,
and in fact may serve to screen out some marginal cases. But such additional screening
pressure may not be worth its price in view of the lawyer's screening incentive and the
client's other psychological and financial disincentives to bringing suit. See text accompany-
ing notes 92 & 116-24 infra. Cf. F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 68-70 (discussing possibility
of incentive for client to bring suit if lawyer assumes expenses). Actual practice, however,
renders these arguments largely academic-the client usually does not pay back these ex-
penses. See id. at 69. Win or lose, then, the contingent fee in practice amounts simply to a
percentage of any recovery obtained. In any event, for ease of expression, we shall pro-
ceed for the time being on the assumption that no such litigation expenses exist. We shall
eventually relax this assumption in notes 63-73 and accompanying text infra.
In summary, we can adequately describe the contingent fee as 33 3% of any recovery.
4 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20, 5-7; Comment, Are Contin-
gent Fees Ethical Where Client Is Able to Pay a Retainer, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1959). Cf. note 2
supra.
Payment for legal services may take other forms, such as a contingent or certain lump
sum for handling the case. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 18-20; M. MAYER, THE
LAWYERS 20-21 (1967); ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL
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amount proportional to the number of hours worked, say $50 per
hour; his fee accrues whether his client wins or loses.5 These two
basic fees come in many variations, 6 and often the actual fee
charged is effectively a combination of the two.7 Nevertheless, for
purposes of analysis it is useful to simplify, separate, and then
examine these two basic fee systems."
Examination reveals that the two fees are polar opposites on
two separate axes: (1) conditionality-payment contingent on re-
covery versus certain payment, and (2) computation-a percentage
of recovery versus an hourly rate.9 Therefore, a more accurate
terminology for these two polar fee systems would be "contingent
percentage fee" and "certain hourly fee."
Each of the two fees has its own significant and distinctive
disadvantages. We shall explore them in Parts II and III.
OPINIONS, No. 1389 (1977). However, such other forms of payment rarely occur in the
personal-injury context. Most have obvious inadequacies and offer no avenue for the fruit-
ful pursuit of reform. We discuss those that do have potential for reform in the text ac-
companying notes 218-34 infra.
5 The hourly fee is likewise subject to the general restriction of reasonableness de-
scribed in note 3 supra. Generalization with regard to hourly charges is difficult, but our
illustrative $50 figure is realistic. See Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees,
LrrIGATION, Summer 1976, at 20, 21, 23; Median Earnings of Lawyers Show Slight Increase, 62
A.B.A.J. 768 (1976). Cf. HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 33 (medical malpractice); Dietz,
Baird, & Berul, supra note 2, at 114-16 (same).
6 Many complex variations in the rate level for the contingent fee exist in practice. For
example, the percentage may decrease with the size of recovery or increase as the stage of
litigation progresses. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 65-66; Note, supra note 3, at
947-48. Similarly, the hourly fee may involve adjustments reflecting factors other than time
in an attempt to measure more accurately the value of the legal services. Cf. ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSIBILrrY DR 2-106(B) (listing "[f]actors to be considered ... in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a fee"). We discuss the principal variations that have potential
for reform in the text accompanying notes 218-34 infra.
7 For example, a lawyer on a contingent fee might not charge the full percentage
agreed upon if the case unexpectedly required little work or yielded a surprisingly large
recovery. See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 188, 194 n.77; Columbia Study, supra note 2, at
24-26, 33. Similarly, a lawyer might reduce his hourly charge if his representation has
proved unsuccessful. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B)(4); M.
MAYER, supra note 4, at 24-25.
8 This does not require blinding oneself to the possibility of ultimately combining the
attributes of the two basic systems. Indeed, this Article proposes such a combination.
9 The conditionality and computation variables give rise to four possible combinations:
(1) contingent percentage, (2) contingent hourly, (3) certain percentage, and (4) certain
hourly. The first and the fourth are the two polar systems discussed in the text. Number
(3) is self-contradictory in the personal-injury context, unless the percentage is based on
the amount sought rather than recovered; and, in any form, it has nothing to recommend
it. Number (2), however, does present a real possibility, which we discuss in the text ac-
companying note 225 infra.
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II
THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Numerous conflicts of interest exist between lawyer and client,
many of them economic in nature. Consider two situations where,
if we view the lawyer as choosing among alternative economic
paths, there may be no guarantee that he will choose the path that
is best for his client. First, the lawyer may not have a direct
economic incentive to work for his client's victory because the
lawyer's profit may be unrelated to-the case's outcome. Second, the
lawyer may not have a direct economic incentive to work the
number of hours necessary to maximize the size of his client's net
recovery, if any, because to maximize his own profit the lawyer may
have to work a different number of hours. 10 Our initial discussion
here in Part II concerns only these two particular kinds of lawyer-
client conflict, which we shall synecdochically call "economic con-
flict of interest." To begin, we offer two fundamental propositions.
First, we propose that the lawyer and the client are rational,
economic beings who tend to act in accordance with their own
direct economic best interests. Morality, professional ethics, or even
self-interested concern for indirect benefits such as a good reputa-
tion might, of course, cause the lawyer or the client to act in a
contrary way. Or, one party to the lawyer-client relationship might
have sufficient power to force the other to act contrary to the
latter's direct economic best interests. For example, an occasional,
sophisticated client might be able to control the lawyer so that he
serves the client's interests more perfectly." Nevertheless, we focus
on direct economic interests because our aim is to see how the
unrestrained economic animal will act, and then to change the
economic environment so that the same animal would be inclined
to act in a socially more desirable manner. With such change, soci-
ety could lessen its reliance on those noneconomic or indirect re-
straints currently used to bring about socially desirable behavior.
Second, we submit that economic conflict of interest between
lawyer and client is undesirable. This proposition flows from the
premise of the adversary system and from the concept of advocacy.
1o See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 196-200; D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at 96-99.
See generally Mitchell & Schwartz, Theoretical Implications of Contingent Legal Fees, 12 Q. REV.
ECON. & Bus. 69 (1972); Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in
Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970).
11See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 196; D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at 115-16.
[Vol. 63:529
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Client battles client, as each tries to maximize his own economic
return. A client hires a lawyer to serve as his champion. There are,
however, certain limits on the lawyer's devotion to his client's cause.
Ethical rules of the game proscribe the lawyer's excesses of zeal,
and the court and opposing counsel stand ready to control and to
offset such excesses. A lawyer-client conflict of interest could con-
ceivably help to temper the lawyer's zeal: A lawyer who looks after
his own interests will not push vigorously his client's conflicting
interests. But economic conflict of interest between lawyer and
client has no proper role in tempering zeal. The lawyer's direct
economic self-interest is too potent an influence to set against the
client's interests. The lawyer should generally be a faithful rep-
resentative, striving within the bounds of the law to maximize his
client's economic return; the lawyer's direct economic self-interest
should never distract him from that task.12
Therefore, we conclude that an important goal in structuring
legal fees should be the elimination, or at least the minimization, of
economic conflict of interest between lawyer and client. We shall
now examine the two polar fee systems to discover how they mea-
sure up in this regard. Conclusions will be stated preliminarily, and
then an economic model will be introduced to demonstrate their
validity.
Assume that the client has a claim that conceivably has a posi-
tive net value.' Under the certain hourly fee, because the lawyer's
fee is proportional to the number of hours devoted to the case, too
much work by the lawyer could reduce the client's net recovery to
zero or less. On the other hand, too little work could result in little
or no recovery, likewise reducing the client's net recovery to zero
or less. There is a particular number of hours of work between
these two extremes that would result in the largest net recovery for
the client. However, the lawyer has no direct economic incentive to
work that particular number of hours. No matter how many hours
the lawyer devotes to the case before he ceases work and shifts his
efforts to other cases, his economic position will be unaffected,
22 Perhaps we belabor this second proposition, but we pause on it because, contrary to
first impression, it is not a preordained precept. Nevertheless, the authorities cited in note
10 supra all assume that economic conflict is undesirable. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 treats this as a given:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of
the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences
and loyalties. . . . [H]is personal interests . . . should [not] be permitted to dilute
his loyalty to his client.
1978]
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because he is being paid at his normal hourly rate and his fee is
unconditional. If his workload happens to be light, the lawyer
would tend to work more than the particular number of hours
required to maximize his client's net recovery-a strategy obviously
to his client's disadvantage. The overworked attorney would tend
to work fewer than that particular number of hours, also to the
client's detriment. In short, the lawyer's economic interests do not
align with those of his client. At best, the certain hourly fee leaves
the lawyer indifferent to the client's economic interests. Absent a
direct economic incentive to make the lawyer work in the client's
best interests, our legal system must rely exclusively on noneco-
nomic or indirect restraints to forestall the potential economic
conflict of interest between lawyer and client.
In contrast, a frequently cited advantage of the contingent
percentage fee is that the lawyer and the client become partners:
Since the attorney gets a percentage of the recovery but nothing
else, the client can rely on him for zealous and faithful service. A
recent study gave this aspect of the contingent percentage fee only
this cursory treatment: "It gives the lawyer an incentive to get the
best possible award or settlement for his client."' 3 This is simply a
misconception. The lawyer's and the client's economic interests
align only partially. Although lawyer and client share a common
interest in victory, misalignment exists with respect to the number
of hours the lawyer should work. Because the client's net recovery
varies directly with the gross recovery, and because the client must
pay a fixed percentage fee without regard to the number of hours
worked, the client's economic interests are best served when the
lawyer devotes a very large number of hours to ensure the max-
imum settlement or judgment. However, as shown below, the
lawyer optimizes his own economic position by working a much
smaller number of hours; direct economic incentive prods him to
obtain a respectable settlement with relatively slight effort, thus
securing for himself the maximum profit. Here again our legal
system must rely on restraints other than direct economic incentive
to make the lawyer act in the client's best interests.
In sum, neither the certain hourly fee nor the contingent per-
centage fee can align fully the economic interests of lawyer and
client. Alignment with respect to interest in the outcome of the case
results from resolving the conditionality variable in favor of con-
tingency. However, alignment with respect to interest in hours
11 McGILL REPORT, supra note 3, at 194. See id. at 42.
[Vol. 63:529
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worked depends on the other variable: the basis for computing the
fee. Unfortunately, neither the hourly approach nor the percent-
age approach solves this side of the alignment problem. The for-
mer tends to make the lawyer indifferent as to hours worked, while
the latter provides an incentive for him to underwork.
To study this problem further, we introduce an economic
model of the real world. We shall use the model first to illustrate
and prove our foregoing conclusions, and then to devise a new fee
that solves the alignment problem completely. Making that new fee
a contingent fee would provide alignment of interests in out-
come.14 Hybridizing the hourly and percentage approaches would
align interests in hours worked. The dollar amount of the pro-
posed contingent fee would be computed by adding (1) the lawyer's
time charge for the hours worked to (2) a percentage (say 5% or
10%15) of the amount by which the gross recovery exceeds that
time charge. We call this proposed fee, fully described below,'16 the
"contingent hourly-percentage fee."
A. Modeling the Economic Conflict of Interest Problem
1. The Model
To analyze the alignment problem in a quantitative fashion, we
must initially make certain assumptions. The model that emerges
will enable us to apply the tools of mathematical and economic
analysis. We have derived our primary model from that of Profes-
sors Murray L. Schwartz and Daniel J.B. Mitchell.' 7 The following
assumptions underlie our model:
(1) the plaintiff and his lawyer are profit maximizers; 18
(2) the plaintiff and his lawyer are indifferent to delay;
(3) the plaintiff's lawyer knows in advance (a) that the defen-
dant in the particular case will exhibit a continual willingness to
settle in an amount independent of the lawyer-plaintiff fee struc-
ture, (b) what the defendant will .offer in settlement after any
number of hours that the plaintiff's lawyer has devoted to the case,
14 But cf. note 57 infra.
" See notes 178-79 and accompanying text infra.
16 See notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra; text accompanying notes 171-74 infra.
'
7 See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1127-28, 1156. Indeed, we gratefully
acknowledge heavy analytical reliance on that piece throughout this Section A, as well as
inspirational reliance throughout this Article.
"See text accompanying note I 1 supra. Profit means income minus opportunity cost.
See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1134 n.13.
1978]
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and (c) that the defendant's highest settlement offer will be accept-
able to the plaintiff and his lawyer; 19
(4) the size of the defendant's settlement offer depends on the
number of hours that the plaintiff's lawyer has devoted to the
case-specifically, the plaintiff's lawyer must work some minimum
amount of time before the defendant will make any positive settle-
ment offer, but thereafter each additional hour of lawyer's time20
will increase the settlement offer by a successively smaller incre-
ment2' until some maximum settlement level is reached;
(5) the plaintiff's lawyer has no idle time and each hour he
devotes to the plaintiff's case he would otherwise have devoted to
matters handled at his certain hourly wage-i.e., time that the law-
yer allocates to the plaintiff's case causes him to forgo earning his
certain hourly wage; and
(6) there are no costs for the plaintiff in pressing his claim or
for his lawyer in working on that or any other matter, except the
cost of the lawyer's time.
Assumptions (3) and (4) generally deal with the benefits to be
reaped from the case, assumptions (5) and (6) deal with the as-
sociated costs, and assumptions (1) and (2) deal with the way the
plaintiff and his lawyer will act when faced with those benefits and
costs. Some of the assumptions are more realistic than others. As-
19 What a party is willing to offer or to accept in settlement at any given time is gov-
erned by a complex set of factors. These prominently include that party's current estimates
of (1) the plaintiff's probability of obtaining judgment, (2) the expected size of the plain-
tiff's judgment, if any, and (3) the expected costs both sides will incur in litigating to
judgment. See note 84 infra. Both sides' attitudes toward risk and litigation also play a role.
These estimates and attitudes are highly subjective. The parties' views thereon may be
so different as to preclude settlement. See generally Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-20 (1973). We assume here,
however, that the defendant's highest settlement offer will be acceptable to the plaintiff
and his lawyer. This assumption implies that every case will eventually be settled. We shall
later relax this implied assumption of a 100% settlement rate. See text accompanying notes
74-89 infra. Cf. text accompanying notes 197-206 infra.
20 The plaintiff's lawyer might spend each additional hour in a variety of activities:
investigation, research, negotiation, drafting, court appearance, and so on. The lawyer,
however, would tend to allocate his efforts among these various tasks so that the additional
hour brings the maximum possible increment in settlement value. This strategy yields the
smooth curve depicted in Figure 1. Cf. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1128 n.3
(relationship between gross recovery and hours need not be smooth); text accompanying
notes 56 & 101 infra.
21 See text accompanying note 22 infra. In mathematical terms, if s stands for the size
of the defendant's settlement offer and h for the number of hours the plaintiff's lawyer
works, dsldh > 0 and d2sldh2 < 0. We obviously also assume that the curve relating s to h is
continuous and that such first and second derivatives exist for all positive values of s. In
economic terms, diminishing returns prevail.
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sumptions (1) and (4) do not represent unreasonable departures
from reality. The four other assumptions, however, are clearly un-
realistic in some cases. Accordingly, we shall relax these four as-
sumptions in Section B of Part II.
2. An Illustrative Case
We have assumed that the size of any given settlement offer in
a case is related to the number of hours devoted to the case by the
plaintiff's lawyer. The curve in Figure 1 depicts this hour-settle-
2000 -FIGURE 1
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ment relationship for an illustrative case. 22 The horizontal axis of
the graph measures the number of hours (h) worked; the vertical
axis measures the size of the defendant's settlement offer (s) in
dollars. For each number of hours, the height of the curve (s-curve)
represents the amount of the settlement then obtainable. For
example, if the lawyer works 10 hours, the defendant will offer
$1760 to settle. Once the lawyer works 16 hours, the s-curve reaches
its maximum value of $2000; further effort by the plaintiff's
lawyer will not increase the size of the settlement.
Using the model and this illustrative case, we can now analyze
the economic interests of the plaintiff and his lawyer under various
fee systems by asking two questions: (1) at what number of hours
would the lawyer be inclined to settle the case, and (2) at what
number of hours would his client wish it to be settled?
3. Performance of the Certain Hourly Fee
Since a fee on a certain hourly basis is proportional to the
number of hours worked, the relationship between fee (f) and
number of hours naturally results in a straight line. Figure 2 shows
this certain hourly fee line (fh-line). For each value of h, the height
of thefh-line represents the fee then earned, which is equal to the
hourly wage (w) times h. We continue with an illustrative wage of
$50 per hour.23 The client's net recovery, under our assumptions,
is the difference between the settlement and the fee. For example,
if the lawyer works 10 hours, the settlement will be $1760, the
lawyer's fee will be $500, and the client will recover the difference,
or $1260.
As a profit maximizer indifferent to delay, the client would
like to receive the highest possible net recovery. If he were as
knowledgeable as his lawyer and could control the number of
hours worked by the lawyer, the client would choose the number of
hours required to maximize the difference between the settlement
and the fee. Graphically, the client would choose that h for which
the s-curve is farthest above thefh-line; that particular number of
hours (h*) occurs at the point where the tangent to the s-curve
22 For ease of comparison, we have taken the depicted values from Schwartz & Mitch-
ell, supra note 10, at 1128-33. Those numbers are realistic. See Grady, supra note 5, at
20-21. For a similar numerical illustration, see D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at 97-98.
23 See note 5 supra. Our conclusions concerning the performance of the certain hourly
fee hold true for any positive hourly wage.
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becomes parallel to thefh-line .24 Turning to the illustrative case in
Figure 2, we see that the point where the client's interests are best
served, h*, occurs at 12 hours.25 At that point, the settlement is
$1920, the fee is $600, and the client's net recovery is $1320. No
other h would yield the client a larger net recovery. For any h less
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24 In mathematical terms, dsldh = dfldh at h*. In economic terms, the marginal settle-
ment equals the marginal fee at h*. For a proof of this, see Appendix A.
25 In the textual illustrations, we treat h as having only integer values.
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than h*-that is, to the left of h* in Figure 2-the s-curve rises more
rapidly than thefh-line; there the increase per hour in s more than
covers the $50 per hour by which f increases. For any h greater
than h*, the fh-line climbs more rapidly than the s-curve; there the
hourly increase in the fee consumes more than the corresponding
increase in the settlement. Thus, to serve the client's best interests,
the lawyer should work h* hours, no more and no less.
We can reach this result more intuitively. If the client were
himself the lawyer and'had other legal work yielding $50 per hour,
he would view his own case as a resource and his time as a cost. He
would seek profit by investing time in developing the case. He
would continue to spend time on the case as long as each additional
hour increased the settlement value of the case by $50 or more,
and would stop work when an additional hour would cause the
settlement value to increase by less than $50. For example, after 11
hours of work, the settlement value is $1860, the time cost is $550,
and the client-lawyer's net recovery is $1310. If he works one more
hour, the settlement will increase by $60 to $1920. Since the addi-
tional hour will cost him only $50, the client acting as his own
lawyer should work that twelfth hour, thus obtaining a net recovery
of $1320. A decision to spend more time, however, would not be
wise: 13 hours of work would earn for the client-lawyer a settle-
ment of $1960 at a time cost of $650, leaving a net recovery of
$1310. The extra hour would cost him $50, but the settlement
would increase by only $40. Instead of spending that thirteenth
hour on his own case and receiving only $40 for it, the client-
lawyer would do better by working on some other matter that
would pay him $50 for that hour. When the client hires someone
else to act as his lawyer, his reasoning remains the same-there is
no difference here between spending $50 worth of his own time
and paying $50 in cash for the same amount of someone else's
time. Therefore, the client would want his lawyer to devote 12
hours--h* hours-to the case.26
The lawyer, on the other hand, has economic interests quite
different from those of his client. The lawyer receives $50 for each
hour he devotes to the case. Under the assumptions of the model,
however, for each such hour he must forgo working an hour on
some other matter, which would also have rewarded him $50. So
26 This intuitive picture suggests that h* is the optimal amount of work-the number
of hours that would be invested in the case if the lawyer and the client were the same
person, thus ensuring the absence of conflict of interest.
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the opportunity forgone equals the benefit derived from an addi-
tional hour on this case. If we plot forgone income against h, we
find that the resulting opportunity cost line (o-line) is identical to
thefA-line in Figure 2; the opportunity cost is $50 per hour. In an
economic sense, this means that the lawyer can neither profit nor
lose by devoting time to this case rather than to another matter.
Thus, as a profit maximizer indifferent to delay, the lawyer is in-
different as to h.
In sum, the lawyer has no direct economic incentive to work h*
hours, the number of hours that his client's best interests dictate.
4. Performance of the Contingent Percentage Fee
A fee on a contingent percentage basis is proportional to the
size of the settlement. Figure 3 shows, in addition to the s-curve and
the o-line, the relationship between the contingent percentage fee
and the number of hours worked. Naturally, this relationship is a
curve tied to the s-curve. For each h, the height of the contingent
percentage fee curve (f%-curve) represents the fee earned-equal to
the percentage rate (r) times s-if settlement were then consum-
mated. We continue with an illustrative rate of 33'A%. 2 7 The
client's net recovery still equals the settlement minus the fee. For
example, if the lawyer works 10 hours, the settlement will be $1760
and the lawyer's fee will be $587, leaving the client with a net
recovery of $1173.
The client's goal remains the same: He would like to choose
the number of lawyer's hours required to maximize his net re-
covery-the difference between the settlement and the fee-or,
equivalently, to maximize the vertical distance between the s-curve
and the f%-curve. To accomplish this, the client would choose that
particular number of hours (hc) where the tangents to the s-curve
and thef%-curve become parallel.28 This condition occurs where the
s-curve reaches its maximum.29 Turning to the illustrative case in
Figure 3, we see that the number of hours at and above which the
client's interests are best served, he, is 16. At that point, and for any
greater value of h, the settlement is $2000, the fee is $667, and the
client's net recovery is $1333. No lesser value of h would give the
2,See note 3 supra. Our conclusions concerning the performance of the contingent
percentage fee hold true for any value of r greater than 0% and less than 100%.
28 In mathematical terms, dsldh = dfldh at he. In economic terms, the marginal settle-
ment equals the marginal fee at hc. For a proof of this, see Appendix B.
29 For a proof, see Appendix B.
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client a larger net recovery. This result is hardly surprising. Since
the client keeps 2/3 of any settlement, the amount he keeps will
reach a maximum when the settlement itself is maximized. Thus, in
the client's best interests, the lawyer should work at least hc hours.
The lawyer once again has economic interests very different
from his client's. For each hour the lawyer devotes to the case, he
receives A of any increase in the settlement resulting from that
hour's work. However, for that hour he must forgo working an
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hour on some other matter, at an opportunity cost of $50. His
interests suggest that he should continue to devote hours to this
case only as long as each additional hour increases his fee by at
least as much as his opportunity cost. When the hourly increase in
his fee drops below his opportunity cost, he would do better to
settle and then to shift his efforts to other matters. This means that
the lawyer is inclined to work the number of hours required to
maximize his profit-the difference between his fee and his oppor-
tunity cost-or, equivalently, to maximize the vertical distance be-
tween thef%,-curve and the o-line.a0 That particular number of hours
(hL) occurs at the point where the tangent to the f%-curve becomes
parallel to the o-line.31 In Figure 3, the point where the lawyer's
interests are best served, hL, occurs at 9 hours. At that point, the
settlement is $1620, the fee is $540, the opportunity cost to the
lawyer is $450, and the lawyer's profit is $90. No other h would
give the lawyer a larger profit. For all values of h less than hL, the
f-curve rises more rapidly than the o-line; there the hourly increase
in the fee more than covers the $50 per hour opportunity cost.32
For all values of h greater than hL, the o-line climbs more rapidly
than the f-curve; there an hour's opportunity cost exceeds the
30 In Figure 3, the f%-curve lies above the o-line for some values of h. We ignore the
possibility of thef%-curve lying below the o-line for all values of h, because the lawyer would
then simply refuse to take the case under a contingent percentage fee. In the economic
conflict of interest context, this situation is of no concern. But cf. text accompanying notes
189-96 infra.
There is a third possible configuration. Thef%-curve might lie below the o-line for all
values of h except for one particular h, where thefq-curve and the o-line just touch. This
situation would prevail in a world of perfect competition among lawyers-i.e., in a no-
profit world. See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1136-39. Adoption of this third
configuration would not alter the conclusion that the economic interests of lawyer and
client conflict under the contingent percentage fee; indeed, it would strengthen that con-
clusion. See id. at 1139. Yet we reject this third configuration for the purposes of this
Article, because perfect competition is not a realistic assumption here. Competition has
apparently not succeeded in driving lawyers' average hourly earnings in contingent percent-
age cases down to their wages in certain hourly cases. See note 177 infra. Furthermore,
competition has not caused percentage rates to vary with case value; standard percentage
rates usually apply regardless of how clear the liability or how great the damages. See note
182 infra. Cf. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1139-40 (under perfect competition,
lawyer will lower percentage rate to attract client with case of high value). Accordingly, this
third configuration is highly atypical; Figure 3 depicts reality better and more generally.
31 In mathematical terms, dfldh = w at hL. In economic terms, the marginal fee equals
the opportunity cost at hL. For a proof of this, see Appendix B.
32 For example, at h = 8 hours, the settlement is $1460, the fee is $486.67, the oppor-
tunity cost to the lawyer is $400, and the lawyer's profit is $86.67. If the lawyer works one
more hour, the fee will increase by $53.33 to $540. Since the additional hour would cost
the lawyer only $50, it would serve his best interests to work that ninth hour.
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corresponding increase in the fee. 3 Thus, to serve his own best
interests, the lawyer should work hL hours, no more and no less.
To illustrate the lawyer's interests in a more intuitive fashion,
imagine the following situation. The client approaches lawyer A
with his case, and lawyer A agrees to take it on a contingent percent-
age basis. Rather than do the work himself, however, lawyer A
subcontracts the job to lawyer B with the client's consent. The two
lawyers agree that lawyer A will pay lawyer B a certain hourly fee of
$50 per hour, but that lawyer B will work just the number of hours
lawyer A directs. To serve his own best interests, lawyer A should
direct lawyer B to work 9 hours because the ninth is the last hour
for which he will realize at least the $50 he must pay lawyer B. The
ninth hour of work will cause lawyer A's fee to increase by $53.33,34
but the tenth hour would cause his fee to increase by only $46.67.35
Since lawyer A must pay lawyer B $50 for every hour the latter
works, lawyer A would have to pay the missing $3.33 for the tenth
hour out of the profit reaped from lawyer B's earlier hours.
Lawyer A could avoid this and achieve a maximum profit by direct-
ing lawyer B to stop work at 9 hours. At that point the client will
pay lawyer A $540. Lawyer A will then pay lawyer B $450, thus
reaping a profit of $90. Had lawyer A instructed lawyer B to work
10 hours, he would have reaped a profit of only $86.67. When
lawyer A does the work himself, his reasoning remains the same.
Therefore, he would be inclined to work 9 hours-hL hours-on
the case.
In sum, the client wishes the lawyer to work hc hours, a num-
ber greater than h*, but the lawyer is inclined to work hL hours, a
number less than h*. 36 The lawyer's and the client's economic in-
terests come into stark conflict. The lawyer who truly serves his
client must penalize himself; the self-interested lawyer underworks.
5. Performance of the Proposed Contingent Hourly-Percentage Fee
Our proposed solution to the alignment problem is the contin-
gent hourly-percentage fee. This proposed fee, paid only in the
'3 For example, at h = 10 hours, the settlement is $1760, the fee is $586.67, the oppor-
tunity cost to the lawyer is $500, and the lawyer's profit is $86.67. That extra hour of
lawyer's time had an opportunity cost of $50, but the fee increased by only $46.67 from its
ninth-hour level of $540. Therefore, it was not in the lawyer's best interests to have worked
that tenth hour.
34 See note 32 supra.
" See note 33 supra.
36 For the illustrative case depicted in Figure 3, hL = 9, h* = 12, and hc = 16. In all
cases, hL < h* < hc. For a proof of this, see Appendix B. Cf. note 26 supra.
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event of recovery,37 is the sum of two simple components: (1) the
lawyer's time charge for the hours devoted to the case, and (2) a
percentage of the amount by which the gross recovery exceeds that
time charge. Under the assumptions and terminology of the model,
the first component is equal to w times h, where again w is the
certain hourly wage and h is the number of hours worked. This
first component pays the lawyer for his time-that is, for his oppor-
tunities forgone. The second component is equal to some per-
centage (x) of s minus wh, where again s is the settlement. This
compensates the lawyer for those inevitable cases that will prove
unsuccessful. As we shall show, this second component aligns the
client's and the lawyer's economic interests. Any positive value of x
under 100% solves the alignment problem; 38 therefore, x may be
fixed by the market or may be regulated to serve any relevant
policy goals. 39 For illustrative purposes, we shall use a value of 10%
for x.
We can thus represent the proposed fee by the formula wh +
x (s - wh).' The reader can visualize it as a segregation of the con-
tingent lawyer's two functions: laborer and insurer. The lawyer
merits compensation not only for his time, but also for the risk he
allows his client to shift onto him by means of the contingency
aspect of the fee. The contingent percentage fee crudely lumps
payment for these two functions into a single percentage compo-
nent. The proposed fee separates payment for the dual functions
into two components, thus permitting rationalization of the fee
structure and solution of the alignment problem.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the proposed fee and
the number of hours worked. For each h, the height of the new fee
curve (fr-curve) represents the fee earned if settlement were then
consummated. As always, the client's net recovery is the difference
between the settlement and the fee. For example, if the lawyer
37 In the event of a recovery smaller than the computed fee, the client would not be
liable for the deficiency. We introduce this qualification to promote other policy concerns
(see text accompanying note 91 infra), not to induce economic alignment.
" For a proof, see Appendix C.
39 See text accompanying notes 175-83 infra.
40 Because the client is not liable for the deficiency when the computed fee exceeds the
recovery (see note 37 supra), this formula does not provide a full description of the pro-
posed fee. Nevertheless, to avoid unnecessary complications, we shall use this formula with-
out qualification in our subsequent calculations. Cf. note 30 supra. Such simplification will
affect our alignment analysis only when we enter the world of uncertainty. See text accom-
panying note 79 infra. Even there the effect will not be significant. See notes 272 & 289
infra. Cf notes 300 & 303 infra.
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works 10 hours, the settlement will be $1760, the lawyer's fee will
be $626,41 and the client will receive a net recovery of $1134.
The client's aim, by now familiar, is to choose the number of
lawyer's hours required to maximize his net recovery or, equiva-
lently, to maximize the vertical distance between the s-curve and the
f,-curve. That particular number of hours occurs at the point where
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the tangents to the s-curve and thefa-curve become parallel.42 This
condition occurs at h* hours, precisely the same number of hours
the client would have chosen under the certain hourly fee. 43 Turn-
ing to the illustrative case in Figure 4, we see that the point where
the client's interests are best served, h*, occurs at 12 hours under
the proposed fee. At that point, the settlement is $1920, the fee is
$732, and the client's net recovery reaches a maximum of $1188.
No other h would yield the client a larger net recovery.44 Thus, to
serve the client's best interests, the lawyer should work h* hours, no
more and no less.
The lawyer's economic interests finally align with his client's.
The lawyer still desires to work the number of hours required to
maximize his profit or, equivalently, to maximize the vertical dis-
tance between thefn-curve and the o-line. That particular number of
hours occurs at the point where the tangent to thefn-curve becomes
parallel to the o-line 45 but this condition is met at h* hours, pre-
cisely the same number of hours that would maximize the client's
net recovery under the proposed fee.46 In Figure 4, h* occurs at 12
hours. At that point, the fee is $732, the opportunity cost to the
lawyer is $600, and the lawyer's profit reaches a maximum at $132.
No other h would yield the lawyer a larger profit.4 7 Thus, to serve
his own best interests, the lawyer should work h* hours, no more
and no less.
In sum, the certain hourly fee leaves the client wanting the
lawyer to work h* hours and leaves the lawyer feeling indifferent.
Under the contingent percentage fee, the client wants the lawyer to
42 In mathematical terms, dsldh = dfldh at the client's optimal point. In economic terms,
the marginal settlement equals the marginal fee at that point. For a proof of this, see
Appendix C.
4 3 See text accompanying note 24 supra. For a proof, see Appendix C.
44 At h = 11 hours, the settlement is $1860, the fee is $681, and the client's net recov-
ery is $1179. At h = 13 hours, the settlement is $1960, the fee is $781, and the client's net
recovery again is $1179. These figures compare unfavorably with the client's $1188 net
recovery at h = 12 hours. Therefore, the client's best interests dictate that the lawyer work
beyond eleven hours, but that he settle before working the thirteenth hour.
45 In mathematical terms, dfldh = w at the lawyer's optimal point. In economic terms,
the marginal fee equals the opportunity cost at that point. For a proof of this, see Appen-
dix C.
46 Cf. note 26 supra. For a proof, see Appendix C.
47 Ath = I1 hours, the fee is $681, the opportunity cost to the lawyer is $550, and the
lawyer's profit is $131. At h = 13 hours, the fee is $781, the opportunity cost is $650, and
again the lawyer's profit is $131. These figures compare unfavorably with the lawyer's $132
profit at h = 12 hours. Therefore, the lawyer's best interests dictate that he work beyond
eleven hours, but that he settle before working the thirteenth hour.
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work at least hc hours, but the lawyer wishes to underwork at hL
hours. The proposed contingent hourly-percentage fee solves this
economic conflict of interest problem-the lawyer, prompted solely
by self-interest, is inclined to work the precise number of hours
that best serves his client.
B. Relaxing the Model's Assumptions
The discussion in Section A of Part II rests on an economic
model of the real world. Using the model's list of assumptions, we
showed that the proposed contingent hourly-percentage fee solves
the problem of economic conflict of interest by perfectly aligning
the interests of lawyer and client. We must now determine how
valid the conclusions of Section A remain when we return to the
real world by relaxing the four questionable assumptions of the
model.48
This task is forbidding, if not impossible. On the one hand, it
requires complete knowledge of the real world. On the other hand,
full analysis requires highly sophisticated tools, even if one takes
into account only those complexities of the real world that one can
perceive and comprehend.
Yet we must take a stab at the task, if our proposal is to be
more than an academic game. This exercise in relaxing assump-
tions also exposes the need and provides a vehicle for fleshing out
the structure of the proposed fee. Accordingly, we shall attempt
relaxation in a rough-and-ready way. Two tentative conclusions will
emerge: (1) alignment under the contingent hourly-percentage fee
is not perfect, but (2) this does not imply that reality diminishes the
proposed fee's superiority over the two present fee systems-in-
deed, certain complexities of the real world may even enhance our
fee's superiority.
1. Effects of the Lawyer's Workload-Relaxing Assumption (5)
The economic model rests on a two-part assumption concern-
ing the workload of the plaintiff's lawyer: (1) the lawyer has no idle
time, and (2) the time devoted to the plaintiff's case would other-
wise have been devoted to matters handled at the lawyer's certain
hourly wage. These dual assumptions are not entirely unrealistic.
Lawyers have an increasing amount of freedom to lower their fee
rates or otherwise to enhance their attractiveness to clients in order
to obtain enough work to keep themselves busy; also many per-
48 See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
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sonal-injury lawyers fill in their time with at least some work on a
certain hourly basis. 49 However, these assumptions will not always
hold true, so we must examine the effect that relaxing them has
on the conclusions of Section A. Such relaxation makes the pro-
posed fee even more attractive relative to the two present fee sys-
tems.
Consider the dual assumptions in reverse order. The assump-
tion that time devoted to the plaintiff's case would otherwise have
been devoted to certain hourly work, if devoted to any work at all,
is not at all essential to the analysis of Section A. We adopted it
simply for ease of expression, because it provided a readily express-
ible opportunity cost. If, as in the case of a pure personal-injury
specialist, the lawyer were giving up time that he would otherwise
devote to cases not on a certain hourly basis, an opportunity cost
would still exist, and would equal the effective hourly wage the
lawyer could earn by putting in additional work on those cases. 50
Once this opportunity cost is derived and w is set equal to it, the
analysis of Section A will lead to the same conclusions regarding
alignment.
The assumption that the lawyer has no idle time, on the other
hand, is quite important. It implied that there was some legal work,
on a certain hourly basis or otherwise, that the lawyer could do in
lieu of his work on the plaintiff's case. This assumption thus gave
each hour devoted to the plaintiff's case a positive opportunity
cost, to which w could be pegged. However, when the lawyer has
idle time-hours that he would like to fill with paying legal work
but cannot-the opportunity cost of legal work forgone drops to
zero. Only when the idle time is exhausted does opportunity cost
regain a positive value. Therefore, if idle time exists, we cannot
depict the opportunity cost line as we did in Figures 2, 3, and 4.
49 This certain hourly work tends to be the least remunerative (cf. note 177 infra);
thus, the lawyer would tend to give up this work as he devotes more time to the plaintiff's
case. Hence, the second part of the assumption remains realistic even when the lawyer's
certain hourly work constitutes only a minor portion of his workload.
"
0 See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1134 n.14, 1138 n.20. The lawyer distrib-
utes his time among all of his cases that are not on a certain hourly basis so as to equalize
his marginal expected fee on each. See note 84 infra. If he devoted an extra hour to the
plaintiff's case, he would cut back slightly on all his other such cases to maintain that
equality. That marginal expected fee, then, would be his opportunity cost. Since the cut-
back would be spread out among all of the lawyer's other such cases, this opportunity cost
would be virtually constant over the number of hours conceivably allocable to the plaintiff's
case. Thus, the o-line in Figures 2, 3, and 4 accurately depicts opportunity cost, and the
analysis of Section A remains unchanged. Cf. note 61 infra.
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Instead, if the lawyer has a certain number of hours (hi) of idle
time, we must shift the o-line to the right to show that the first hi
hours devoted to the client's case have an opportunity cost of zero.
Figure 5 illustrates the shift for hi equal to 8 hours. This shifting of
the o-line has no effect on the client's interests, since his goal is
simply to maximize the difference between the settlement and the
fee. But the lawyer's aim relates to his opportunity cost, so shifting
the o-line might affect his strategy.
To analyze this effect on the lawyer's strategy, we make three
preliminary points. First, a lawyer does not blindly fix some num-
ber of hours that he will devote each week to legal work, no matter
how small the pay. More realistically, we may presume that every
lawyer has a minimally acceptable hourly wage, a rate below which
he will not do legal work because he would be unable to cover his
variable costs, would find another job instead, or would prefer to
perfect his tennis game.51 Idle time, then, means those hours that
the lawyer would like to fill with legal work, but cannot fill with
work paying at least his minimally acceptable hourly wage.
Second, before the lawyer would tolerate idle time, he would
lower his certain hourly wage for new matters to this minimally
acceptable level, 52 and would then work all his certain hourly mat-
ters for as long as his conscience, the authorities, and his clients
allow. He would also work all of his other cases until his effective
hourly wage thereon decreased to his minimally acceptable hourly
wage.53 Presumably, idle time could exist only after the lawyer has
taken these steps.
" This can be viewed as the opportunity cost of forgoing doing something else, includ-
ing the possibility of doing nothing. To the extent that we are focusing on a broader range
of the lawyer's interests, rather than solely on his monetary desires, we are here also relax-
ing assumption (I). As depicted in Figure 5, the lawyer's minimally acceptable hourly wage
presumably would remain virtually constant over the number of hours conceivably alloca-
ble to the plaintiff's case. Cf. note 61 infra.
52 A lawyer might not lower his certain hourly wage all the way to the minimally ac-
ceptable level. Market imperfections like price fixing or advertising restrictions might pre-
vent such a strategy or prevent it from being effective in attracting business, or the lawyer
might find himself unable to price his new matters selectively. However, such an elevated
certain hourly wage will usually have no effect on the analysis of this Subsection, except to
make the lawyer even more inclined to overwork the plaintiff's case if taken under the
certain hourly fee. There are usually no other effects because the lawyer still will work
those cases not on a certain hourly basis until his effective hourly wage thereon decreases
to his minimally acceptable hourly wage; thus, once idle time has been consumed, the
opportunity cost of legal work forgone will still equal his minimally acceptable hourly wage.
If, however, the lawyer's workload other than the plaintiff's case is entirely on a certain
hourly basis, and that certain hourly wage has not fallen to the minimally acceptable level,
then we must resort to the more general analysis suggested in note 61 infra.
SS See note 50 supra.
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Third, after the lawyer has managed to occupy any idle time
that does exist, his opportunity cost of legal work forgone starts
climbing. It climbs at a rate equal to the wage earned on the
lawyer's least remunerative work--i.e., his minimally acceptable
hourly wage. Graphically, the o-line in Figure 5 begins to run paral-
lel to the minimally acceptable hourly wage line as soon as idle time
disappears. Thus, while idle time exists, the lawyer will not work
below his minimally acceptable hourly wage; the same is true after
idle time has been exhausted, because his opportunity cost then
equals that minimally acceptable hourly wage. Therefore, although
w should normally be equated to the lawyer's opportunity cost, in
the idle-time context w should be set equal to his minimally accept-
able hourly wage. Let us assume it is so set. We can now consider
the strategy of the lawyer with idle time under each of the three fee
systems. 54
If the lawyer has accepted the plaintiff's case on a certain
hourly basis with a wage w, he will be inclined to work at least until
he occupies all his idle time. Idle time, after all, means hours the
lawyer would like to fill with legal work paying at least his mini-
mally acceptable hourly wage. In graphic terms, the slope of the
fh-line exceeds the slope of the o-line until the lawyer works hi
54 For a more general approach to problems introduced by idle time, see note 61 infra.
Cf. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1145-47, 1161 (discussing effects of idle time
under administered wage).
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hours, because for values of h less than hi the slope of thefh-line is w
while that of the o-line is zero. This difference in slopes induces the
lawyer to work at least hi hours. After he has worked hi hours, the
lawyer will become indifferent to working additional hours, be-
cause for values of h greater than hi the fh-line and the o-line are
parallel. Thus, the lawyer will not become indifferent until he has
reduced his idle time to zero by working hi hours. If hi > h*, the
lawyer will be inclined to overwork relative to the client's best in-
terests.55 Indeed, hi may be so high that the lawyer would be in-
clined to work until his fee consumes the settlement or even until
the "victorious" client ends up owing his lawyer money.
This brings up an important, but somewhat parenthetical,
point: The lawyer's indifference under the certain hourly fee does
not survive relaxation of the model's assumptions. As just shown,
the idle lawyer has direct economic interests that sharply conflict
with those of his client. In the real world the lawyer's self-interest
will cause him to fall from the precarious point of indifference in
many other circumstances. For example, the overburdened lawyer
will be inclined to put in fewer than h* hours. Since the attorney
under the certain hourly fee does not get a piece of the action, he
will not inevitably devote each hour to its most efficient use; in-
stead, he may put off distasteful tasks. Similarly, the attorney will
have no direct economic incentive to work as diligently as he can.
His fee increases by the hour, not by what that hour produces. 56 In
short, indifference is a dream induced by the economic model;
returning to the real world shatters that dream. Therefore, when
choosing between the certain hourly fee and the proposed fee, one
chooses not between indifference and alignment but between mis-
alignment and alignment.57
Under the contingent percentage fee, the lawyer with idle time
will still be inclined to work to hL: the point where the lawyer's
55 Of course, the presence of idle time will cause a change in fee rates, so the actual
value of h* here does not necessarily equal the actual value of h* under conditions without
idle time. The same is true for hL. However, the analysis remains unaffected.
6 See text accompanying note 101 infra. Cf. note 20 supra & note 87 infra.
57 Here we are not speaking of lawyer-client misalignment with respect to interest in
outcome. Introduction of the complexities of the real world into the economic model will
likely induce alignment of their interests in outcome under the certain hourly fee, because
most conceivable noneconomic or indirect influences on the lawyer would push him to seek
victory regardless of the certainty of his fee. Thus, it is not the failure of the certain hourly
fee to create direct economic alignment with respect to interest in outcome that prompts us
to make our proposed fee contingent. Rather, our reasons flow from the other problems of
certainty of payment discussed in the text accompanying notes 91-98 infra.
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marginal fee-the slope of thefqr-curve-falls to w. 58 If hi < hL, the
lawyer will have no reason to stop work at hi hours because each
additional hour between hi and hL will pay him at a rate greater
than his opportunity cost. In other words, between hi and hL the
slope of thefq-curve is greater than w and hence greater than the
slope of the o-line, thus inducing the lawyer to work on to hL where
the slopes of thef.%-curve and the o-line become equal. But if hi />
hL, the lawyer will stop at hL, since beyond hL his marginal fee falls
below its minimally acceptable level, w. Thus, given idle time, the
lawyer will still be inclined to work hL hours, which is less than the
hc hours of work the client would wish.
Under the proposed contingent hourly-percentage fee, the
lawyer with idle time will still work to h*, which is the point where
the slope of thefn-curve equals w, and which is also the number of
hours the client would choose his lawyer to work.59 If hi < h*, the
slope of the f,-curve between hi and h* will be greater than w and
hence greater than the slope of the o-line, thus inducing the lawyer
to work on to h* where the slopes of the f 1-curve and the o-line
become equal. But if hi :> h*, the lawyer will stop at h*, since be-
yond h* his marginal fee falls below its minimally acceptable lev-
el, w. Thus, even given idle time, lawyer-client alignment remains
perfect.
In sum, introduction of idle time does nothing to weaken the
theoretical conclusions of Section A. In a comparative sense, the
presence of idle time increases the attractiveness of the proposed
fee over the certain hourly fee, without decreasing its alignment
superiority over the contingent percentage fee.
A final caveat is in order, however. The no-idle-time analysis
of Section A rests on the assumption that w in the proposed fee was
fixed precisely at the lawyer's opportunity cost. Similarly, the
foregoing idle-time analysis rests on the assumption that w in the
proposed fee was fixed precisely at the lawyer's minimally accept-
able hourly wage. We therefore stress that w in the proposed fee
should be set, as closely as possible, at the minimally acceptable
hourly wage for those lawyers with idle time or at the higher op-
portunity cost for those lawyers without idle time. However, such
precision rarely exists in real life. The lawyer may be arbitrary or
deluded in fixing w. 60 Indeed, if the relevant standard-minimally
58 Cf. text accompanying note 31 supra.
59 Cf. text accompanying note 46 supra.
60 Alternatively, the relevant standard-minimally acceptable hourly wage or opportu-
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acceptable hourly wage or opportunity cost-has a low actual value,
w will more likely be fixed too high. The proposed fee will misalign
the economic interests of lawyer and client to the extent that w is
not precisely fixed.61
2. Effects of Delay-Relaxing Assumption (2)
In the economic model, we assumed that the lawyer and the
client were indifferent to delay. Under this assumption, $1000
would be equally attractive whether received today or a year from
today; $1001 a year from today would be more attractive than
$1000 today. This assumption is obviously unrealistic. Money has a
time value-a dollar today is worth more than a dollar a year from
today, because one could invest that dollar. Moreover, the lawyer
and his client may differ in their attitudes toward delay and in their
access to the capital market.
The analysis in Section A justifiably ignored these complica-
tions, because the amount of time, h, that the lawyer might con-
ceivably spend on the plaintiffs case is so small that delay has only
imperceptible effects. The decision on whether to work one more
hour will not turn on the effects of delaying recovery by an hour's
work.
In Section A, however, we dealt with the question of how long
the lawyer will work on the case before recovering, not how long he
will wait before recovering. In other words, we inquired how much
nity cost-may not be a linear function of h, thereby precluding precision in fixing w. See
note 61 infra. Cf notes 50 & 51 supra.
61 For example, if w in the proposed fee is fixed above the relevant standard, the
lawyer will be inclined to overwork until the slope of the f-curve equals that relevant
standard. Conceivably, the lawyer could then work such a great number of hours that his
fee would consume the entire settlement. Cf. note 52 supra. If w is fixed below the relevant
standard, then the lawyer will be inclined to underwork.
Furthermore, the relevant standard might not be a linear function of h, but rather be
an ascending curve. Opportunity cost might be an ascending curve if the lawyer were
forced to give up increasingly lucrative work as he devoted more and more time to the
plaintiff's case. The minimally acceptable hourly wage might be an ascending curve if the
lawyer became less desperate as he made more and more money beyond his most basic
needs. An ascending curve would also result if a kink occurred at h, (where the relevant
standard shifts from minimally acceptable hourly wage to opportunity cost) because market
imperfections or other factors prevented opportunity cost from dropping to the minimally
acceptable hourly wage. See note 52 supra. In the event of such an ascending curve, if W is
set greater than the slope of the curve at h*, the lawyer will tend to overwork. If w is set
less than the slope of the curve at h*, the lawyer will tend to underwork. Of course, if the
value of the ascending curve as a function of h were known precisely, that value could
replace the wh terms in the formula for the proposed fee. Alignment under the proposed
fee would then remain perfect.
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of the lawyer's work will be invested in the case, not how that work
will be spread out over time. Only for the latter question-a distinct
kind of conflict between lawyer and client considered later 6 2-- do
the economic effects of delay become significant.
3. Effects of Other Costs-Relaxing Assumption (6)
The economic model ignores all costs except the cost of the
time of the plaintiff's lawyer. In reality, both the lawyer and his
client likely will incur various and substantial expenses during the
course of the case's life. These expenses complicate description and
analysis, but do not significantly affect the conclusions of Section A.
Client's expenses fall into two categories: (1) litigation expenses
that he will share with his lawyer, and (2) litigation expenses that
the client must bear alone.
The first category includes only those litigation expenses that
the lawyer deducts from the gross settlement before applying his
percentage to determine his fee. This method of computation
means that the lawyer contributes to those expenses in proportion
to his percentage. 63 The lawyer-client contract generally deter-
mines when this method will apply, but the category might include
such items as filing fees, expenses of investigation and medical
examination, witness fees, printing and duplicating costs, and com-
munication and travel disbursements. Graphically, first-category
expenses shift downward and reshape the s-curve. But the s-curve
affecting the lawyer's interests undergoes the same change as the
one affecting the client's interests, so they remain one and the
same. Consequently, the conclusions of Section A regarding align-
ment would suffer no effect if we made these first-category ex-
penses a part of the model.
There is a lesson here regarding the operation of the proposed
fee: To the extent feasible, all litigation expenses that fall on the
client or that will be shifted to him should be treated in the above
manner. Certainly, the lawyer should have to deduct from the
gross settlement all his disbursements chargeable to the client before
62 See text accompanying notes 144-46 infra; note 165 and accompanying text infra.
63 See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 66-67; note 3 supra. By our definition, the first
category of expenses exists only under fee structures with a percentage component. Under
the usual lawyer-client contract providing for a certain hourly fee, either the client or the
lawyer alone assumes each expense. If the lawyer-client contract, on a certain hourly basis
or otherwise, provides for some idiosyncratic fractional sharing of expenses, then the frac-
tions can simply be viewed as two distinct expenses, with the client bearing one alone and
the lawyer bearing the other alone.
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he calculates his fee. 64 This will help to preserve the proposed fee's
alignment.
In the second category of client's expenses-those that he will
not share with his lawyer-fall all his other litigation expenses.
These include most prominently the cost of the client's time con-
sumed by the litigation process, but likely also include the client's
transportation costs, child-care expenses, and so forth. We can
divide this second category into two groups: (1) fixed costs, and (2)
costs that vary with h. Costs in the first group are lump-sum ex-
penditures that the client must make to press his claim. Such ex-
penses have no effect on the conclusions of Section A; they shift
the client's s-curve down, but leave its shape unaltered. The second
group, however, not only shifts the client's s-curve down but also
flattens it out. The presence of such expenses therefore encourages
the client to settle sooner than under the expense-free model.
To summarize regarding client's expenses, only those litigation
expenses that fall solely on the client and that vary with h affect the
alignment conclusions of Section A. Such expenses incline the
client to settle sooner, regardless of the fee structure.
Relevant lawyer's expenses fall into three categories: (1) busi-
ness expenses in the nature of overhead that are not related to any
particular case, (2) litigation expenses linked to the plaintiff's case
that the lawyer will share with the plaintiff, and (3) litigation ex-
penses linked to the plaintiff's case that the lawyer must bear alone.
The first category includes rent, utilities, library costs, and the
like. Because these expenses lower the net fee on all matters that
the lawyer handles, they have no effect on the conclusions of Sec-
tion A. Graphically, these expenses have the same downward effect
on both the opportunity cost line and the fee curve, so the lawyer's
strategy remains unchanged-he will work the same number of
hours as in the expense-free model.
The second category of lawyer's expenses reshapes in the same
manner the relevant s-curve for both lawyer and client. As ex-
64Cf N.Y. APP. Div. R. 603.7(e)(3) (1st Dep't) (listing items attorney should deduct
and should not deduct from gross recovery before applying percentage); D. ROSENTHAL,
supra note 2, at 108 (attorney may transfer some expenses to client, but should deduct
them from gross recovery before calculating fee); Columbia Study, supra note 2, at 23 &
n.109 (discussing view that attorney should deduct expenses from gross recovery before
calculating fee so that fee constitutes fraction of benefit received by client). The lesson here
is not a surprising one. It is obvious that to preserve alignment such expenses should be
treated in the same manner as is the lawyer's time charge-i.e., they should be deducted
before application of the percentage.
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plained above, this leaves the alignment conclusions of Section A
unaffected. 65
In the third category of lawyer's expenses-those linked to the
plaintiff's case that the lawyer must bear alone-fall all his other
litigation expenses. These include most prominently salaries of
employees (secretaries and paraprofessionals 66) working on the
case, but likely also include office supplies and similar incidental
expenses. We can divide this third category into two groups: (1)
fixed costs, and (2) costs that vary with h. The first group has no
effect on the conclusions of Section A, because such expenses
merely shift the fee curve down without altering its shape. 67 The
65 See text accompanying note 63 supra. This Subsection still deals with a world of
certainty. When we shift into a world of uncertainty (see text accompanying note 79 infra),
the risk arises that recovery might be insufficient to cover this second category of expenses.
One must then consider the practice of lawyers in contingent fee cases of advancing these
expenses but not collecting them from the unsuccessful client. See note 3 supra. To the
extent of that risk, these expenses thus become third-category lawyer's expenses for con-
tingent fee lawyers.
66 In a law office, associates' salaries can be treated just as are secretarial expenses if the
associates' services are not separately billed. However, under hourly fees, the more com-
mon practice is to bill for the hours spent by each lawyer, associate or partner. See M.
MAYER, supra note 4, at 20. Cf. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1333 (1975) (attorney may bill time of unadmitted law clerk if
client acquainted with legal limitations on clerk's scope of responsibilities). If associates' (or
even paraprofessionals') time is so billed, it is better to view the expense as an aspect of a
more general problem: What happens when two or more lawyers work together on the
plaintiff's case-i.e., when we move from the world of the sole practitioner to the world of
the law firm?
Under this more general analysis, we need not distinguish associates from partners. If
a firm has n lawyers working on a case, it wants to maximize the difference between the
fee and the accumulated opportunity cost to the firm of the n lawyers' time. That the firm
comprises associates as well as partners merely affects how the fee is split up, not the firm's
work strategy. Analysis of that work strategy takes us into n-space, forcing us to leave
behind our two-dimensional graphs. Nevertheless, given the assumptions of the economic
model, an n-space analysis yields the same results: The law firm would be indifferent to the
number of hours each lawyer works under the certain hourly fee; the law firm would
underwork under the contingent percentage fee; and the interests of the firm and the
client (not only with respect to total number of hours worked, but also with respect to
number of hours worked by each lawyer) would align under the proposed fee. For a proof
of this, see Appendix D.
The proposed fee in the law firm setting would be wlh, + w2 h2 + . + w~h, + x(s -
w1 h, - w2h2 - -... w,), where wk and hk are, respectively, the hourly billing rate of and
the hours worked by lawyer k.
67 The textual discussion in this Subsection does not treat each fee system separately,
because expenses tend to affect the analysis for all three fee systems similarly. But see notes
63 & 65 supra. There is, however, one important distinction. Under the certain hourly fee,
the lawyer can recoup his fixed expenses only by increasing the hourly wage. By this
method alone can the lawyer ever move from his deficit position back to his opportunity
cost line. Increasing the hourly wage, however, will give thefh-line a steeper slope than the
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second group, however, not only shifts the fee curve down but also
flattens it out. To analyze this effect, we must divide the costs that
vary with h into two subgroups: (1) variable costs typical of such
variable costs incurred in the lawyer's other work, and (2) atypical
variable costs. The former subgroup does not affect Section A's
conclusions, because the opportunity cost line and the fee curve
undergo the same changes.68 The latter subgroup, however, does
have an impact: If the plaintiff's case presents atypically light vari-
able costs, the lawyer will be inclined to work more hours than
under the expense-free model; if the variable costs are atypically
heavy, the lawyer will be inclined to work fewer hours.
One particular kind of lawyer's expense-the forwarding
fee-merits special mention. Lawyers in the personal-injury field
often receive cases through referral. As a matter of professional
responsibility, the forwarding lawyer may share in any eventual fee
only "in proportion to the services performed and responsibility
assumed" by him.6 9 In practice, however, a forwarding lawyer who
has done virtually nothing commonly receives between one-fourth
and one-half of the total fee.70 If the forwarding fee is a set dollar
figure, then it is a fixed cost borne by the working lawyer and, as
just shown, will not affect the conclusions of Section A. If, on the
other hand, the forwarding fee is a fraction of the total fee, then it
is an atypically heavy variable cost and will incline the lawyer to
work fewer hours. 71 Nevertheless, this tendency to work less is not
o-line, which in turn will influence the certain hourly lawyer to overwork relative to his
client's best interests. Therefore, strictly speaking, the statement in the text-that fixed
costs borne by the lawyer do not affect the conclusions of Section A-is true only for the
proposed fee and the contingent percentage fee.
68 Cf. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1156 n.AI (assuming that "out-of-pocket
costs ... occur in a fixed relationship to lawyer manhours").
69 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(2). But cf. note 140 infra.
7 1 See M. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 143-46; J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHIcs 200 (1966); F.
MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 180-81; D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at 99-100; Columbia
Study, supra note 2, at 13, 27; Grady, supra note 5, at 22-23; Special Subcomm. of Defense
Research Comm., supra note 3, at 206-08.
1 If the forwarding lawyer is to receive a fraction (y) of the fee ), the working lawyer
will keep only (1 - y)f. So instead of working until dfldh = w, the working lawyer will stop
when dfldh = wl(l - y). Since y < 1, we know that wI(1 - y) > w. Therefore, under the
contingent percentage fee the lawyer will work fewer than hL hours, and under the pro-
posed fee the lawyer will work fewer than h* hours. However, this tendency to underwork
will be offset to the extent that the working lawyer charges higher fee rates for referred
cases than for non-referred cases. See Columbia Study, supra note 2, at 27-28. Fractional
forwarding fees apparently are not common in certain hourly cases (see sources cited note
70 supra); if used, they would incline the lawyer to underwork to the point of refusing the
case. However, if he could increase his certain hourly wage to wI(1 - y), the lawyer would
again become indifferent to number of hours worked.
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an important concern here because, as we shall later show, the
proposed fee discourages forwarding fees.7 2
To summarize regarding lawyer's expenses, only those ex-
penses that (1) are linked to the plaintiff's case, (2) are borne solely
by the lawyer, (3) are variable with h, and (4) are atypical in relation
to such variable expenses incurred in the lawyer's other work affect
the alignment conclusions of Section A. When we speak generally
about fee systems, we must assume that the expenses for any par-
ticular plaintiff's case will be typical. 3 Therefore, we can conclude
that lawyer's expenses do not affect the alignment conclusions of
Section A.
In the final analysis, introduction of costs other than the
lawyer's time has only this small effect: To the extent that the client
incurs variable costs that he must bear alone, the client will be
inclined to settle sooner. This slightly disturbs the lawyer-client
alignment under the proposed fee, leaving the lawyer inclined to
overwork relative to his client's best interests. An offsetting effect,
however, will appear upon introduction of uncertainty into the
model, the effects of which we consider next.
4. Effects of Uncertainty-Relaxing Assumption (3)
Up to now the economic model has represented a world where
the plaintiff's lawyer could operate free from all uncertainties. This
implied a risk-free7 4 economic environment in which the lawyer
eventually settled in the plaintiff's favor every case taken on.7 5 In
the real world, of course, some cases-but not many-result in little
or no recovery. Ordinarily, the plaintiff's lawyer can make a fairly
good estimate of a case's value; accordingly, the overwhelming
72 See note 163 infra. Indeed, since fractional forwarding fees prevail only under the
contingent percentage fee and since they tend to make the lawyer work fewer than hL hours,
the inclusion of forwarding fees in the economic model reinforces the conclusions of Sec-
tion A regarding alignment.
73 The only other plausible assumption regarding work done under the proposed fee
is that expenses will be slightly heavier than those incurred in the lawyer's other work. One
might base this assumption on the extra expenses the lawyer bears in an unsuccessful suit
(see note 65 supra) or on any forwarding fees paid (but see text accompanying note 72 supra;
note 163 infra). Under this assumption, the lawyer would tend to work fewer hours. This
inclination would offset the effect of client's expenses, thus tending to restore the perfect
alignment of lawyer's and client's interests under the proposed fee.
74 Some economists draw a distinction between the terms "risk" and "uncertainty." See
W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIc THEORY AND OPERATIONs ANALYSis 574 (3d ed. 1972). We use the
two terms interchangeably, however, to refer to situations where the outcome is not certain
but where the probabilities of the possible outcomes can at least be estimated.
7
' See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
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majority of his cases conclude with a settlement in the plaintiff's
favor. 6 The assumption of certainty is thus not entirely unrealistic.
Moreover, although the model assumed certainty, we did not con-
struct the proposed fee on that assumption. We took into account
the real world's inevitable element of uncertainty in two ways. First,
we protected the client from uncertainty by making the proposed
fee contingent. Second, we protected the lawyer from uncertainty
by including the percentage component of the proposed fee, which
serves to compensate him for his unsuccessful cases. Therefore,
introduction of uncertainty is unlikely to invalidate the conclusions
of Section A or to destroy the proposed fee.
To say more than that, however, requires detailed analysis and
significant alterations in the modeling process." As a starting
point, we must recognize that the model involved three key ele-
ments of certainty. First, the plaintiff's lawyer knew that the de-
fendant would be continually willing to settle. Second, the lawyer
knew in advance the precise amount that the defendant would be
willing to offer in settlement at any particular time. Third, the
lawyer knew that such amount would at least ultimately be accept-
able to him and his client.7 8 When these three elements of certainty
disappear, the lawyer who has accepted a case 79 faces a much
76 See M. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 141-42; R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN
NEW YORK CITY? 51, 106 (1962); M. MAYER, supra note 4, at 253-54; D. ROSENTHAL, supra
note 2, at 58-59; H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT 179 (1970); Columbia Study, supra note 2,
at 10-11, 13-14; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 35 & n.14 (1972);
Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1147-49. Researchers estimate that 98% of all
personal-injury cases in which the plaintiff engages a lawyer are settled (89% are settled
with plaintiff receiving payment, 9% with no payment), and that 2% go to judgment (with
plaintiff and defendant enjoying approximately equal success). This means that the plain-
tiff obtains a recovery in 90% of all such cases. See, e.g., Columbia Study, supra note 2, at
10-11, 13-14. Cf. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1155 n.45 (excluding death cases,
only about 6% of all personal-injury claims with some objective economic loss are settled
for less than that loss, and less than 4% result in no recovery). But cf. Dietz, Baird, &
Berul, supra note 2, at 103-04 (settlement and recovery rates lower in medical malpractice
cases).
77 Unaltered, the modeling scheme of Section A permits only a partial relaxation of
the certainty assumption. See, e.g., Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1147-54.
78 The model involved a fourth element of certainty: The amount offered by the de-
fendant was independent of the lawyer-plaintiff fee structure. We made this assumption
simply for ease of comparison as we shifted from fee to fee. For each particular fee, how-
ever, the conclusion concerning alignment obviously did not rest on this assumption.
Hence, relaxation of this assumption would not affect those conclusions of Section A; only
the particular number of hours that the client would choose and the particular number of
hours that the lawyer would be inclined to choose would change, not the degree to which
their choices aligned. Cf. note 206 infra.
79 We address the question of which cases a lawyer will accept under the various fee
systems in the text accompanying notes 189-96 infra.
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cloudier future. He is unsure how high the settlement offers will
be; indeed, he is unsure that he will receive any positive settlement
offers at all. After beginning to work on the case, he somehow
must decide when he has worked enough.
To analyze how he will make this decision, we must further
recognize that at any given time one of two possible situations will
prevail: either (1) he will have in hand a settlement offer minimally
acceptable to his client or to him,80 thus forcing a decision on
whether to accept it or to reject it and work on, or (2) he will not
have such an offer in hand.
Up to now we have been considering whether the lawyer will
be economically inclined to work the number of hours that best
serves his client. In situation (1), we can rephrase this question as
whether the lawyer's and the client's thresholds for acceptance of
settlement offers coincide.81 If they do coincide, the lawyer will
80 The minimum amount a plaintiff or his lawyer is willing to consider in settlement at
any given time is governed by a complex set of factors, prominently including that person's
current estimates of (1) the plaintiff's probability of recovery after trial, (2) the expected
size of the plaintiff's recovery, if any, after trial, and (3) that person's expected further
costs of litigating through trial. See note 84 infra. A more sophisticated, but basically simi-
lar, decision process would take into account current estimates of probability of an appeal,
expected outcome on appeal, and expected costs of appeal. By weighing these factors, the
person in question-the plaintiff or his lawyer-can determine whether he prefers to ac-
cept a given settlement offer rather than go to judgment. If so, we say that the offer is
'.minimally acceptable" to that person, and it may indeed be the offer he would choose to
accept. Cf. note 81 infra.
The plaintiff's subjective estimate of any particular factor might, of course, differ from
the corresponding subjective estimate of his lawyer. No fee structure can ensure that the
estimates of lawyer and client will coincide, or take into account the reasons for and the
degree of any differences. Nor is that related to our aim here. We seek to minimize built-in
economic conflict of interest, not difference of opinion--our concern in Part II is whether
the lawyer will be inclined to work for the client's economic best interests, not whether the
lawyer will necessarily follow the dictates of what the client thinks are his economic best
interests. Accordingly, we assume here that the plaintiff and his lawyer agree on their
estimates (which is not unlikely, given that the client gets most of his information from his
lawyer, who will try to convince his client of the soundness of the lawyer's estimates) or,
alternatively, that the lawyer's estimates are in fact sounder than the plaintiff's (which is
also not unlikely, given the lawyer's usually greater knowledge and objectivity). In this
Subsection, then, we shall narrow our consideration to that set of estimates of probabilities
and expected values arrived at by the lawyer.
Minimal acceptability also turns on the plaintiff's and his lawyer's attitudes toward risk
and litigation. We consider attitudes toward risk in note 86 and accompanying text infra.
No fee structure can take into account the plaintiff's or his lawyer's attitudes toward
litigation-traits such as vindictiveness, litigiousness, the desire to keep the insurance com-
pany honest, and their opposites. Nor is that our aim here. Accordingly, we assume that
such attitudes toward litigation are neutral.
"I We must distinguish two questions relating to settlement offers. One is whether a
given settlement offer is minimally acceptable; the other is whether the given offer would
HeinOnline -- 63 Cornell L. Rev. 563 1977-78
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tend to work as long as his client's interests dictate; if not, the
lawyer will tend either to underwork or to overwork relative to his
client's best interests.
To put this situation into the graphic terms we have used thus
far, we must convert the s-curve into a series of discrete points
representing settlement offers actually received at time h that were
then minimally acceptable to either the lawyer or his client. At each
new point the lawyer and, theoretically, his client8 2 must decide
whether to accept that offer or to work on, taking into account the
uncertainty as to the existence and size of the next minimally ac-
ceptable offer. The crucial question is to what extent their decisions
are in agreement.
Assuming that the lawyer and his client are risk-neutral,8 3 we
can derive and compare the thresholds of acceptance for the
lawyer and the client under the various fee systems. The lawyer
would be inclined to accept any settlement offer that causes his
profit to equal or exceed the expected value8 4 of his profit at
higher values of h; the client would want to accept any settlement
offer that causes his net recovery to equal or exceed his expected
net recovery at higher values of h. We can show that although the
lawyer's and the client's thresholds of acceptance do not precisely
coincide under the proposed fee (the lawyer having the lower
threshold), their thresholds coincide more closely there than under
the two present fee systems.85 In practical terms, under the pro-
actually be accepted. We discuss the first question-the threshold of "minimal accept-
ability"-in note 80 supra; the answer results from comparing the offer with the option of
going to judgment. The answer to the second question-the threshold of "acceptance"--
results from comparing the offer with the option of taking one's chances on future offers.
See text accompanying note 84 infra.
s2 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7, 7-8.
83 A risk-neutral person treats expected values (see note 84 infra) as though they were
certain values. For example, given the choice between a 50% chance of winning $100 and
the certain receipt of $50, a risk-neutral person would be indifferent. A risk-averse person,
on the other hand, would prefer the certain $50; he would require a larger expected value,
say $60, to bring him to indifference between that and a certain $50. The $10 excess is
called a "risk premium" and serves to compensate the risk-averter for taking the risk in-
volved.
84 The term "expected value" as used in this Article is a technical term from the theory
of probability. It means, in effect, that the value is discounted according to its probability
of occurring. For example, if there is a 90% chance of recovering $1000 and a 10%
chance of recovering nothing, the expected value of the recovery is $900. More generally,
if a quantity z can take on a set of possible values z,, z2 ..... z., where n is a positive integer,
and if the probability that z will take on each of these values is Pl, P2 .... P,, then the
expected value of z, or E(z), is pz, + p z2 + "'" + pz. For a still broader definition of ex-
pected value, see note 267 infra.
85 For a proof, see Appendix E.
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posed fee and in a world of uncertainty, the lawyer will tend to
settle somewhat sooner than would be ideal-he will be inclined to
underwork relative to his client's best interests.
If we adopt the more realistic assumption that the lawyer is
risk-neutral and that his client is somewhat risk-averse, the client's
threshold of acceptance shifts downward, tending to bring the
lawyer's and the client's thresholds of acceptance under the pro-
posed fee back toward coincidence. 86 In practical terms, under the
proposed fee and in a world of uncertainty, the risk-averse client
will want to settle sooner than the risk-neutral client. Thus, the
"underworking" lawyer under the proposed fee might in fact be
serving well his risk-averse client.
In situation (2), no settlement offer minimally acceptable to
either the plaintiff or his lawyer is in hand. Perhaps they have not
yet received any such offer; perhaps they have received one or
more such offers, but have rejected them. In either event, the law-
yer must continue to work.8 7 If the defendant later makes a settle-
86 Introduction of attitudes toward risk precludes precision, because such attitudes are
intangible and completely individualized. We must nevertheless consider them. In a world
of uncertainty, risk attitudes, will certainly affect client and lawyer behavior. The lawyer
and the client will seek to maximize a broader range of interests, taking into account risk
attitudes as well as monetary desires. (To this extent, then, we are here also relaxing as-
sumption (1).) See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1162.
In the context of our present discussion, risk-aversion means that a person will not
reject a settlement offer unless his expected profit (or net recovery) at some higher value
of h exceeds the sum of his profit (or net recovery) under the offer plus some risk pre-
mium. This lowers the threshold of acceptance and causes the person to wish to settle at a
lower value of h than would a risk-neutral person. Cf. id. at 1149-50, 1153, 1161-62
(analogous risk analysis).
In the real world, we can expect the lawyer to be virtually risk-neutral. If he is work-
ing for a certain fee and has taken steps to assure payment regardless of outcome, he will
incur almost no risk. If he is working for a contingent fee and handles a substantial
number of cases, he will tend to be risk-neutral because he can spread the risk. See id. at
1150-51, 1153; text accompanying note 94 infra. The client, on the other hand, will tend to
be somewhat risk-averse. See note 92 infra. Generally, under a contingent arrangement the
client will exhibit less risk-aversion than under a certain fee, because a contingent fee per-
mits the client to shift some of the risk of loss to his lawyer. See text accompanying note 94
infra. Cf. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1150 ("The contingent [percentage] fee
narrows the range of fluctuation in net settlement value by eliminating the chance of nega-
tive net settlement and by trimming the client's share of an unexpectedly high settle-
ment.").
Thus, given the assumption of a risk-neutral lawyer and a somewhat risk-averse client,
we can state in the text that the lawyer's and the client's thresholds of acceptance converge.
However, if the client is highly risk-averse, or if the lawyer is risk-averse, or if either
exhibits risk-preference, then the statement in the text no longer holds true and the mis-
alignment could be exaggerated.
17 After comparing the probability of eventual settlement with the probability of going to
judgment, the lawyer would tend to direct his efforts so that each additional hour brings
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ment offer minimally acceptable to either the client or the lawyer,
the foregoing analysis becomes applicable. This leaves only the
scenario in which no such settlement offer is in hand and no such
settlement offer is later received. The question in this event be-
comes whether, in going to judgment, the lawyer will be economi-
cally inclined to work the number of hours that best serves his
client.
Once again, although the lawyer's and the client's interests in
the number of hours to be worked do not align perfectly under the
proposed fee, the alignment there does not seem to compare un-
favorably with the alignment under the two present fee systems.88
At any rate, the proposed fee's performance with respect to align-
ment in this judgment setting does not have major significance.
This setting encompasses only 2% of all personal-injury cases that
lawyers handle; the other 98% result in settlement.8 9
In sum, after the introduction of uncertainty the proposed fee
no longer perfectly aligns the economic interests of lawyer and
client, but it still substantially improves upon the two present fee
systems. Uncertainty generally causes the lawyer who operates
under the proposed fee to underwork somewhat. But the client's
expenses and his risk-aversion offset this effect by disposing the
client to desire fewer lawyer's hours. Admittedly, this comparison
of effects is gross, but we find it significant that the various effects
are offsetting rather than cumulative. Thus, after relaxation of the
model's assumptions, the proposed fee survives; it still aligns the
economic interests of lawyer and client significantly better than the
certain hourly fee or the contingent percentage fee.
III
OTHER PROBLEMS OF PRESENT FEE SYSTEMS
Part II demonstrated that the proposed contingent hourly-
percentage fee largely solves one important problem common to
the maximum possible increment in the expected value of the recovery. Cf. note 20 & text
accompanying note 56 supra; text accompanying note 101 infra.
88 For a proof, see Appendix F.
" See note 76 supra. Furthermore, the visibility of the courtroom probably counteracts
any economic conflict of interest that may theoretically exist here. The lawyer is less likely
to pursue his own interests out in the open than to do so behind the scenes during the
settlement process. Lastly, in all candor, we have now reached a rather rarefied level of
analysis. In the judgment setting, we are calling on the decisionmaker to compare two
uncertain, multicomponent quantities. Such a decision process has largely forsaken ver-
isimilitude and has surpassed the capabilities of even those decisionmakers willing to
employ it. Thus, the conclusions of Appendix F, even if unambiguous, would not likely be
significant or particularly reliable.
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both the certain hourly fee and the contingent percentage fee: the
problem of economic conflict of interest between lawyer and client.
Each of the two polar fee systems, however, has other serious
drawbacks that merit consideration.9"
A. Problems of the Certain Hourly Fee
1. Problems Due to the Certain Nature of the Fee
The principal problem associated with requiring payment of a
fee regardless of outcome is that the fee may preclude access to the
legal system by the poor.91 Every potential litigation involves the
risk that the recovery will be insufficient to offset the costs of litiga-
tion, including the expensive investment in lawyer's time. When
payment of the lawyer's fee is on a certain basis, the client bears the
entire risk of such a loss. The poor litigant may be reluctant to bear
that risk. 92 Moreover, the lawyer wants assurance of payment be-
fore he performs his services. 93 The poor litigant, even if willing to
bear the risk of loss, will probably be unable to provide that assur-
ance. In contrast, a contingent fee provides the client a convenient
means of shifting some of the risk of loss to the lawyer and of
obtaining legal services without assurance of payment. The contin-
gent fee lawyer charges a premium to cover the attendant costs;
over the long run his successful cases will compensate him for his
unsuccessful ones.94 Thus, a fee system on a contingent rather than
a certain basis is better suited to offering lower-income groups
access to legal services.
Another problem frequently attributed to a certain fee is the
plaintiff's possible dissatisfaction with having to pay his lawyer for
9o In Part IV, we shall determine to what extent the contingent hourly-percentage fee
solves or minimizes these drawbacks. See text accompanying notes 157-70 infra.
91 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20, 2-24, 5-7; Corboy, Contin-
gent Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse Door, LITIGATION, Summer 1976, at 27, 27-29,
34-35; Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 587, 589 (1940); Youngwood,
The Contingent Fee-A Reasonable Alternative?, 28 MOD. L. Rv. 330, 334 (1965); Comment,
supra note 4, at 330-32.
92 Poor litigants are not the only ones who hesitate to risk paying a certain fee for a
losing case; even many who can afford to pay a lawyer are risk-averse in the litigation
setting. See R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, supra note 76, at 105-06; note 86 supra. There-
fore, the argument in the text regarding access to legal services extends beyond the poor to
risk-averse litigants in general.
9 3 See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 21.
94 Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B)(8) (whether fee is
fixed or contingent should serve as guide in proving its reasonableness); F. MAcKINNON,
supra note 1, at 182-83 (discussing fairness of overcharging some clients to offset under-
charges to others); note 86 supra.
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a losing effort. 95 The notion that the lawyer guarantees only rep-
resentation and not a particular .outcome may not temper the
client's sensation of inequity. Indeed, the suspicion that the cer-
tainty of the lawyer's fee resulted in indifferent representation by
the lawyer may intensify this sensation of inequity. To the extent
that our legal system sees party satisfaction as a goal,96 this problem
is a serious one. Here again a contingent arrangement has a rela-
tive advantage: 97 Conditioning payment on outcome increases client
satisfaction.9"
2. Problems Due to the Hourly Nature of the Fee
Since the size of an hourly fee depends on the number of
hours the lawyer has devoted to the case, the lawyer working under
this type of fee has the burden of keeping careful records.99 More
importantly, an hourly fee entails the risk that an unscrupulous
lawyer will charge his client for more hours than he actually
worked, because the client has no foolproof way to verify the time
claimed by the lawyer. The relative advantage of a percentage fee
is that the number of hours is irrelevant in computing the fee.
Another shortcoming of an hourly fee is that it measures im-
See R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, supra note 76, at 49.
9 See C. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW 3-4 (1954).
'7See Radin, supra note 91, at 587; Comment, supra note 4, at 340 n.56. But see id. at
339 n.53:
These [contingent] contracts debase the profession by valuing successful services
only, and equate successful outcome with successful practice. The contingent fee
. . . ignores the duty of the bar to educate the public that the right to a day in
court is worth something, even if the cause is itself lost.
9' This listing of real and alleged problems of the two polar fee systems is not exhaus-
tive. Instead, we limit our focus to the more serious drawbacks and the more frequently
voiced attacks. For example, we have omitted from the textual discussion of problems due
to the certain nature of the certain hourly fee the argument that "[t]he contingent fee is
the only way for a young attorney to get a start. Until he has a reputation as a successful
attorney, retainer clients will go elsewhere." Comment, supra note 4, at 340 n.56. A certain
fee may also entail collection difficulties when there is no recovery, leading to unseemly fee
disputes between lawyer and client. See id. Another problem is that a certain fee dis-
courages potential plaintiffs from seeking legal advice and from seeking it early, when it
can be most useful and effective. See Hughes, The Contingent Fee Contract in Massachusetts,
43 B.U.L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1963); Youngwood, supra note 91, at 333. Finally, other problems
of a certain fee are suggested in note 92 supra and by negative implication in text accom-
panying notes 112, 124, & 128 infra.
99 On the other hand, it is desirable always to have time records kept so that the client
and the authorities could know how much time the lawyer has spent. See Grady, supra note
5, at 21. Indeed, compulsory time records may even be to the lawyer's advantage, since this
might increase the efficiency of his operation. See M. PIRSIG & K. KIRWIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 269 n.13 (3d ed. 1976).
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perfectly the value of the legal services rendered. 0 0 This leads to
problems associated with undervaluation and overvaluation: The
lawyer may receive no reward for displays of exceptional profes-
sional ability, or the client may have to pay far more than the worth
of legal services rendered. Undervaluation results in a lack of di-
rect economic incentive for the lawyer to work as diligently and
efficiently as possible. 10' Overvaluation becomes most obviously
acute when the hours mount and the fee grows so large that it
approaches or even exceeds the size of the recovery; because the
lawyer operating under an hourly fee has no direct economic in-
centive to work the number of hours demanded by the client's best
interests,' 0 2 the possibility of a disproportionately large hourly fee
is quite real. Contrast a percentage fee. Although plagued with
even greater measurement imperfections, 0 3 a percentage fee does
take into account an element of the value of legal services that an
hourly fee ignores: results obtained.' 0 4 Thus, a lawyer working for
a percentage will dependably make every hour he works count
most effectively in terms of recovery. Moreover, a percentage fee
by definition can never consume the client's recovery.' 0 5
B. Problems of the Contingent Percentage Fee
1. Problems Due to the Contingent Nature of the Fee
One problem of a contingent fee is that it might lead to over-
reaching by the lawyer in setting the fee.'0 6 When the fee is set in
advance and made contingent upon recovery, a promise to pay a
sizable fee may not seem unreasonable to the eager and inexperi-
enced plaintiff. A certain fee has the relative advantage of en-
couraging greater client attentiveness and assertiveness when the
fee is set.
Another common objection to a contingent fee is that it gives
100 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B); F. MACKINNON, supra
note 1, at 19.101 See text accompanying note 56 supra. Cf. notes 20 & 87 supra.
102 See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
103 See text accompanying notes 130-43 infra.
10 4 See Hughes, supra note 98, at 13. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY DR 2-106(B)(4). But cf. note 7 supra.
105 Here again the list is not exhaustive. Among other possible problems of an hourly
fee are those suggested in note 147 infra and by negative implication in note 143 and text
accompanying note 149 infra.
106 See Youngwood, supra note 91, at 333; Comment, supra note 4, at 339 n.53. But see
Corboy, supra note 91, at 33.
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the lawyer a speculative interest in the claim. This objection has
deep historical roots,'0 7 but more recently it has come to rest on
arguments that the speculative nature of the lawyer's interest is
inconsistent with professional detachment and that this converts
lawyering from a profession into a mere business.10 8 Real problems
nestle in these somewhat rhetorical arguments. The lawyer's
economic interest in the outcome may tempt him to use improper
tactics for ensuring victory and to slight his duties as an officer of
the court; further, the lawyer may find himself unable to act disin-
terestedly in advising his client and unwilling to allow client par-
ticipation in controlling the lawsuit. 0 9 In other words, when one
shifts from the lawyer's theoretical indifference concerning out-
come under a certain fee to alignment of the lawyer's and the
client's direct economic interests in outcome under a contingent
fee, the result may be an increase in abuses caused by the lawyer's
economic self-interest. Yet there are several reasons to believe that
these problems are not as severe as they might appear. First, the
lawyer's theoretical indifference under a certain fee is a myth. Pure
indifference cannot exist in reality. In the real world, the lawyer
normally faces many pressures other than contingency that push
him to seek victory. Direct economic alignment through con-
tingency may not significantly increase that urge to win."10 Second,
because of the other pressures for victory, noneconomic or indirect
controls on excessive zeal and loss of impartiality exist anyway."':
These controls should help to minimize any increase in abuses by
the lawyer that contingency might induce. Third, direct economic
alignment brings with it at least three benefits that offset the prob-
lems it induces: (1) a virtual guarantee of at least that amount of
zeal on which our adversary-advocacy system depends, (2) a virtual
guarantee that those inevitable departures from indifference (and
hence from impartiality) on the part of the lawyer will be in the
direction of alignment rather than misalignment of lawyer's and
client's interests," 2 and (3) an increase in client satisfaction stem-
ming from the feeling that his lawyer is his partner in interest."13
107 See Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 48 (1935); Comment, supra
note 4, at 334-35.
"'8 See J. COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFSSION? 205-16 (1916).
109 See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 196, 200-01; Comment, supra note 4, at 339 &
n.53.
110 See note 57 supra.
l See text accompanying note 12 supra.
112 See generally id.
I" See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
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Still another problem that critics attribute to a contingent fee is
the clogging of court dockets." 4 To refute this contention as a
general matter, we need only restate it as an argument for lighten-
ing court burdens by closing the courthouse doors to certain
meritorious suits, especially suits brought by the poor.'1 5 Yet when
the critics phrase their contention more finely, rebuttal is not as
easy. Consider the finer formulations of this general argument.
Some argue that a contingent fee encourages the filing of
groundless speculative suits-i.e., suits where the probability of re-
covery is small but the recovery, if any, would be large." 6 Our legal
system relies on ethical" 7 and economic restraints on client and
lawyer to discourage such suits. The question here is whether
changing from a certain to a contingent fee is likely to encourage
suits of this kind. Since a contingent fee allows a plaintiff to sue
without significant financial risk,"" contingency would encourage
him to file. However, the risk of loss does not disappear; it simply
shifts to the plaintiff's lawyer. Since contingency makes his fee
depend on the outcome, the lawyer would shy away from any case
with a probability of success so low that it makes the case a poor
investment. Thus, it is not at all clear that a contingent fee encour-
ages groundless speculative suits." 9 Indeed, a contingent fee may
be more effective than a certain fee in deterring such suits. Under
a certain fee the restraining influence of the lawyer decreases;
therefore, our legal system must rely more heavily on the client's
self-restraint. But in most instances the client cannot perform the
screening function as well as the lawyer. The client is in a uniquely
poor position to evaluate his claim objectively and knowledgeably.
The risk-neutral client's condition for bringing suit under a certain
fee is less stringent than the risk-neutral lawyer's condition for
'14 See R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, supra note 76, at 50-5 1; F. MACKINNON, supra note
1, at 201; L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 3, at 275.
5 See text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
'
16 See Radin, supra note 91, at 589; Comment, supra note 4, at 339 n.53.
'1See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109,
7-102(A)(1) & (2).
118 In the United States the losing party usually does not have to pay the attorneys'
fees of his successful opponent. See generally AIyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975). Moreover, the contingent fee lawyer usually does not hold his
losing client responsible for litigation expenses. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 69;
note 3 supra. But a contingent fee does not eliminate the client's financial and psychological
disincentives to bringing suit; it merely reduces them.
"
9 See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 32-33; F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 201;
Corboy, supra note 91, at 32; Dietz, Baird, & Berul, supra note 2, at 118; Comment, supra
note 4, at 339-40.
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bringing suit under a contingent fee.' 2 0 Although the client will
often be risk-averse and therefore will shrink from the risk of
greater loss under a certain fee,121 this may not effectively deter
groundless speculative suits, because a certain fee presents the
client with the chance for an even bigger windfall, thus heightening
the "pot of gold" mentality 122 necessary to prompt such suits.' 23 In
other words, under a contingent fee the primary screening func-
tion shifts to the lawyer, and the lawyer will probably do a more
effective screening job. We can at least conclude that contingency
itself 124 gives little or no encouragement to groundless speculative
suits.
Others argue that a contingent fee encourages the filing of
nuisance suits-i.e., suits where there is a good chance the defen-
dant will buy off the plaintiff in order to save the costs of litiga-
tion.' 25 Our legal system depends most heavily on clients' self-re-
straint and lawyers' ethics 26 to screen out such cases. The change
from a certain to a contingent fee will not likely undermine that
screening process. Because a nuisance suit involves a low number
of lawyer's hours and has a good chance of success, the client might
be less willing to sue under a contingent fee than under a certain
fee. 27 The lawyer, economically motivated under a contingent fee
120 To show this, let E(R) be the expected recovery, EDf) the expected certain fee, E(F)
the expected contingent fee, and E(H) the expected number of the lawyer's hours involved;
assume also that E(R) and E(H) are independent of the conditionality of payment. The
client's condition for bringing suit under a certain fee is E(R) - ED'). Since a certain fee is
presumably set at the lawyer's opportunity cost, ED') = wE(H). Therefore, the client's condi-
tion for bringing suit becomes E(R) -- wE(H). The lawyer's condition for bringing suit
under a contingent fee is E(F) -_ wE(H). Whether by law or custom (cf. note 3 supra), a
lawyer cannot fix a contingent fee so high that he captures the whole recovery. In other
words, a contingent fee is presumably set so that E(F) is substantially less than E(R). There-
fore, since E(F) < E(R), the lawyer's condition for bringing suit is more stringent than the
client's.
121 See note 92 supra.
122 Cf. note 124 infra.
123 Cf. HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34 (medical malpractice). This proposition
justifiably assumes that a certain fee would be smaller than a contingent fee in the event of
victory, since a contingent fee must compensate the lawyer for the risk he has borne.
124 Visions of a huge fee might induce the lawyer to overestimate the probability and
rewards of success, or might stimulate any risk-preference characteristics on his part,
thereby weakening his screening capability. But this is a direct consequence of the size of
the fee, not of its contingency. See text accompanying notes 134-35 infra.125 See L. PA-rERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 3, at 275; Radin, supra note 91, at
589; Comment, supra note 4, at 339 n.53.
"
2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109,
7-102(A)(I) & (2).
127 Cf. Comment, supra note 4, at 340 ("[T]he time involved, generally, in pressing a
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to invoke his more effective screening faculties, will also be less
willing to sue. Here again we can at least conclude that contingency
itself 128 gives little or no encouragement to nuisance suits. 12
9
2. Problems Due to the Percentage Nature of the Fee
A percentage fee's principal shortcoming is that it measures
poorly both the cost to the lawyer and the value to the client of the
legal services rendered. This leads to a host of problems.
Because it measures poorly the cost to the lawyer of services
rendered, a percentage fee discourages the bringing of small,
meritorious claims.' 30 A percentage, which tends to have an up-
ward limit imposed by law or custom,' 31 of a small recovery might
not compensate the lawyer for the cost of the hours he must put
into the case. As a result, the lawyer will refuse the case regardless
of its merit. An hourly fee enjoys the relative advantage of covering
the lawyer's cost; 132 therefore, the client can arrange for repre-
sentation in any case that has a positive expected net recovery.
Also by measuring poorly the cost to the lawyer of services
rendered, a percentage fee causes certain cases to yield an exorbi-
tant profit for the lawyer.' 33 For example, a case of serious per-
nuisance action is slight, and, therefore, the contingent fee offers only a small advantage
over a retainer to the client.").
128 The contingent percentage fee could encourage nuisance suits if the percentage is
fixed high enough to overcome the lawyer's ethical and economic reluctance. However,
that problem stems from the percentage nature of the fee, not from its contingency. See
text accompanying notes 134 & 136 infra.
129 Again, this list of real and alleged problems of a contingent fee is not exhaustive.
See, e.g., note 97 supra.
130 See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 19, 33; McGILL REPORT, supra note 3, at 193-94;
Dietz, Baird, & Berul, supra note 2, at 118.1
"' See note 3 supra. Cf. note 120 supra.
13 2Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSxILrry DR 2-106(B)(1) & (2) (reasonable-
ness of fee measured in part by lawyer's time and labor required and opportunities for-
gone).
133 See Grady, supra note 5; Comment, supra note 4, at 339 n.53. But see id. at 340 n.56;
cf. text accompanying note 104 supra. We are concerned here with profit from a particular
case, and not profit from a lawyer's entire run of cases. Overall, contingent percentage fee
lawyers do not do excessively well compared to the rest of the profession. See F. MAC-
KINNON, supra note 1, at 124-36, 182. Cf. HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 33 (medical mal-
practice); Dietz, Baird, & Berul, supra note 2, at 114-16 (same). However, the individual
lawyer may fare better in contingent percentage fee work than he would in other lines of
legal work. See note 177 infra. To the extent that the lawyer's earnings in contingent per-
centage fee work average above his normal hourly wage, other problems arise. For exam-
ple, supernormal profit will cause lawyers to resist strongly reform of the fee system. But
problems stemming from long-run excessive earnings directly involve only the size of the
percentage charged, not the mere fact that a percentage measure is being used.
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sonal injury where the defendant's liability is relatively clear might
produce a big settlement after the lawyer has worked only a few
hours; after applying the agreed percentage' 34 the lawyer would
pocket a very lucrative fee. The possibility of such a premium leads
to a series of subproblems. First, impairment of the lawyer's screen-
ing faculties by the "pot of gold" mentality may encourage ground-
less speculative suits.' 35 Second, the premium may override the
lawyer's ethical and economic reluctance to bring nuisance suits. 136
Third, solicitation of lucrative cases is a natural by-product. 37
Fourth, the premium sometimes prompts the lawyer to impinge
upon his client's freedom of choice by forcing a percentage fee on
the client.'3x Fifth, the premium induces other ethical violations by
causing the lawyer to view a proffered case as a valuable commod-
ity; thus, the lawyer sometimes will refuse to refer the case away
even though he ethically should 39 or will demand a heavy forward-
ing fee even though he ethically should not.' 40 Sixth, the occasional
exorbitant profit leads to public resentment,' 4' which may not be
tempered by the thought that in the long run the lawyer's profits
and losses average out to a nonexorbitant level. An hourly fee
enjoys a relative advantage here, since it is a more accurate mea-
sure of the attorney's cost, and therefore tends to avoid the prob-
lems of exorbitant profit in particular cases.
134 See note 182 infra.
"' See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34; note 124 supra. Cf. text accompanying
note 124 supra.
"3
6 Cf. text accompanying note 128 supra.
"
7 See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 113-25 (1975); F.
MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 202-03. Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-103 (solicitation prohibited except in limited circumstances). One's view of the gravity
of this subproblem will be proportional to one's distaste for solicitation.
3
' See Grady, supra note 5, at 25-26. Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 2-20 (lawyer should decline employment on contingent fee basis if client able to pay
unless fully informed client desires such arrangement); Foonberg, Cases and Clients That
Should Be Turned Down, BARRISTER, Fall 1976, at 10, 53 (where early settlement is unlikely,
lawyer is advised to "convince the client that a non-contingency hourly rate payable in
advance is best for him"); notes 2 & 4 supra and note 177 infra.
11' See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A); D. ROSENTHAL, supra
note 2, at 101-02.
14' See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A); M. BLOOM, supra
note 2, at 143-46; D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at 99-100; Grady, supra note 5, at 22-23;
text accompanying note 70 supra. One can persuasively argue that given the current imper-
fections in the market for lawyers' services, this ethical prohibition is misguided; a client
might be better off paying a fee for referral than having no referral at all. See Morgan, The
Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 719-21, 741-42 (1977).
Referral for a fee might not be a problem; conditioning referral on the heavy forwarding
fee now prevalent is rightly considered a problem.
141 See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at 97-98.
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Because it measures poorly the value to the client of the law-
yer's services, a percentage fee raises the problems of (1) the un-
fairness in paying far more than the services' worth 142 and (2) the
consequent client dissatisfaction. 143
A percentage fee has shortcomings other than poor measure-
ment of cost and value. A percentage fee may introduce a conflict
of interest regarding the timing of recovery. The client, in the face
of mounting medical bills and loss of income, may desperately need
cash. Furthermore, the client may be unable to neutralize his con-
sequent aversion to delay by borrowing because he has no collateral
and cannot borrow against his claim, either in the capital market 44
or from his lawyer.' 45 The lawyer, on the other hand, is apt to have
a lesser aversion to delay and better access to the capital market.
Thus, the lawyer may be more willing than the client to wait in the
hope that the defendant will offer a higher settlement or the court
will award a largerjudgment, thereby resulting in a heftier percent-
age fee. 46 An hourly fee's relative advantage is that the lawyer,
unable to increase his fee by simply waiting, is more likely to follow
the client's interest in the timing of recovery. 47
A percentage fee may also tempt the lawyer to use improper
tactics in order to increase the recovery, and to slight his duties as
an officer of the court. Further, it may render him unable to act
disinterestedly in advising his client and unwilling to allow client
participation in controlling the lawsuit. However, we have already
142 See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 182-83. But cf. text accompanying notes 103-04
supra.
143 See Stone & White, The Public Image of the Legal Profession: 1960-1975, 49 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 298, 330 (1977); Youngwood, supra note 91, at 333; Comment, supra note 4, at 339
n.53. Cf. text accompanying note 95 supra. But see L. PATrERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra
note 3, at 274 ("quantum meruit as measured by the result" is a basis of computation that
"meets the ordinary man's view of a sensible basis of charges for intangible services as
those of the lawyer").
144 See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1125-26, 1154.
145 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B); Morgan, supra note
140, at 734-35.
146 See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 198-99. In more unusual situations, the lawyer
might be less willing than the client to wait out the defendant. The point here is simply
that giving the lawyer a percentage of the recovery opens the door to a conflict of interest
over the timing of recovery.
147 This proposition, however, is valid only if the hourly lawyer is being paid periodi-
cally, which is frequently the case. Id. at 21. Otherwise, the hourly lawyer would be inclined
to settle as quickly as possible in order to recover his fee; waiting normally could only cost
the lawyer money-i.e., the time value of his fee. In other words, an hourly fee payable
only after completion of the case might create the opposite conflict of interest: The lawyer
might be inclined to settle sooner than his client's interests call for.
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discounted a similar argument concerning contingency. 148 In large
part, the counterarguments used there carry over, weakening but
certainly not destroying this objection to a percentage fee. 49
Critics further contend that a percentage fee encourages in-
flated claims.15 0 The thrust of this argument is unclear: It may in-
dicate dissatisfaction with inflated ad damnum clauses, with efforts
by attorneys to obtain large settlements and judgments, or with
excessive awards by juries. In any event, the validity of this crit-
icism is questionable. First, the amount that the lawyer inserts in
the ad damnum clause of his complaint has little significance.
Moreover, eliminating the requirement of an ad damnum clause 15'
would more readily solve any problems caused by such a clause
than would changing the fee structure. 52 Second, the percentage
nature of the fee may indeed prompt the lawyer to seek a larger
recovery. But given the premises of our adversary-advocacy system,
such an incentive in itself is not a disadvantage. We should applaud
the advocate who zealously seeks the largest recovery he can obtain
within the bounds of the law. 153 Third, public knowledge of the
widespread use of a percentage fee may conceivably lead a jury to
increase the size of its award in order to cover the anticipated fee.
However, even if such compensatory inflation of awards does occur
in practice (which has never been demonstrated154), and even if
"'5 See text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
149 The only change in the counterarguments is one of degree. The first counterargu-
ment in the certain-contingent context was that contingency might not significantly increase
the pressure to win, since many other considerations also push the lawyer to seek victory.
Similarly, there are usually many pressures besides a percentage fee that push the lawyer
to seek a high recovery by methods other than investing more hours in the case. However,
a percentage fee might push the lawyer to cross ethical bounds in order to seek a still
higher recovery. Therefore, this first counterargument is not as strong in the hourly-
percentage context, because the lawyer is not faced with a win-or-lose choice but with the
question of how hard he should drive for a high recovery.
15 See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 32; L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 3,
at 275.
1 5 E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3 0 17 (c) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
"
2 See McGILL REPORT, supra note 3, at 65, 201; Tondel & Chittenden, Work of the
Medical Professional Liability Commission, 62 A.B.A.J. 1580, 1581 (1976). Cf House of Delegates
Adopts Advertising D.R. and Endorses a Package of Grand Juy Reforms, 63 A.B.A.J. 1234, 1238
(1977) (ABA approved elimination of ad damnum clauses in medical malpractice cases,
provided defendant can reasonably ascertain amount claimed by plaintiff).
15 3 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1. Cf. text accompanying note
148 supra.
"'
5 4 See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 145-46; McGILL REPORT, supra note 3, at 193;
Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158,
176-77 (1958). This qualification could have been made countless times before in this Arti-
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this were an evil (which is not self-evident1 55), it is certainly not
clear that the percentage aspect of the fee is to blame. A similar
inflation might occur if all fees were on an hourly basis, since the
jurors would often presume an hourly fee to be substantial after
they had seen the case go through a full trial. 156
C. Summary
Part III has explored the problems-other than economic con-
flict of interest concerning outcome and hours worked-that
plague the two most common bases for fee computation. As we
have shown, both the hourly and the percentage bases have serious
drawbacks. An hourly fee presents the risk of bill-padding. Al-
though it measures well the cost to the lawyer of the legal services
rendered, an hourly fee can measure only partially the value to the
client of those services. A percentage fee introduces its own unique
problems: the lawyer-client conflict over the timing of recovery and
the risk of ethical abuses inspired by the lawyer's percentage in-
terest in the case. Further, a percentage fee measures poorly the
cost and the value of services rendered.
In the foregoing pages we have also explored the problems of
the two basic approaches to conditionality of fee payment. A cer-
tain fee has serious drawbacks. Most notably, it erects a barrier
against the poor seeking access to the legal system, a drawback
serious enough by itself to justify some kind of contingent fee.
Additionally, a certain fee risks client dissatisfaction. On the other
hand, contingency has only one unarguable drawback: The lawyer
may overreach in setting the fee. The percentage aspect of the
contingent percentage fee contributes most of the fee's problems
and apparently stimulates most of the associated hostility.
cle. Arguments concerning the effect of fee structure are almost invariably cast in the form
of assertion, and almost never subjected to economic or- empirical study.
155 See Posner, supra note 19, at 428-29, 437-39 (discussing effects of English rule-
requiring losing party to reimburse winning party's attorneys' fees--on judicial administra-
tion).
156 Again, this list of real and alleged problems of a percentage fee is not exhaustive.
For example, some argue that the prevalence of a percentage fee encourages such practices
as settling several claims as a group, occasionally fighting a case through trial just to keep
the insurance company honest, and occasionally easing up on a case just to stay on the
good side of the insurance company. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 199-200. Cf.
S. THURMAN, E. PHILLIPS, & E. CHEATHAM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION 266 (1970) ("The broader problem suggests itself: Is the lawyer's obligation to
negotiate the best possible settlement in a particular case ever in conflict with his desire for
a general professional reputation?").
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This summary irresistibly suggests reform. A combination of
the hourly and percentage bases would more accurately measure
cost and value, and contingency would avoid the drawbacks of a
certain fee. In short, the contingent hourly-percentage fee appears
as the natural reform, a reform that we shall now evaluate in greater
detail.
IV
EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED FEE
A. Preferability
1. Advantages
Part II showed the clear advantage of the proposed contingent
hourly-percentage fee over the two present fee systems in minimiz-
ing economic conflict of interest between lawyer and client as to
outcome and to hours worked. Part III surveyed the other prob-
lems of the two present fee systems. We shall now demonstrate that
the proposed fee has the advantage of minimizing most of these
drawbacks as well.
First, since the proposed fee retains no aspect of certainty of
payment, it not only minimizes but eliminates the problems of a
certain fee. 1 57 Thus, the proposed fee mitigates the inaccessibility
of legal services to the poor and client dissatisfaction with having to
pay for losing.
Second, the problems of a contingent fee remain under the
proposed fee. But as just shown, these problems are slight.'5 8
Third, the proposed fee reduces the problems of an hourly
fee. With its percentage component, the proposed fee is a better
measure of the value of the legal services rendered. The percent-
age component rewards the lawyer for effective representation,
thus giving him a direct economic incentive to work as diligently
and efficiently as possible. Such is not the case under a pure hourly
fee. Also, the proposed fee is less likely to result in the client's paying
far more than the services' worth. For example, the proposed fee
cannot possibly exceed the recovery 159 and, because of the align-
ment of lawyer's and client's economic interests, is less likely to
157 Cf. note 118 supra.
158 See notes 106-29 and accompanying text supra.
159 See note 37 supra.
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approach the size of the recovery than is a pure hourly fee. The
lawyer can best serve his own economic interests under the pro-
posed fee by working the amount of time that maximizes his
client's net recovery; he would penalize himself by overworking to
the point where his fee approaches the size of the recovery.
Fourth, the proposed fee reduces the problems of a percent-
age fee because (1) the proposed fee's combination of an hourly
component with a percentage component -results in a better over-
all measure of the cost to the lawyer and the value to the client of
the legal services rendered, and (2) the proposed fee's percentage
rate is much lower.160 Because it better measures the cost to the law-
yer, the proposed fee relatively encourages the bringing of small,
meritorious claims.' 6 ' By the same virtue, the proposed fee elimi-
nates the exorbitant profit that a pure percentage fee may yield in
certain cases. Thus, we can expect the proposed fee to lower the
incidence of groundless speculative suits, nuisance suits, solicita-
tion, interference with the client's freedom of choice of fee,'62 re-
fusals to refer without a heavy forwarding fee, 163 and public re-
sentment over exorbitant profit. Because it better measures the
value to the client, the proposed fee alleviates the unfairness of
excessive fees and the consequent client dissatisfaction.' 64 Finally,
because its percentage component is relatively small, the proposed
fee mitigates the other shortcomings of a pure percentage fee: the
1 See text accompanying notes 178-79 infra.
161 See text accompanying notes 192-96 infra.
16' Cf. notes 177-79 and accompanying text infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 139-40 supra. See also note 71 and accompanying text
supra. Since changing from a percentage fee to the proposed fee removes the possibility of
exorbitant profit, the first lawyer ceases to view the proffered case as a valuable commod-
ity. He becomes less determined to hang on to it or be bought off; he becomes more
willing to refer away cases that he is unqualified to handle or too overburdened to treat
adequately. Concomitantly, the second lawyer becomes much less willing to pay a forward-
ing fee, because the proposed fee better reflects the cost to that lawyer of the legal services
he renders. In short, there is little or no fat in the proposed fee: The first lawyer is more
willing to refer, and the second lawyer is less willing to pay for the referral. Just as heavy
forwarding fees are not common practice where hourly fees prevail, we expect that they
would not present a significant problem under the proposed fee. For further discussion of
this point, see Appendix G.
,"See text accompanying notes 95-98 & 142-43 supra. Client satisfaction is an unat-
tainable goal, since some clients will be displeased no matter how the fee is computed. See
sources cited note 143 supra. However, because the proposed fee is contingent and com-
bines the measurement attributes of the hourly and percentage bases, it would probably
satisfy many clients. The lawyer could enhance this effect by carefully explaining the pro-
posed fee to the client; of course, such explanation is essential in the small cases where the
proposed fee will consume a high fraction of the recovery.
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conflict between lawyer and client over the timing of recovery 165
and the risk of ethical abuses inspired by the lawyer's percentage
interest in the case.
2. Disadvantages
The only significant drawback of the two present fee systems
that the proposed fee fails to abate is the possibility of abuse by the
lawyer in setting the fee. The hourly component of the proposed
fee continues the danger of bill-padding. The element of con-
tingency continues the risk of overreaching by the lawyer. The
lawyer could thus take advantage of the client by setting an exces-
sive hourly wage or percentage rate for use in the proposed fee.
But this type of abuse is not peculiar to the proposed fee. The
dishonest lawyer can somehow gouge his client under any fee. The
choice is between the proposed fee, under which dishonest lawyers
can take advantage *of their clients, and the present fee systems,
under which honest lawyers also are inclined to act contrary to
their clients' interests.
To control abuse by the lawyer in setting the fee, we would
subject the proposed fee to the usual restriction of reasonable-
ness. 166 Only honesty and self-restraint on the part of lawyers,
along with vigilance and willingness to discipline on the part of the
authorities, can enforce this restriction. As always, there is no sim-
ple solution to lawyers' unethical behavior.
One might argue that in urging the proposed fee we abandon
one of the virtues of a pure percentage fee: ease of regulation in
the form of percentage rate ceilings. 167 The defect in this argu-
ment lies in the implicit belief that such ceilings are effective. The
ease of imposing a percentage rate ceiling may be attractive, but
such a step is unlikely to achieve its regulatory aim. A rate ceiling
on a pure percentage fee will more likely result in some potential
clients' inability to find lawyers who will even accept employment
165 See text accompanying notes 144-46 supra. By making periodic fee payment imprac-
tical, the contingency aspect of the proposed fee would offset any remaining inclination of
the lawyer to wait out the defendant in the hope of garnering a higher settlement or
judgment, and hence a heftier percentage component. Waiting could increase only the
small percentage component of the fee, not the hourly component; while waiting, the
lawyer would be losing the time value of the whole fee. See note 147 supra. Thus, the
lawyer operating under the proposed fee would probably not be more willing than the
client to wait out the defendant. Cf. note 146 supra.
166 See notes 3 & 5 supra.
167 See note 3 supra.
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under such a fee.' 6 8 Those clients with cases valuable enough to
ensure representation will have lawyers markedly inclined to un-
derwork; 169 the consequent decrease in recovery will likely more
than offset the decrease in fee. 170 Thus, percentage rate ceilings
neither improve the client's position nor tie the fee to the cost or
the value of the legal services rendered. Instead, such rate ceilings
are largely cosmetic, keeping the final fee at what seems a reason-
able level to the outside observer, while still permitting the lawyer
covertly to pick and then milk (through underwork) the lucrative
cases. Indeed, percentage rate ceilings resemble a speed limit that
forbids traveling more than 55 miles in one hour: Lawyers will
either stay home or take half-hour trips at 110 miles per hour.
B. Feasibility
The contingent hourly-percentage fee appears generally pref-
erable to the two present fee systems. Despite its theoretical at-
tractiveness, however, the proposed fee's acceptability ultimately
depends upon its feasibility. Fortunately, the contingent hourly-
percentage fee has several practical features that would facilitate its
implementation.
First, the structure of the proposed fee is simple enough that
both clients and lawyers should have no trouble understanding it.
The contingent hourly-percentage fee is payable only in the event
of recovery1 7 1 and equals the sum of two components:
(1) the lawyer's time charge for the hours devoted to the case;
and
(2) a percentage (x) of the amount by which the recovery (S)172
exceeds that time charge.
The first component pays the lawyer, in his role as laborer, for his
time; it equals the hours worked (h) times the amount per hour (w)
16See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1144 & n.33; Comment, An Analysis of
State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1444-45.
169 Lowering the percentage rate of the contingent percentage fee increases the
lawyer-client conflict as to hours worked--i.e., it decreases the value of hL. See Appendix B.
170 See Special Project, supra note 3, at 718 & n.224. Cf. Reder, Medical Malpractice: An
Economist's View, 1976 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 511, 548, 552 (limiting lawyers'
earnings in malpractice litigation would drive prosperous attorneys into other fields and
reduce lawyers' investments in such suits); Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1144-45
(effect of rate ceiling depends on its scope and level at which it is set).
171 Furthermore, the client is not responsible for the deficiency if the computed fee
exceeds recovery. See note 37 supra.
172 In general, "recovery" here means the gross recovery minus any expenses of litiga-
tion chargeable to the client. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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that the lawyer could have earned by working on other matters.17 3
The second component pays the lawyer, in his role as insurer, for
those inevitable cases that prove unsuccessful;. it equals x times the
difference s minus wh. The proposed fee is thus expressible as wh +
x(s - wh)j 7 4 Since it is the sum of two components, it is more com-
plex than either of the two present fee systems. Nevertheless, each
of the two components is quite simple and readily explainable. In-
deed, by separating into two components the distinct payments for
the contingent lawyer's two functions as laborer and insurer, the
proposed fee may facilitate true comprehension.
Second, fixing the actual numbers to plug into the proposed
fee's formula would not be difficult. For each case the lawyer could
readily determine the number of hours worked, h, and the recov-
ery, s. Each lawyer would have to fix his hourly wage, w, but this is a
task lawyers have always managed. The size of the percentage, x,
would pose a greater, but not insurmountable, problem. Setting x
does not demand precision, because the contingent hourly-per-
centage fee aligns the economic interests of lawyer and client for
any positive value of x under 100%.175 Conceivably, the regula-
tory authorities could set x, or a ceiling on x, at some fixed value
for all cases.176 In so doing, they would presumably act in accord-
ance with some external goal, such as (1) maintenance of lawyers'
current income or (2) creation of lawyers' indifference between the
proposed fee and the certain hourly fee.' 7 7 Using crude assump-
173 If the lawyer has idle time, w should be set equal to the lawyer's minimally accept-
able hourly wage. See text accompanying notes 51-61 supra.
174 If a number of lawyers have worked together on the case, the two wh terms each
become the sum of the time charges of those lawyers. See note 66 supra.
175 For a proof, see Appendix C.
16 Upon application, the court might recognize exceptions on a case-by-case basis. See,
e.g., N.Y. APP. Div. R. 603.7(e)(4) (1st Dep't). Also, it may be desirable to set x specially for
distinguishable classes of cases, such as those in the more risky medical malpractice field.
See note 76 supra.
177 These two goals are in fact different. Currently, personal-injury lawyers prefer the
contingent percentage fee over the certain hourly fee to such an extent that the former is
almost the exclusive method of financing such litigation. See notes 2 & 4 supra. This
suggests that the personal-injury lawyer's average hourly earnings under the contingent
percentage fee exceed his certain hourly wage, even when the lawyer takes into account
those contingent cases where there is little or no fee. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at
70; Comment, supra note 4, at 345. Cf. HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 33 (medical malprac-
tice); Dietz, Baird, & Berul, supra note 2, at 114-16 (same). Although empirical data here
are scanty, it appears that a ball-park estimate of the ratio (k) of the personal-injury
lawyer's average hourly earnings under the contingent percentage fee to his certain hourly
wage would be 1.15. See Comment, supra note 4, at 345 (25% premium in cases won); note
76 supra (recovery in 90% of cases). Cf. HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 33 (medical malprac-
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tions and rough data, x should be set at approximately 10% if the
goal is to maintain lawyers' income as the proposed fee replaces the
contingent percentage fee.17 8 Using similarly crude assumptions
and rough data, x should be set at approximately 5% if the goal is
to make lawyers indifferent as to the choice between the proposed
fee and the certain hourly fee, and thus to enhance clients' free-
dom of choice with respect to fee. 17 9 As experience under the new
fee accumulates, the regulators could adjust x to a finer tuning.
Alternatively, lawyer-client negotiation could set x in each case,
subject to the general restriction of reasonableness. 80 This ap-
proach has a number of virtues. Negotiation on a case-by-case basis
would allow observation of the proposed fee in practice; if a need
for regulation became apparent, the authorities could then proceed
on a sound experiential basis. Freedom of contract would also
permit experimentation with variations on the proposed fee,' 8
thus facilitating additional reform. Moreover, freedom to negotiate
would at least permit18 2 variation in x as a function of the indi-
tice); Dietz, Baird, & Berul, supra note 2, at 114-16 (same). Accordingly, if the goal were to
maintain lawyers' income as we shift from the contingent percentage fee to the proposed
fee, x would have to be fixed higher than it would if the goal were to induce lawyers'
indifference between the proposed fee and the certain hourly fee. Maintaining lawyers'
income requires that the proposed fee be as financially attractive to lawyers as the present
contingent percentage fee. Inducing lawyers' indifference, on the other hand, calls for
making the proposed fee only as financially attractive to lawyers as the present certain
hourly fee.
Of course, fixing x or imposing a ceiling on x would permit only approaching the
chosen goal, not reaching it. An inflexible x could roughly maintain lawyers' total current
income, but some lawyers would be made better off and some worse off in the process. For
example, a lawyer whose practice consists primarily of rapid settlement of lucrative
personal-injury cases would become worse off under such a version of the proposed fee.
Similarly, an inflexible x could induce only an overall indifference between the proposed
fee and the certain hourly fee, because in any particular case one or the other fee might
look better to the particular lawyer. For example, a small or questionable case would be
more attractive to the lawyer under the certain hourly fee than under such a version of the
proposed fee. See also notes 207-16 and accompanying text infra.
178 Given this goal, the formula for x is (k - p) I [(klr) - p], where p is the fraction of
contingent fee cases in which there is a recovery, r is the average percentage rate now
charged under the contingent percentage fee, and k has the definition given in note 177
supra. In Appendix H we derive this formula and state the assumptions on which it rests.
If p = .9 (see note 76 supra), r = .33 (see note 3 supra), and k = 1.15 (see note 177 supra),
then x = 9.8%.
179 Given this goal, the formula for x is (I - p) I [(klr) - p]. In Appendix H we derive
this formula and state the assumptions on which it rests. If we take p, r, and k at the values
stated in note 178 supra, then x = 3.9%.
18O See text accompanying note 166 supra.
181 See note 218 infra.
182 However, it is unlikely that negotiation will induce much variation in x. Under the
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vidual case's value. 183
Third, although the exacting and explicit formulation of the
proposed fee is innovative, the fee does not differ drastically in
thrust and effect from actual practice today. Under both the cer-
tain hourly fee and the contingent percentage fee, lawyers com-
monly make retrospective adjustments in light of results obtained
and work entailed, 18 4 often leaving themselves in a position similar
to that of a lawyer operating under the proposed fee. This fact
should reduce rational and forthright resistance by lawyers to the
new fee.
Fourth, lawyers, bar associations, or courts could normally im-
plement the proposed fee without the need for legislation or other
political action.'8 5 Moreover, the powers that be would not have to
contingent percentage fee, little room for real negotiation currently exists. A standard per-
centage rate tends to be applied, with little or no variation in the light of case value or the
quality of the lawyer involved. See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 186-87; D. ROSENTHAL,
supra note 2, at 65. But see H. SHAIN, LEGAL FIRST AID 170 (1975). Although the attorney
frequently charges less than the contract percentage after the case has been resolved (see
note 7 supra), the contract percentage itself tends to be standard. However, there are hopes
for greater competitive forces in the future, as the number of lawyers increases and the
effects of price fixing and restrictions on advertising decrease. See Grady, supra note 5, at
52-53.
183 We feel x should vary with the characteristics of the individual case for a number of
reasons. Fixing x or imposing a ceiling on x will have economically disruptive effects. Cf.
text accompanying notes 167-70 supra. It makes economic sense to allow an increase in x so
that a potential client may induce a lawyer to take on a case of low value, as well as to
encourage a decrease in x so that a client may rightly realize the rewards of a case of high
value. Cf. Grady, supra note 5, at 25 (size of percentage should depend on amount of
work involved and size of judgment or settlement); Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at
1139-40 ("Under competitive conditions the same percentage fee would not be charged for
both [high-value and low-value cases]."). Moreover, fixing x, or likely even imposing a ceil-
ing on x, will result in certain plaintiffs' paying more than their appropriate "insurance
premium" for contingency (the second component of the proposed fee), and thereby sub-
sidizing plaintiffs with less valuable cases. Nothing recommends such an arbitrary subsidiza-
tion scheme. A much fairer scheme would let each plaintiff pay his own way by varying x,
or would turn to a system of subsidization funded by a broader segment of society.
If x is to vary, how should it be set in a particular case? Again, the answer turns in
part on the goal chosen-e.g., maintenance of the effective hourly income currently obtain-
able under the contingent percentage fee, or equalization of the effective hourly income
under the proposed fee and under the certain hourly fee. Aside from goal considerations,
the value of x should turn on (1) the plaintiff's probability of recovery, (2) the expected
size of the plaintiff's recovery, if any, and (3) the expected costs of seeking recovery. We
derive a formula for computing x in Appendix H; that formula shows how the above-
mentioned factors should influence the value ofx.
184 See notes 6 & 7 supra.
18 See note 3 supra. Lawyers could immediately implement the proposed fee through
lawyer-client contract. But perhaps introduction of the proposed fee would be easiest in a
retrospective judicial award of attorneys' fees. Such awards occur in a variety of situations,
HeinOnline -- 63 Cornell L. Rev. 584 1977-78
IMPROVING ON THE CONTINGENT FEE
undergo a major conversion in fee philosophy, since the proposed
fee introduces no new notions but simply recombines several old
ones. Finally, we merely suggest that the proposed fee should gen-
erally supplant the contingent percentage fee, leaving the certain
hourly fee as a client's option.'8 6 The proposal's net effect would
thus be a move away from the contingent percentage fee, which
has never enjoyed great favor in the eyes of the established bar.187
All this adds up to a feasible and acceptable reform.
C. Possible Side Effects
Implementation of the proposed fee would entail changing
one of the most basic rules of the game: the scheme for compensat-
ing lawyers. A change so fundamental risks side effects so great as
to give any would-be reformer pause. "The undiscover'd country
... makes us rather bear those ills we have, Than fly to others that
we know not of."'1 88
Yet we muster some courage from the thoughts expressed
above: The proposed fee merely recombines the characteristics of
the two present fee systems; indeed, it looks much like what al-
ready occurs informally in practice. Implementation of the pro-
posed fee is therefore unlikely to have any revolutionary side
effects. The following analysis and accompanying Appendices re-
inforce this intuition with some foresight.
We now consider the question of what side effects our legal
system will undergo if the contingent hourly-percentage fee re-
places the contingent percentage fee. We shall treat those side ef-
fects in three Subsections. First, we shall examine changes in the
quality of cases that lawyers would be willing to take on. Second, we
such as class actions. See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 23; Berger, Court Awarded Attor-
neys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 281 (1977); Dawson, Lawyers and In-
voluntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975); .Developments in the
Law--Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1606-18 (1976). The courts here already accord
heavy weight to the factors of hourly rate, hours worked, recovery, and risk. See, e.g.,
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161,
166-69 (3d Cir. 1973), enforced, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976). The proposed fee would
provide a ready formula for calculating a reasonable fee in many of the situations that call
for a retrospective judicial award.
"' See note 235 and accompanying text infra.
187 See Radin, supra note 91, at 587; Youngwood, supra note 91, at 333-34; note 3
supra. Cf. F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 135-36 ("[T]he section of the bar which receives
the highest average income and a disproportionately large share of the total income is
concerned little, if at all, with specialties characterized by the contingent fee.").18 8 W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act III, sc. 1, lines 79-82.
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shall consider changes in the mode of disposing of those cases-i.e.,
changes in the settlement rate. Third, we shall briefly explore
changes in the allocation of wealth resulting from the disposition
of those cases-i.e., what changes in economic position the parties
and counsel could expect as the proposed fee replaces the contin-
gent percentage fee.
Even with much more sophisticated analytical tools than ours,
we could not predict the impact of the proposed fee with certainty.
Nevertheless, we submit these two tentative conclusions: (1) none
of the expected side effects is earthshaking, and (2) none of the
expected side effects argues against implementing the proposed
fee-some may even supply additional arguments for its im-
plementation.
1. Effect on Case Mix
Not all prospective cases are economically acceptable to a
lawyer whose fee is wholly or partly dependent on the size of the
recovery. While large, meritorious cases are clearly attractive, and
small, dubious cases clearly unattractive, many cases do not fit into
either of these two categories. The lawyer may reject some meri-
torious cases because they are too small, and may accept some
dubious cases because they are sufficiently large. His decision to
reject or accept such cases depends in part on the fee arrange-
ment.
The first step in any analysis is to define terms. In this con-
text, the words "meritorious" and "dubious" refer to the lawyer's
estimate of the probability (P) that the plaintiff will recover some
amount greater than zero, whether by settlement or by judgment.
The words "large" and "small" are more complex in meaning.
They refer to the relation between the expected size of the plain-
tiff's recovery, if any, and the expected costs of seeking recovery.
We can give the terms "large" and "small" quantitative meaning
through a payoff ratio (q), defined as the conditional expected
value of the recovery given a positive recovery, divided by the
opportunity cost of the total time that the lawyer expects to de-
vote to the case.
We can assume that a lawyer will reject those cases where his
expected fee is less than his expected opportunity cost, and accept
all others.1 8 9 The excess of expected fee over expected opportu-
189 This assumption may overstate somewhat the category of cases accepted, especially
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nity cost-that is, the lawyer's expected profit--depends on his per-
centage rate and on the values of P and q for the particular
case.190 Specifically, the lawyer's expected profit decreases as P or
q decreases. The lawyer could offset this effect by increasing his
percentage rate, thereby making many cases economically accept-
able. However, if the percentage has an upward limit imposed by
law or custom, 19' the lawyer may not be able to raise his percent-
age rate high enough to make a case with a low P or q economi-
cally acceptable.
This suggests a mode of analysis for determining which cases
would be economically acceptable under any particular percentage
fee. If we hypothesize some ceiling on the applicable percentage,
we can specify in terms of P and q which cases the lawyer would
accept and which he would reject under the particular fee. This in
turn permits us to compare the case mix under the contingent
percentage fee and the contingent hourly-percentage fee.192
To illustrate, set x in the proposed fee at 15%, a ceiling that
regulatory authorities might impose.' 93 For purposes of compari-
son, set r in the contingent percentage fee at 33Y3%, the value
that most commonly prevails. 94 If we plot P against q, we can
draw a curve for each fee, as in Figure 6. The solid curve repre-
sents the acceptability boundary for the proposed fee; the broken
curve serves the same purpose for the contingent percentage fee.
Cases that fall below the relevant curve would appear economi-
cally unacceptable, and the lawyer would reject them. He would
accept cases above the relevant curve.
Figure 6 shows that some cases, those in region A, would be
unacceptable under both fees. Most of these are small, dubious
cases. The lawyer would accept other cases, those in region D,
under both fees. Most of these are large, meritorious cases. Region
B, however, represents cases that the lawyer would reject under the
under the proposed fee, since the lawyer may also require the recovery to exceed his fee
by some significant margin. However, this incentive to avoid serious client dissatisfaction is
irrelevant to our immediate analytical concern with direct economic incentives. In any
event, this incentive cannot be quantified. Moreover, under the proposed fee, client dis-
satisfaction could be avoided or minimized by the client education mentioned in note 164
supra.
190 The exact relationship is developed in Appendix I.
19 1 See note 3 supra. Cf. note 120 supra.
19' We make this comparison in Appendix I, and use the formulas derived there to
create Figure 6.
193 See generally text accompanying notes 176-77 supra.
194 See note 3 supra.
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FIGURE 6
Acceptability Boundaries
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
PAYOFF RATIO (q)
7 8 9 10
contingent percentage fee but accept under the proposed fee.
These are meritorious (high P) cases that are too small (low q) to be
economically acceptable to the lawyer under the contingent percent-
age fee. Under the proposed fee, bringing this kind of case would
become feasible. Finally, region C represents cases that the lawyer
would accept under the contingent percentage fee but reject under
the proposed fee. These are dubious (low P) cases that are suffi-
ciently large (high q) to be economically acceptable to the lawyer
under the contingent percentage fee. The proposed fee would
deter this kind of case. 1 95
In sum, replacing the contingent percentage fee with the pro-
posed fee would encourage the bringing of smaller, meritorious
cases and discourage the bringing of larger, dubious cases. This, we
submit, is on balance a desirable side effect. 196
195 In Figure 6 the two curves cross each other, thereby creating regions B and C. This
does not depend on the particular values of x and r used in Figure 6. Appendix I shows
that the curves will always cross in the manner depicted, and that regions B and C will
always exist. Changing x and r affects only the sizes and shapes of those regions.
196 The predicted effect is curiously similar to what would happen if the English rule
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2. Effect on Settlement Rate
At present, the vast majority of personal-injury cases end in
settlement before trial.' 97 Consequently, a small change in that pre-
trial settlement rate would have a significant impact on the number
of cases going to trial.' 98 Similarly, a change in the overall rate of
settlement before judgment could have huge social costs. Since the
fee arrangement determines the allocation of the recovery between
the plaintiff and his lawyer, changing the fee arrangement might
affect the overall settlement rate. We shall now examine this pos-
sible side effect.
The threshold conditions under which a given settlement offer
will appear minimally acceptable to the plaintiff or to his lawyer,
which we discussed earlier, 99 represent the plaintiff's and his
lawyer's lower bounds on the range of offers that could conceivably
result in settlement. We can apply a similar analysis to the
economic interests of the defendant 00 in order to derive an upper
bound on the range of offers that he would conceivably make. Set-
tlement is possible only if the defendant's upper bound lies at or
above the governing lower bound on the plaintiff's side. Indeed, the
difference between the upper and lower bounds provides a rough
measure of the likelihood of settlement under any particular fee-
the bigger the difference the more likely is settlement.20' This mea-
sure permits us to compare the settlement rates under the contin-
gent percentage fee and the contingent hourly-percentage fee. 202
The conclusions resulting from this analysis depend on wheth-
er the settlement decision on the plaintiff's side is made in the best
interests of the plaintiff or in the best interests of his lawyer. If
the plaintiff's best interests control, replacing the contingent per-
centage fee with the proposed fee would encourage settlement
requiring reimbursement of attorneys' fees were implemented. See Posner, supra note 19, at
437-39.
19 7 See note 76 supra. One study estimates that 95% of all personal-injury cases in
which the plaintiff engages a lawyer are settled before trial, 3% are settled during trial, and
2% go to judgment. See Columbia Study, supra note 2, at 10-11.
198 For example, suppose the pretrial settlement rate is 95%, which leaves 5% of all
cases going to trial. If that settlement rate drops to 94%, a decrease of about 1%, the
resulting increase in the number of cases going to trial is 20%. But cf. note 205 infra.
199 See note 80 supra.
200 See note 312 infra.
201 See note 313 infra; Note, Contingent Fees for Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation, 86
YALE L.J. 1680, 1705-06 (1977).
202 For the details of this comparison, see Appendix J. We state only the naked conclu-
sions in the text.
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when the offer comes early in the case's life or when the plain-
tiff's subjective estimate203 of the probability of winning a judg-
ment is high, and would discourage settlement otherwise. If in-
stead the best interests of the plaintiff's lawyer control, replacing
the contingent percentage fee with the proposed fee would en-
courage settlement when the offer comes late in the case's life or
when the plaintiff's subjective estimate of the probability of win-
ning a judgment is low, and would discourage settlement other-
wise. Thus, implementation of the proposed fee would tend to
encourage early settlement by the plaintiff's lawyer who works in
his client's best interests and to discourage early settlement by the
lawyer who works in his own best interests. 0 4
Various unknowns, including the degree to which the best in-
terests of the plaintiff's lawyer dominate those of his client, make it
difficult for us to go further in predicting the effect on settlement
rate of the change from the contingent percentage fee to the pro-
posed fee. But note that regardless of whose interests control, the
typical case under the proposed fee will in the course of its life go
through one phase where settlement is encouraged relative to the
situation that would have prevailed under the contingent percent-
age fee; it will also go through one phase where settlement is
relatively discouraged. We can therefore surmise that the overall
effect on settlement rate of this change in fee arrangement would
be neutral.0 5 At any rate, there is no indication that any potential
side effect here need give the would-be reformer pause. 0 6
203 See notes 265 & 317 infra.
204 An incidental benefit here is that the proposed fee, by discouraging early settle-
ment and encouraging late settlement where the lawyer's best interests control, would
modulate the implicit conflict of interest. The potential for harm to the interests of the
plaintiff is probably greatest in the early stages, when some lawyers accept a settlement offer
that is low compared with the judgment they could obtain, but high compared with the
opportunity cost of the small number of hours expended.
205 Our resolve to tolerate the possibility of a slight effect on settlement rate is
strengthened by the thought that we cannot really know whether an increase or a decrease
in the rate is desirable. One is apt to assume that the settlement rate should always be
increased, in order to reduce the direct costs of dispute resolution. But one must also
consider error costs-i.e., the social costs entailed in mistaken imposition of liability or mis-
taken failure to impose liability. As the settlement rate approaches 100%, which it does in
the personal-injury field, error costs start mounting. If the settlement rate is high enough,
further increases in the rate will reduce the efficiency of the legal system. No one knows
whether personal-injury cases have passed that optimal settlement rate. See Posner, supra
note 19, at 400-01, 429.
206John Prather Brown, a former professor of economics at Cornell University, sug-
gested another side effect concerning settlement that merits mention: Substitution of the
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3. Effect on Allocation of Wealth
Unlike the contingent percentage fee, the size of the proposed
fee rests in part on the number of hours worked by the plaintiff's
lawyer. Accordingly, it depends only in part on the recovery, to the
extent of the variable x. Nevertheless, manipulation of x can control
the lawyer's income.20 7 Lawyers' current income could thus be
maintained under the proposed fee, if this were deemed a legiti-
mate goal.20 8
Implementation of the proposed fee would remove the incen-
tive under the contingent percentage fee for lawyers to cease work-
ing too soon, and would thus very likely lead to an increase in the
average number of hours worked by lawyers on each case. 20 9 The
total number of cases handled by lawyers would depend on the
variable x. As we noted earlier,210 if there were an upward limit on
x, the number of small, meritorious cases would increase and the
number of large, dubious cases would decrease, resulting in an
undramatic effect on the total number of cases. 2 1 Absent an up-
ward limit on x, the number of large, dubious cases would not
decrease because the lawyer could negotiate an x high enough to
make many such cases economically acceptable to him; since that
leaves only an increase in the number of small, meritorious
proposed fee for the contingent percentage fee may change the strategy of the defendant
with respect to the size of his settlement offer. Although the upper bound on the range of
offers that the defendant would conceivably make is independent of the plaintiff's fee ar-
rangement, this does not imply that the size of the offer the defendant actually makes is
also independent of that fee arrangement. If, under the plaintiff's fee arrangement, there
is a range of offers acceptable to the plaintiff's lawyer but not to the plaintiff, the defen-
dant might seek to make an offer within that range. As we show in Appendix E, such a
range does in fact exist under both the contingent percentage fee and the proposed fee,
but the range is generally smaller under the latter. Consequently, implementation of the
proposed fee would reduce the opportunity for the defendant to exploit the economic
conflict of interest between the plaintiff and his lawyer-a desirable side effect. Moreover,
one could argue that, all else being equal, this change would further encourage settlement,
since offers not aimed at dividing the plaintiff and his lawyer are more likely to be ac-
cepted.
207 See text accompanying notes 175-83 supra.
208 Any restrictions on varying x would leave some lawyers better off and some worse
off; overall, however, lawyers' total current income could still be roughly maintained. See
note 177 supra.2
" See text accompanying note 47 supra.
2 1 0 See notes 189-96 and accompanying text supra.
211 This is admittedly a rough approximation, but a reasonable one. There are likely
more potential small cases awaiting lawyers than large ones.
Parenthetically, a relative increase in small cases does not imply a decrease in average
hours worked per case, because "small" is not defined solely in terms of hours worked but
in terms of payoff ratio. See text accompanying note 189 supra.
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cases, 212 the net effect would then be an increase in the total
number of cases. In sum, by increasing the average number of
hours worked per case and holding the total number of cases at
least constant, implementation of the proposed fee would increase
the total number of hours worked by lawyers. This increased de-
mand on lawyers' services would raise lawyers' income, not only in
the arena where the contingent fee prevails but throughout the
legal profession.2 13
The increase in the number of hours worked by the lawyer on
the average case would naturally cause an increase in the size of the
average recovery.214 Indeed, implementation of the proposed fee
would maximize the average return, where "return" means recov-
ery minus opportunity cost. 215 But whether the average client's net
recovery would increase depends on the variable x, since x deter-
mines how the lawyer and the client are to divide the return. Set-
ting x (either for all cases or through case-by-case negotiation) at
any reasonable level-even at a level high enough to maintain
lawyers' current income-would give the average client a higher
net recovery than he would have received under the contingent
percentage fee. 216 This accords with what one would expect upon
the removal of the economic conflict of interest between lawyer
and client.
With plaintiffs and their lawyers generally better off, someone
must be financing this increased well-being. It is the defendants, of
course. They would pay more in the form of larger recoveries, and
possibly do so in more cases. Yet there is no indication that this
would be a bad development. The proposed fee should be allowed
to remove the economic conflict of interest and the related disrup-
tive effects of the contingent percentage fee. These are the sources
212 See text accompanying note 161 supra.
213 See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1137-39.
214 See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
215 Cf. note 26 supra.
216 The proposed fee would maximize the average return. Assuming that lawyers do
not work for less than their opportunity cost, setting x in general very close to 0% would
cause the average client's net recovery to approach the maximum value attainable under
any fee arrangement. But if x were set in general very close to 100%, the average client's
net recovery would be approximately zero. Thus, whether the average client would be
better or worse off under the proposed fee than under the contingent percentage fee
depends on x. Appendix K shows that, even if x were set high enough to maintain lawyers'
current income, the average client would still be better off under the proposed fee. Al-
though Appendix K also shows that some clients would be somewhat worse off under the
proposed fee because of the shape of their particular s-curves, clients' net recovery would
increase overall.
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of the bargains that defendants currently enjoy. There is no
reason, based either in equity or in efficiency,2 17 to allow continued
availability of these bargains.
V
ALTERNATIVE REFORMS
Part IV showed the preferability and feasibility of the proposed
contingent hourly-percentage fee, and demonstrated that the pos-
sible side effects consequent to its implementation are neither
earthshaking nor undesirable. This leaves the possibility of alter-
native fee reforms as the only remaining argument against the pro-
posed fee.218
Several alternative reforms have been proposed, or even im-
plemented in certain situations, in an attempt to solve the prob-
lems associated with the two present fee systems. Some of these
reforms are unattractive for economic reasons, others for reasons
of practicality.
The economically unattractive reforms include those sched-
ules for contingent percentage fees under which the percentage
rate decreases as the size of recovery increases. 219 For small re-
21'7 See generally Posner, supra note 19, at 402-06.
218 We limit our concern here to alternative reforms that are true substitutes for the
proposed fee.
There are several major reforms, some highly desirable, that are not necessarily incon-
sistent with the proposed fee. These include expansion of legal aid, development of pre-
paid legal services plans, and implementation of the English rule requiring reimbursement
of attorneys' fees. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 141-52; Corboy, supra note 91, at
33-34; Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RE-
SEARCH J. 87, 132-36.
There are also many minor reforms that could be implemented as refinements of the
proposed fee. We certainly do not suggest here that the proposed fee is the optimal fee
structure. Experience under the proposed fee would undoubtedly suggest further reforms,
perhaps including: (1) making the variable x in the proposed fee decrease as the return
(s - wh) increases (cf. note 219 and accompanying text infra), (2) equating the variable s in
the proposed fee to recovery minus some floor amount which, in the particular cir-
cumstances, is considered certain to be recovered (cf. F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 65,
185-86 (discussing practice common in workmen's compensation cases of assessing fee per-
centage only against that portion of recovery above settlement offer already received)), (3)
imposing on the client some greater share of litigation expenses in the event that the claim
proves unsuccessful (see note 3 supra), (4) tightening ethical controls on undesirable be-
havior by the lawyer, including abuses in setting the fee (see generally text accompanying
note 166 supra), and (5) expanding judicial supervision of fees (see Corboy, supra note 91, at
35-36; Special Subcomm. of Defense Research Comm., supra note 3, at 204-06, 209).
219 The pioneer reformer here was the First Department of New York's Supreme
Court, Appellate Division. N.Y. App. Div. R. 603.7(e) (1st Dep't) provides for a fee of 50%
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coveries, the marginal percentage rate is higher than the normal
rate of 33Y3%; for large recoveries, it is lower than the normal
rate. This decreasing scale is a step toward solving two problems
associated with the contingent percentage fee: the unavailability of
counsel for small claims and the excessiveness of fees for big
claims. Unfortunately, the cure is incomplete. Still missing is any
attempt, such as inclusion of an hourly component, to account for
the amount of work expended by the lawyer. The size of the fee
under a decreasing scale remains essentially unrelated to the work
entailed. Therefore, the fee still measures poorly the cost to the
lawyer and the value to the client of the legal services rendered,
preserving all the problems associated therewith.220 Also, in the
vast majority of cases, the recovery is modest; this means that the
fee under a decreasing scale, when expressed as a flat percentage
of recovery, usually exceeds the 33Y% rate prevailing under the
normal contingent percentage fee. 221 The decreasing scale feature
thus exaggerates all the problems of a percentage fee. Finally, a
decreasing scale does nothing to solve or reduce the problem of
economic conflict of interest between lawyer and client. The
lawyer has no less incentive to accept an early settlement unfavor-
able to his client's best interests than he does under a fee com-
puted on a fixed percentage.222
Consider next those schedules for contingent percentage fees
under which the percentage rate increases as the litigation pro-
on the first $1000 recovered, 40% on the next $2000, 35% on the next $22,000, and 25%
on any recovery over $25,000. Alternatively, the court rule provides that the lawyer and
the client may agree to a straight fee of 33Y3% of the recovery, or in extraordinary cir-
cumstances the lawyer may apply to the court for relief from the decreasing scale. See F.
MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 160-70, 183-84.
The decreasing scale has some support around the country; sometimes it is applied to
all tort actions, as in N.J. GEN. CT. R. 1:21-7, other times only to some special class of
cases like medical malpractice actions, as in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp.
1977). This reform also enjoys considerable popularity among those formulating proposals
to deal with the medical malpractice crisis. See, e.g., HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-35;
McGILL REPORT, supra note 3, at 65, 197.
220 Cf. text accompanying notes 160-65 supra.
221 See Columbia Study, supra note 2, at 23-24. Cf. HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11
(medical malpractice). Under the decreasing scale promulgated by the First Department of
New York's Supreme Court, Appellate Division (see note 219 supra), any recovery less than
$33,000 will result in a percentage fee greater than 33V3% (see id.).
222 That some reformers suggest an increasing scale, under which the percentage rate
increases as the size of recovery increases, suggests the lack of magic in the idea of a
decreasing scale. The rationale of this alternative innovation is that an increasing scale
would better reward the lawyer for displays of exceptional professional ability. See Note,
supra note 3, at 947-48. See generally Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1140.
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gresses from stage to stage. 23 The applicable percentage might be
25% if there is recovery before filing an action, 33Y3% after filing
but before trial, 40% during or after trial but before appeal, or
50% during or after appeal. This ascending scale seems to al-
leviate certain problems associated with the contingent percentage
fee. It provides some measure of the amount of work expended
by the lawyer and reduces the lawyer's inclination to accept a
premature settlement. But the cure is clumsy. A major difficulty is
the ascending scale's discontinuity: One small step for the lawyer
means one giant leap for his fee. Moreover, the stage of litigation
does not necessarily correlate with the number of hours ex-
pended. Thus, by simply going through the formality of filing a
complaint, the lawyer can make his fee jump from 25% to 33Y%;
by waiting until the start of trial to accept a settlement offer made
on the eve of trial, he can make his fee jump to 40%.224 This
cosmetic approach to reform preserves the problems engendered
by a poor measure of the cost to the lawyer and the value to the
client of the legal services rendered. Also, the fee under an as-
cending scale perpetuates all the problems of a percentage fee; to
the extent that the applicable percentage exceeds 33Y3%, those
problems intensify. Finally, an ascending scale still leaves the
lawyer without a direct economic incentive to work the number of
hours demanded by the client's best interests.
Another suggested reform is the contingent hourly fee. 225
Under this system the lawyer receives his fee only in the event of
recovery; to compensate himself for the risk of loss, he then collects
an hourly wage set somewhat higher than his certain hourly wage.
This reform avoids all the problems associated with a percentage
fee, but replaces them with the problems of an hourly fee. In
particular, it remains an imperfect measure of the value of the
legal services rendered. Also, a contingent hourly fee fails to align
the economic interests of lawyer and client. On the one hand, if the
223 An example is § 4 of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1970), which
generally limits the fee to 20% of any settlement or to 25% of any judgment. Similar as-
cending schedules, often with three or four percentage gradations, are frequently pro-
vided for by lawyer-client contract. See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 170, 184-85; Note,
supra note 3, at 948. Cf. Dietz, Baird, & Berul, supra note 2, at 114-15 (survey of lawyers'
fee arrangements in medical malpractice cases).
224 See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 185, 198. Cf. notes 232-34 and accompanying
text infra.
225 See, e.g., Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1154. Cf. In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F.
Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (retrospective judicial award of attorneys' fees calculated on
hourly rate multiplied by risk factor).
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lawyer sets his contingent hourly wage precisely to compensate for
the risk of loss, he will theoretically be indifferent as to the number
of hours worked. As we have already seen, 226 however, indiffer-
ence exists only in the dreamworld of an economic model; it de-
generates into misalignment in the real world. Certainly, the lawyer
will have no direct economic incentive to devote the number of
hours that would maximize his client's net recovery. On the other
hand, if the lawyer sets his contingent hourly wage too high, he will
have a direct economic incentive to overwork; if he sets it too low,
he will be inclined to underwork to the point of refusing the case.
Accordingly, in order to avoid severe misalignment, a precise calcu-
lation of the risk involved in the particular case must precede the
setting of the contingent hourly wage. Such precision is simply
impossible. We can safely conclude, therefore, that a contingent
hourly fee results in economic conflict of interest between lawyer
and client.
In sum, all three of these reforms are unsatisfactory, primarily
for economic reasons. We shall now examine three reforms in the
second category-those that fail primarily for want of practicality.
One suggested reform would allow the potential plaintiff to
sell his claim to a lawyer or some other collection agent.22 7 This
circumvents all the problems discussed in this Article, but it pre-
sents some very serious practical problems. First, this proposal
would require a major change in the attitudes of our legal system
toward champerty and the nonassignability of causes of action, and
in the laws based on those attitudes.228 Second, although a truly
competitive claim-buying market would theoretically eliminate the
need for the potential plaintiff to evaluate his claim, such a market
is unlikely to develop. The unique nature of the product being sold
would erect innumerable obstacles, such as the waste entailed in
costly, independent investigations of each claim by the buyers.
Third, absent a truly competitive market, the typical potential
plaintiff would have to hire his own lawyer to assist in evaluating
and selling the claim. This of course would reintroduce all the
problems discussed in this Article.
A related suggestion would revamp the loan market so as to
22' See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
22 See, e.g., Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1154. Cf. Person v. Association of
the Bar, 414 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (sale of "shares" in claim), discussed in 63
A.B.A.J. 166 (1977).
22' See generally F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 35-41.
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facilitate the client's borrowing against his claim.2 29 The lender
would extend a line of credit to the client, making funds available
as needed to pay the lawyer on a certain hourly basis. The client
would repay the loan only in the event of recovery. An above-
normal interest rate would compensate the lender for the risk of
loss. This contingent loan idea skirts many of the problems of the
present fee systems, but abounds in practical problems. First, the
proposal would run into the attitudinal and legal impediments em-
bodied in the concepts of champerty and maintenance. 30 Second,
the unique nature of the collateral would make attaining the prem-
ised ideal loan market unlikely. Third, the lender would probably
be the lawyer himself, since he would be in the best position to
evaluate the claim and to extend the loan. If he were the lender,
the lawyer-client relationship would be equivalent to that under a
contingent hourly fee.23 ' If someone other than the lawyer were
the lender, the lawyer-client relationship would be similar to that
under a certain hourly fee. In either case, this proposal would
perpetuate all the problems of an hourly fee and would fail to solve
the problem of economic conflict of interest between lawyer and
client.
One last possible reform is a schedule for contingent percent-
age fees under which the percentage rate would increase propor-
tionately with the number of hours worked.232 With each hour
the percentage rate would grow in accordance with some constant
(K); thus, r would equal Kh. For a particular s-curve, the value of K
could be set so as to align the economic interests of lawyer and
client.2 33 This reform, a refinement of the above-described ascend-
ing scale, 234 fails for practical reasons. Only one value of K would
successfully align the lawyer's and the client's economic interests,
229 See, e.g., Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1154.
230 See generally F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 35-41.
231 Under the contingent hourly fee, the lawyer in effect lends the client the value of
his time. In the event of recovery, this loan is repaid, with "interest" in the form of an
above-normal hourly rate; in the event of loss, the lawyer forfeits the amount lent. This is
indistinguishable from a contingent loan at an above-normal interest rate extended by a
lawyer to pay for his own services on a certain hourly basis.
232 This reform has not been proposed elsewhere, but it is a natural postscript to the
ascending scale described in the text accompanying note 223 supra.
233 Alignment could be achieved if K were set so that dfldh falls to a value of w at the
precise number of hours where dsldh = w.
23 4 See text accompanying note 223 supra. This reform differs from the ascending scale
in that (1) the percentage rate increases with the number of hours worked rather than with
the stage of litigation, and (2) the relationship is smooth rather than discontinuous.
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and this value of K would be different for each case. In short, this
proposal would require a totally unrealistic amount of information
concerning the particular s-curve of each case.
Indeed, this last proposal typifies the theoretically infinite
number of schemes that would align the economic interests in-
volved. These schemes have one feature in common: As the
economic problems dissolve, practicality disappears. The proposed
contingent hourly-percentage fee emerges as a seemingly unique
combination of economic attractiveness and practical desirability.
CONCLUSION
A new type of legal fee for pursuing damage claims should be
instituted. This proposed fee would be payable only in the event of
recovery and would be computed by adding (1) the lawyer's time
charge for the hours worked to (2) a small percentage (say 5% or
10%) of the amount by which the recovery exceeds that time
charge.
This contingent hourly-percentage fee largely solves the prob-
lem of economic conflict of interest between lawyer and client, a
problem that exists under both the certain hourly fee and the con-
tingent percentage fee. It also solves or minimizes many of the
other problems associated with these two basic fee systems. Because
of its contingency, the proposed fee facilitates access by the poor to
legal services. Moreover, it measures well the cost to the lawyer and
the value to the client of the legal services rendered--certainly
better than does either a pure hourly fee or a pure percentage fee.
Thus, for example, replacing the contingent percentage fee with
the proposed fee would encourage the bringing of small, meritori-
ous cases and would eliminate the exorbitant profit that lawyers
now reap from certain cases.
Beyond its general preferability, the proposed fee's practicality
makes implementation feasible. Moreover, the possible side effects
consequent to its implementation are neither earthshaking nor
undesirable. Indeed, when compared to alternative reforms, the
contingent hourly-percentage fee appears uniquely sound and
practical.
A proposal to implement a new type of fee does not necessarily
imply that the old should be abolished. The certain hourly fee
should surely continue as a client's option. First, the client should
be free to decide whether or not he wants the contingency feature;
there is no reason to force the client to buy insurance. Second, in
particular situations the client would fare better under a pure
[Vol. 63:529
HeinOnline -- 63 Cornell L. Rev. 598 1977-78
IMPROVING ON THE CONTINGENT FEE
hourly fee than under the proposed fee. 23 5 Third, in vast realms of
legal practice the certain hourly fee is workable but the proposed
fee would not be.236 Fourth, the abuses that exist under the certain
hourly fee are generally neither egregious nor scandalous.
The contingent percentage fee stands in a very different posi-
tion relative to the proposed fee. The perfectly knowledgeable
client would only rarely prefer the contingent percentage fee, 237
and the risk of abuse under it is real and great. In view of these
twin considerations, the contingent percentage fee should be
abolished. At the very least, it should bear a heavy presumption of
impropriety, perhaps being permitted only after the lawyer obtains
specific judicial approval.
Lawyers, bar associations, and courts should therefore begin
experimentation in fee reform, with the ultimate aim of replac-
ing the contingent percentage fee with the proposed contingent
hourly-percentage fee.
2'5 For example, a knowledgeable client would prefer a certain hourly fee in a case
involving clear liability, substantial and fixed damages, and little legal work.
2'6 Any kind of "office work," such as drafting a will, serves as an example. See also F.
MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 45-53 (discussing three areas of legal practice where contin-
gent fee generally prohibited); 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES §§ 2:4-:8 (1973).
237 As Appendix K shows, some clients might receive a slightly larger net recovery
under the contingent percentage fee than under the proposed fee, but to predict this the
client would require an unrealistic amount of information concerning the s-curve of his
case.
Also, as Figure 6 shows, there might be some large, dubious cases that a lawyer would
accept under the contingent percentage fee but not under the proposed fee. Regulatory
authorities could cure this by allowing x to increase; the client could solve the problem by
seeking out a lawyer with a lower w. However, it may be that this kind of case should not
be encouraged.
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APPENDIX A
THE CERTAIN HOURLY FEE UNDER THE ECONOMIC MODEL
Because the size of the certain hourly fee varies directly with the number of
hours that the lawyer devotes to the case, it can be expressed as
fh(h) = wh
where w is the lawyer's hourly wage rate, h is the number of hours,fh(h) denotes
the fee function, and the subscript h denotes the certain hourly feature. The
client's net recovery after paying such a fee is the difference between the settle-
ment and the fee. Thus,
C(h) = s(h) -fh(h)
= s(h) - wh
where C(h) and s(h) are the net recovery and settlement functions. We can now
find the value of h that will maximize the client's net recovery by taking the time
derivative 238 of C(h):
C'(h) = s'(h) -fh(h)
= s'(h) - w.
The maximum value of C(h) occurs at the number of hours h* where C'(h) = 0, 23 9
that is, where
s'(h) = w.
238 The notation C'(h) represents the first time derivative, dC(h)ldh. Similarly, the nota-
tion C"(h) will represent the second time derivative, d2C(h)ldh2.
239 To conclude that C(h) reaches its maximum at h*, we must show not only that
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Sincefh(h) = w,fh(h) = s'(h). Finally, since fa(h) and s'(h) represent the slopes of
thefh-line and the s-curve's tangent, the client's net recovery reaches its maximum
at the point h* where the tangent to the s-curve becomes parallel to thefh-line.240
APPENDIX B
THE CONTINGENT PERCENTAGE FEE UNDER THE ECONOMIC MODEL
Because the size of the contingent percentage fee is proportional to the size of
the settlement, it can be expressed as
f%(h) = rs(h)
where r is the lawyer's percentage rate, fq 0 (h) and s(h) denote the fee and settle-
ment functions, and the subscript % denotes the contingent percentage feature.
The client's net recovery after paying such a fee is
C(h) = s(h) -fo(h)
= s(h) - rs(h)
where C(h) and s(h) represent the net recovery and settlement functions. Taking
the time derivative, we get
C'(h) = s'(h) -f %(h)
= s'(h) - rs'(h).
The maximum value of C(h) occurs at the number of hours hc where C'(h) = 0,241
that is, where
s'(h) = rs'(h).
Sincef'%(h) = rs'(h), the client's net recovery reaches its maximum at the point hc
where the tangents to the s-curve and thef-curve become parallel.2 42 Interestingly,
C'(h*) = 0, but also that C"(h*) < 0. We can show the latter in four steps. First, since C'(h)
= s'(h) - w, it follows that C"(h) = s"(h). Second, recall the assumptions we made about s(h):
(1) the lawyer must initially work a certain minimum number of hours, say ha, before s(h)
can take on a positive value, and (2) after the lawyer works ha hours, s(h) increases by
decreasing increments until it levels off to a maximum value at some point hb > ha. See notes
20-21 and accompanying text supra. It follows from these assumptions tiat s' (h) is a decreas-
ing function of h in the interval (ha, hb), with s'(ha) > 0 and s'(hb) = 0. Therefore, s"(h) < 0 in
the range ha < h < hb. Third, since the lawyer will always work more than the minimum
number of hours required to produce a positive settlement, ha < h*. Finally, since s'(h*) =
w, s'(hb) = 0, and w > 0, it follows that h* < hb. Therefore, h* must lie within the range of
h values where s"(h) < 0. This means that C"(h*) < 0. We can therefore conclude that C(h)
reaches its maximum when C'(h) = 0.
240 See Figure 2 supra.
241 Again, we must show not only that C'(h) = 0 at hc, but that C"(h) < 0 there as well.
Since C'(h) = s'(h) - rs'(h) and r < 1, C'(h) = 0 only when s'(h) ' 0. Additionally, at the
point where s'(h) becomes zero, s"(h) < 0. See note 239 supra. Since C"(h) = (1 - r)s"(h) and
r < 1, C"(h) < 0 whenever s"(h) < 0. Therefore, C(h) reaches its maximum when C'(h) = 0.
242 See Figure 3 supra.
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this point does not occur until both curves have reached their respective maxima:
Since r > 0, s'(h) will equal rs'(h) if and only if s'(h) = 0. But under the assump-
tions of the economic model, s'(h) does not become zero until the s-curve levels off
at its maximum value. 243 Therefore, at hc the settlement, the lawyer's total fee,
and the client's net recovery simultaneously reach their maximum values. Since
s(h) will remain constant beyond that point, so willf%(h) and C(h).
Consider now the lawyer's profit, which is the difference between his fee and
his opportunity cost. The profit function, L(h), can be expressed as
L(h) =f%(h) - wh
= rs(h) - wh,
and its time derivative as
L'(h) = rs'(h) - w.
The maximum value of L(h) occurs at the number of hours hL where L'(h) = 0,244
that is, where
rs'(h) = w.
Sincef %(h) = rs'(h), the lawyer's profit reaches its maximum where the tangent to
thefo-curve becomes parallel to the o-line.245
We can now compare the sizes of h*, he, and hL. Note first that s'(hL) = wir,
s'(h*) = w, and s'(hc) = 0. Under the assumptions246 of the economic model, s'(h) is
a decreasing function of h. Additionally, w > 0, and since 0 < r < 1, wlr > w.
Therefore, hL < h* < he.
APPENDIX C
THE PROPOSED FEE UNDER THE ECONOMIC MODEL
The size of the proposed contingent hourly-percentage fee can be expressed
as
f.(h) = wh + x[s(h) - wh]
= xs(h) + (1 - x)wh
243 See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
244 We can show that L"(hL) < 0 as follows: Since L'(h) = rs'(h) - w, L"(h) = rs"(h). Since
r > 0, L"(h) < 0 when s"(h) < 0. We showed earlier that s"(h) < 0 for ha < h < hb, where ha
is the number of hours below which no positive settlement is possible and hb is the number of
hours above which the settlement will not increase. See note 239 supra. Clearly, ha < hL,
because a lawyer will always work more than the minimum number of hours required to
produce a positive settlement. We also showed that s'(h) is a decreasing function of h in the
interval (ha, hb) and that s'(hb) = 0. See id. Since L'(hL) = 0, s'(hL) = wir. Since w > 0 and 0
< r < 1, wir > 0. Therefore, s'(hL) > s'(hb), which implies that hL < hb. Since hL falls within
the range of h values where s"(h) < 0, L"(hL) < 0. Therefore, L(h) reaches its maximum
when L'(h) = 0.
"' See Figure 3 supra.2 46 See notes 21 & 239 supra.
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wheref,(h) denotes the fee function and the subscript n denotes the new combina-
tion of features. The client's net recovery after paying such a fee is
C(h) = s(h) - f.(h)
= s(h) - [xs(h) + (1 -x)wh]
= (I - x) [s(h) - wh].
Thus,
C'(h) = (1 - x) [s'(h) - w].
The maximum value of C(h) occurs at the number of hours where C'(h) = 0,247
that is, where
s'(h) = w.
Sincef'n(h) = xs'(h) + (1 - x)w, it follows thatfn(h) = w when s'(h) = w. Hence, at
the point where the client's net recovery reaches its maximum, the s-curve tangent,
thefn-curve tangent, and the o-line all become parallel.2 48 Since at this point s'(h)=
w, the client's net recovery under the proposed fee reaches a maximum at the
same number of hours, h*, where it reached a maximum under the certain hourly
fee.
2 49
Consider now the lawyer's profit. Under the proposed fee it can be expressed
as
L(h) =fn(h) - wh
= xs(h) + (1 - x)wh - wh
= x[s(h) - wh].
The time derivative becomes
L'(h) = x[s'(h) - w].
The maximum value of L(h) occurs at the number of hours where L'(h) = 0,250
that is, where
s'(h) = w.
Thus, under the proposed fee, the lawyer's profit reaches its maximum at the
same number of hours, h*, where the client's net recovery is maximized
2 5 1
247 Since C'(h) = (1 - x) [s'(h) - w], C"(h) = (I - x)s"(h). When C'(h) = 0, s'(h) = w;
hence, the point where C'(h) = 0 lies within the range where s"(h) < 0. See note 239 supra.
Since 0 < x < 1, C"(h) < 0 as long as s"(h) < 0. Therefore, C(h) will reach its maximum
when C'(h) = 0.24
8 See Figure 4 supra.249 See note 239 and accompanying text supra.
250 Since L'(h) = x[s'(h) - w], L"(h) = xs"(h). When L'(h) = 0, s'(h) = w; hence, the point
where L'(h) = 0 lies within the range where s"(h) < 0. See note 239 supra. Since 0 < x < 1,
L"(h) < 0 as long as s"(h) < 0. Therefore, L(h) will reach its maximum when L'(h) = 0.
251 See text accompanying note 249 supra.
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APPENDIX D
FEE PERFORMANCE IN A LAW FIRM SETTING
Consider a law firm consisting of n lawyers, some of whom may be associates.
With respect to cases charged on an hourly fee basis, the time expended by each
of these lawyers may be billed to the client at a different rate. Let us represent the
hourly wage for lawyer k as Wk. Then, if he devotes hk hours to the case, the firm
will incur an opportunity cost of wkhk.
Let W represent the vector (wI, w2  , w.), and let H represent the vector
(h,, h2 ,. . •, h,). Assume that the settlement s can be expressed as a scalar function
of the vector H in a manner analogous to the simple s-curve of the ideal economic
model.252 The client's net recovery and the firm's profit then reduce to
C(H) = s(H) -f(H), 25 3
and
L(H) =f(H) - W-H.2 5 4
1. The Certain Hourly Fee
Under the certain hourly fee,
fh(H) = W-H.
Thus, the client's net recovery becomes
C(H) = s(H) - W.H.
Taking the gradient of both sides of this equation, we have
25 s
VC(H) = Vs(H) - V(W-H)
= Vs(H) - W.
At the point H* where C(H) reaches its maximum, its gradient is zero, 256 so that
Vs(H*) = W.
2'2 More precisely, we assume that s(H) can be expressed as a twice-differentiable func-
tion of H, and that for positive values of s, aslahk > 0 and 82slahl < 0 for k = 1, 2 .... n.
Cf. note 21 and accompanying text supra. Implicit in this assumption is the notion that the
values of s are independent of the order in which the hours are expended by the various
lawyers.
2 5 The symbolf(H) represents the fee that will result from the expenditure of hl, h,
., h. hours by the n lawyers in the firm.
254 W-H is the scalar product of the vectors W and H, and equals wlh1 + wh 2 + ... +
w,,h,,.
255 The symbol V represents the gradient operator, and is equivalent to the vector
(0/Oh 1 , Oa ..... 90Oh,). Thus, when V operates on a scalar function such as C, the result,
VC, is the vector (OCIOhl, OC/ah2 ..... aCOh.).
256 We know that C(H) does reach a maximum because it is a linear function of s(H),
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Thus, at H*, Os(H)/0hk = wk for k = 1, 2. n.
The firm's profit becomes
L(H) =fa(H) - W-H
= W-H - W-H
=0.
Therefore, the firm will be indifferent to the number of hours devoted by each
lawyer to the case.
2. The Contingent Percentage Fee
Under the contingent percentage fee,
f%(H) = rs(H).
Thus, the client's net recovery becomes
C(H) = s(H) - rs(H)
= (1 - r)s(H).
Taking the gradient of both sides of this equation, we have
VC(H) = (1 - r)Vs(H).
Since r < 1, VC(H) = 0 where Vs(H) = 0. Thus, to maximize the client's net
recovery,257 lawyer k mustcontinue to work until Os(H)/8hk = 0. Recall that at H*,
Os(H)IOh, = wk. Since wk > 0 and since Os(H)/Ohk is a decreasing function of hk, 25 s
it follows that the client would wish each lawyer to work more than H*.
The firm's profit becomes
L(H) =f%(H) - W-H
=rs(H) - W.H.
Taking the gradient of both sides of this equation, we have
VL(H) = rVs(H) - W.
Thus, L(H) will be maximized 259 where
Vs(H) =W
which we assumed is monotonically increasing (OsIOhk > 0 for k = 1, 2 .... n) and concave
downward (02sOihk < 0 for k = 1, 2 .... n) until it levels off at a maximum value. See
note 252 supra. See also notes 239, 241, & 244 supra. Hence, C(H) reaches a maximum at
the point where VC(H) = 0.257 See note 256 supra.
258 See note 252 supra.
259 Because r is a positive constant, L(H) reaches a maximum at the point where VL(H)
= 0. See note 256 supra.
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To maximize the firm's profit, lawyer k must continue to work until Os(H)Ohk =
wkIr. Since 0 < r < 1, wk/r > wk. Since at H* we found that as(H)lOhk = wk, and
since Os(H)fOhk is a decreasing function of hk, 260 it follows that each lawyer will
tend to underwork relative to H*. The economic interests of the firm clearly do
not align with those of the client.
3. The Proposed Fee
Under the proposed contingent hourly-percentage fee,
f (H) = W.H + x[s(H) - W-H].
Thus, the client's net recovery becomes
C(H) = s(H) - W-H - x[s(H) - W.H]
= (I - x) [s(H) - W-H].
Taking the gradient of both sides of this equation, we have
VC(H) = (I - x) [Vs(H) - W].
C(H) will thus reach its maximum 261 where
Vs(H) = W.
Therefore, the client's net recovery under the proposed fee will reach its
maximum at H*, the same point where it reaches its maximum under the certain
hourly fee. 26
2
The firm's profit becomes
L(H) =f,(H) - W-H
=x[s(H) - W-H].
Taking the gradient of both sides of this equation, we have
VL(H) = x[Vs(H) - W].
L(H) will thus reach its maximum 263 where
Vs(H) = W.
Therefore, the firm's profit under the proposed fee will also reach its maximum at
H*.264 The economic interests of the firm and the client will align, not only in the
260 See note 252 supra.
261 Because x < 1, C(H) reaches a maximum at the point where VC(H) = 0. See note
256 supra.
262 See text accompanying note 256 supra.
263 Because x is a positive constant, L(H) reaches a maximum at the point where VL(H)
-. See note 256 supra.264 See text accompanying note 256 supra.
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total number of hours devoted to the case, but also in the allocation of those hours
among the lawyers in the firm, because the particular combination of hl, h2, ... ,h
that will maximize the firm's profit will also maximize the client's net recovery.
APPENDIX E
EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY-SETTLEMENT SITUATION
1. Conditions of Minimal Acceptability
Suppose that at time h the defendant makes a settlement offer s(h). The
plaintiff's lawyer can then compute with certainty the profit, L(h), that he would
realize from accepting that offer, as well as the net recovery, C(h), that his client
would receive:
L(h) =f(h) - wh,
and
C(h) = s(h) - f(h).
Now let H represent the plaintiff's lawyer's estimate of the number of addi-
tional hours of work that would be required if the litigation were to continue
through to judgment. Let P represent his estimate of the probability that judg-
ment would be rendered for the plaintiff. Finally, let A represent the lawyer's
estimate of the size of the judgment that would be awarded if the plaintiff were to
win.265 Thus, the expected value of the total recovery that would result from
working an additional H hours is given by
E[s(h + H)] = PA. 2 66
With these three estimates, the lawyer can determine the expected value of the
fee 267 that he would receive if he rejected the given offer and continued the
litigation to judgment. His expected profit from that fee would then be
E[L(h + H)] = E~f(h + H)] - w(h + H).
265 The quantities H, P, and A are functions of h since they represent estimates made
at time h. To simplify the analysis, we treat these quantities as having the same value for
the client and the lawyer. Cf. note 80 supra. This simplification is defensible because, if no
settlement occurs and the case must continue through to judgment, some particular route
to judgment will be followed, and with that route there will be associated particular values
of H, P, and A. Thus, even though the particular route to judgment that will serve the
interests of the lawyer will not necessarily serve the interests of the client (see Appendix F),
and even though the route ultimately chosen will depend on the decisionmaker and his
particular values of H, P, and A, we can realistically say that with respect to the settlement
decision, the lawyer and the client will envisage the same route to judgment and that both
will base their settlement desires thereon. Moreover, this simplification permits us to limit
the focus in this Appendix to the conflict regarding settlement acceptance, and leave the
conflict regarding the route to judgment for treatment in Appendix F.
266 For a discussion of "expected value," see note 84 supra.
267 The expected value of a continuous random variable z is E(z) = f_, ucl(u)du, where
0. is the probability density function of z, and u is a dummy variable of integration. Cf.
note 84 supra.
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The lawyer can now compare this expected profit with the certain profit that will
result from accepting the offer in hand. That is, he can now compare E[L(h + H)]
with L(h). If L(h) < E[L(h + H)], a risk-neutral lawyer will reject the offer. Thus,
any offer where L(h) < E[L(h + H)] can be termed unacceptable. On the other
hand, if L(h) _- E[L(h + H)], the lawyer may or may not wish to accept the offer,
depending upon his view of the chances of receiving a larger offer.2 68 Thus, we
can consider the condition L(h) -- E[L(h + H)] to be the lawyer's condition of
minimal acceptability. If an offer fails to meet this condition, it will be unaccept-
able from the lawyer's economic viewpoint. If an offer meets this condition, it will
be at least minimally acceptable, and may indeed be accepted.
Similar considerations apply to the client's net recovery. An offer will appear
at least minimally acceptable from the client's economic viewpoint when C(h) >
E[C(h + H)].
Since the functions C(h) and L(h) involvef(h), the conditions of minimal accept-
ability will depend on the fee arrangement. We can now derive expressions for the
client's and the lawyer's conditions under the certain hourly fee, the contingent
percentage fee, and the proposed contingent hourly-percentage fee.
a. The Certain Hourly Fee
(1) Client's Condition
Under the certain hourly fee,f(h) = wh. Thus,
C(h) = s(h) - f(h)
= s(h) - wh.
Also,
E[C(h + H)] = E[s(h + H)] - E[f(h + H)]
= PA - w(h + H). 26 9
Hence, the client's condition of minimal acceptability is
C(h) > E[C(h + H)]
s(h) >' PA - wH.
(2) Lawyer's Condition
The profit function is given by
L(h) =f(h) - wh
= wh - wh
=0.
268 For a discussion of this decision process, see text accompanying notes 273-75 infra.
269 The second term on the right side of this equation does not contain P because
payment of the fee is certain.
[Vol. 63:529
HeinOnline -- 63 Cornell L. Rev. 608 1977-78
IMPROVING ON THE CONTINGENT FEE1978]
Also,
609
E[L(h + H)] = E~f(h + H)] - wh - wH
= w(h + H) - wh - wH
Hence,
L(h) = E[L(h + H)1.
Therefore, regardless of the size of the settlement offer, the lawyer will be indif-
ferent between accepting the offer on the one hand and rejecting the offer and
continuing the litigation through to judgment on the other.
b. The Contingent Percentage Fee
(1) Client's Condition
Under the contingent percentage fee,f(h) = rs(h). Thus,
C(h) = s(h) - rs(h),
E[C(h + H)] = PA - rPA.2 70
Hence, the client's condition of minimal acceptability is
C(h) > E[C(h + H)]
(1 - r)s(h) > (1 - r)PA
or, since r < 1,
s(h) >-PA.
(2) Lawyer's Condition
The profit function is given by
L(h) = rs(h) - wh,
and the expected profit by
E[L(h + H)] = rPA - wh - wH.
Hence, the lawyer's condition of minimal acceptability is
2'70 The second term on the right side of this equation contains P because payment of
the fee is contingent on recovery.
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L(h) >' E[L(h + H)]
wH
s(h) >PA - r'f
c. The Proposed Fee
(1) Client's Condition
Under the proposed fee,f(h) = wh + x[s(h) - wh]. Thus,
C(h) = s(h) - wh - x[s(h) - wh]
= (1 - x)[s(h) - wh].
Also,
E[C(h + H)] = PA - Pw(h + H) - xP[A - w(h + H)]
= (1 - x)[PA - Pw(h + H)].2 71
Hence, the client's condition of minimal acceptability is
C(h) > E[C(h + H)]
s(h) > PA - Pw(h + H) + wh.
(2) Lawyer's Condition
The profit function is given by
L(h) = wh + x[s(h) - wh] - wh
= x[s(h) - wh],
and the expected profit by
E[L(h + H)] = Pw(h + H) + xP[A - w(h + H)] - w(h + H).
Hence, the lawyer's condition of minimal acceptability is
L(h) > E[L(h + H)]
s(h) > PA - Pw(h + H) + wh - [(wlx) (1 - P) (h + H)].2 7 2
271 Again, P appears throughout the right side of this equation because payment of the
fee is contingent upon recovery.
272 For this analysis, we have simplified the proposed fee by removing the policy re-
quirement that the client's net recovery can never be negative. See note 37 supra.
Mathematically we have simplified the fee formula from f(h) = MIN(s(h), wh + x[s(h) -
wh]) to f(h) = wh + x[s(h) - wh]. The effect of this simplification is to convert the C(h)
formula from C(h) = MAX(O, (1 - x)[s(h) - wh]) to C(h) = (1 - x)[s(h) - wh], and the
E[C(h + H)] formula from E[C(h + H)] = MAX(O, (I - x)[PA - Pw(h + H)]) to E[C(h + H)]
= (1 - x)[PA - Pw(h + H)]. These simplified formulas will yield a non-negative net
recovery to the client only if s(h) -- wh and A >a w(h + H). We must therefore determine
whether removing the non-negativity requirement affects the lawyer-client conflict of in-
terest. For example, if such removal understated the conflict between lawyer and client,
our general conclusion that the proposed fee eliminates economic conflict of interest
[Vol. 63:529
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2. Conditions of Acceptance
If the only choices available upon receipt of an offer were either to accept the
offer or to go to judgment, the conditions of minimal acceptability would also be
conditions of acceptance; the first minimally acceptable offer would be accepted.
Thus, if the lawyer received an offer minimally acceptable to him, and if he knew
would be weakened because at least part of that elimination might come artificially from
the effect of removing the non-negativity requirement rather than from the effect of our
proposed fee structure. A consideration of the cases where A < w(h + H) or s(h) < wh,
however, shows that if the possibility of a client's receiving a negative net recovery has any
effect at all, it is to overstate the conflict. Therefore, if anything, removal of the non-
negativity requirement strengthens our general conclusion that the proposed fee aligns
economic interests.
Consider first the condition A < w(h + H) and assume that C(h) = MAX(O, (I - x) [s(h)
- wh]). It is highly unlikely that A would be less than w(h + H), because a lawyer presum-
ably would not accept a case if he estimated that the judgment after victory would yield less
than his opportunity cost. However, an unexpected turn of events after the lawyer has
accepted the case could reduce his estimate of the judgment so that A < w(h + H). At such
a point either s(h) > wh, or s(h) < wh. If s(h) _- wh, then C(h) _- 0, while E[C(h + H)] =
MAX(0, (I - x)[PA - Pw(h + H)]) = 0; hence, the client would want to accept the offer. On
the lawyer's side, L(h) -- 0, while E[L(h + H)] < 0; hence, the lawyer, too, would want to
accept the offer, and no conflict exists. Removing the non-negativity requirement in this
situation will affect only E[C(h +H)]: It will now become negative. This will simply rein-
force the client's desire to accept the offer.
If s(h) < wh while A < w(h + H), then C(h) = MAX(O, (1 - x)[s(h) - wh]) = 0, and
E[C(h + H)] = MAx(O, (I - x)[PA - Pw(h +H)]) = 0. Thus, whether or not the lawyer
accepts the offer, his decision cannot affect the client's economic interests. If we remove
the non-negativity requirement, however, C(h) < 0, and E[C(h +H)] < 0. On the lawyer's
side, L(h) < 0 and E[L(h + H)] < 0, and the lawyer will accept the offer if IL(h) I < I E[L(h
+ H)]I because that will minimize his loss. But unless IC(h)l I- IE[C(h + H)]I, a decision to
accept will hurt the client. Thus, removing the non-negativity requirement gives rise to a
potential source of lawyer-client conflict.
The only remaining possibility is that A _- w(h + H) and s(h) < wh. Because A _- w(h +
H), the non-negativity requirement has no effect on E[C(h + H)] and E[L(h + H)]. There-
fore, if removing the non-negativity requirement has any effect on the conflict between
lawyer and client, it must come from the effects that such removal has on C(h) and L(h).
With the requirement in force, C(h) = MAX(0, (1 - x)[s(h) - wh]) = 0 because s(h) < wh.
This means that if the current offer is accepted, the lawyer Will receive the entire s(h). But
since his opportunity cost is wh, he will suffer a loss: L(h) = s(h) - wh < 0. If we remove
the non-negativity requirement, C(h) = (1 - x) [s(h) - wh] and L(h) = x[s(h) - wh]. Since
s(h) < wh, both C(h) and L(h) will be negative; but since 0 < x < 1, the loss to the lawyer
represented by L(h) decreases as we remove the non-negativity requirement. Therefore, the
lawyer will be more inclined to accept the settlement offer when the non-negativity re-
quirement does not prevail. The client, on the other hand, becomes less inclined to accept
the offer: With the non-negativity requirement, C(h) = 0; without it, C(h) = (1 - x) [s(h) -
wh] < 0. Once again, removing the non-negativity requirement has increased the potential
conflict between lawyer and client.
In sum, the effect, if any, of simplifying the fee formula to allow a negative net recov-
ery to the client is that the analysis of the proposed fee will be conducted under conditions
of more severe economic conflict than would prevail under the correct formula. Thus, the
conclusions that we show to be valid for the simplified formula will be valid a fortiori for
the correct formula.
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with certainty that no further minimally acceptable offers would be tendered, he
would wish to accept the offer.
In reality, however, the lawyer cannot know whether he will receive another
minimally acceptable offer. Consequently, the possibility of subsequent offers will
affect his strategy. If the lawyer believes that the investment of additional time will
result in a more lucrative settlement offer, he may decide to reject the offer in
hand, even though that offer meets his condition of minimal acceptability.
More precisely, the lawyer will wish to accept the offer if the resulting profit is
greater than or equal to his estimate of the profit that would result from rejecting
the offer. Suppose the lawyer receives an offer s(h) that meets his condition of
minimal acceptability. If he accepts the offer, the profit that will result is given by
L(h) =f(h) - wh.
The expected profit that would result from rejecting the offer is more complex.
The lawyer must estimate not only the expected profit that would result from
going to judgment, but also two additional factors: (1) the probability (a) that
there will be another offer minimally acceptable to him if he devotes further time
to the case, and (2) the size (s) of that minimally acceptable offer.2 7 3 Using these
estimates, the lawyer can then determine the expected value of the profit that
would result from rejecting the offer in hand and continuing on. By comparing
this expected profit with the certain profit that would result from accepting the
offer, the lawyer can decide whether accepting the offer would serve his own
economic interests.
Similar considerations apply to the economic interests of the client. Suppose
that the given offer is minimally acceptable to the client. If that offer is accepted,
the resulting net recovery will be
C(h) = s(h) -f(h).
This net recovery must be compared with the expected value of the net recovery
that would result from rejecting the offer and continuing on. That expected net
recovery depends not only on the estimated net recovery that would result from
going to judgment, but also on two additional estimates: (1) the probability that
there will be another offer minimally acceptable to the client, and (2) the size of
that minimally acceptable offer. A comparison of the resulting expected net re-
273 More precisely, 3 is a conditional expected value. Suppose that at time h one course
of action being considered by the lawyer is to work one additional hour, and then to await
or solicit another offer. With respect to that anticipated offer,
If-Luo,(u)du
and
a =fc.(u)du
where m is the lowest offer that would meet the lawyer's condition of minimal acceptability
at time h + 1, and 0. is the probability density function of s at time h + 1. See A. P'ouLIs,
PROBABILITY, RANDOM VARIABLES, AND STOCHASTIC PROCESSES § 5-4, at 143 (1965).
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covery with the certain recovery that will result from accepting the offer will
determine which of the two strategies, accepting or rejecting the offer, will best
serve the client's economic interests.
Using the method just described, we can now derive expressions for the
client's and the lawyer's conditions of acceptance under the certain hourly fee, the
contingent percentage fee, and the proposed contingent hourly-percentage fee.
a. The Certain Hourly Fee
(1) Client's Condition
Under the certain hourly fee,f(h) = wh. Thus, accepting the offer will yield a
net recovery of
C(h) = s(h) - wh,
and rejecting the offer will yield an expected net recovery of
as - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)[PA - w(h + H)].2 74
Hence, the client's condition of acceptance is that C(h) be greater than the ex-
pected net recovery from rejecting the offer:
s(h) _- as - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)[PA - w(h + H)] + wh.
(2) Lawyer's Condition
Accepting the offer will give the lawyer a profit of
L(h) =wh - wh
=0,
and rejecting the offer will give him an expected profit of
a[w(h + 1) - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)[w(h + H) - w(h + H)],
274 The bracketed quantity in the first term of this expression is the expected net recov-
ery, given that s(h + 1) is minimally acceptable. The use of h + 1 for the time of the next
offer results in no loss of generality, since the use of hours as the unit of time is arbitrary.
The bracketed quantity in the second term is the expected net recovery, given that s(h + 1)
is not minimally acceptable.
Implicit in this calculation is a tentative decision rule for time h + 1. For planning
purposes at time h, we assume that if s(h + 1) is minimally acceptable it will be accepted,
and that otherwise it will be necessary to go to judgment. This decision rule is an approxi-
mation, since it is possible that even if s(h + 1) is minimally acceptable, it will be turned
down because of the expectation of another minimally acceptable offer s(h + k), k > 1.
Also, it is remotely possible that, with s(h) acceptable and s(h + 1) unacceptable, s(h + 2)
could be acceptable. To take this possibility into account, however, would require a decision
rule so complex that it would be entirely unrealistic to suppose that anyone would use it.
Furthermore, the use, at time h, of this tentative decision rule for time h + 1 affects only
the decision at time h, and does not commit the decisionmaker to accept any offer at time
h + 1. If and when another minimally acceptable offer is received, the entire decision
process is repeated anew.
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which also equals zero. Thus, regardless of the size of the offer in hand, the profit
from accepting the current offer equals the expected profit from rejecting it. The
lawyer will therefore be indifferent between accepting and rejecting any given
offer.
b. The Contingent Percentage Fee
(1) Client's Condition
Under the contingent percentage fee,f(h) = rs(h). Thus, accepting the offer
will yield a net recovery of
C(h) = s(h) - rs(h),
and rejecting the offer will yield an expected net recovery of
a(I - r)3 + (1 - a)(1 - r)PA.
Hence, the client's condition of acceptance is
s(h) -- a3 + (1 - a)PA.
(2) Lawyer's Condition
Accepting the offer will give the lawyer a profit of
L(h) = rs(h) - wh,
and rejecting the offer will give him an expected profit of
a[r - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)[rPA - w(h + H)].
Hence, the lawyer's condition of acceptance is that L(h) exceed the expected profit
from rejecting the offer:
sh -a3- r) + (1 - ce)(PA----)
c. The Proposed Fee
(1) Client's Condition
Under the proposed fee,f(h) = wh + x[s(h) - wh]. 27 5 Thus, accepting the offer
will yield a net recovery of
C(h) = (1 - x)[s(h) - wh],
and rejecting the offer will yield an expected net recovery of
a(1 - x) [3 - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)(1 - x) P [A - w(h + H)].
275 Again we are simplifying the analysis by not qualifying the proposed fee to prevent
a negative net recovery to the client. The effect of this simplification is similar to that
discussed in note 272 supra.
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Hence, the client's condition of acceptance is
s(h) -- c[3 - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a) P [A - w(h + H)] + wh.
(2) Lawyer's Condition
Accepting the offer will give the lawyer a profit of
L(h) = x[s(h) - wh],
and rejecting the offer will give him an expected profit of
ax[3 - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)[PxA + (1 - x)Pw(h + H) - w(h + H)].
Hence, the lawyer's condition of acceptance is
x[s(h) - wh] -- ax[3 - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)[PxA + (1 - x)Pw(h + H) - w(h + H)].
Dividing by x and adding wh, we get
s(h) a[3 - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)[PA - (1 - -1)Pw(h + H) - (-) (h + H)] + wh
s(h) > a[3 - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a) [PA - Pw(h + H)] +Pw(1 - a)[(w (h + H) + -E- (h + H)] + w~h
s(h) >'a[- - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)P[A - w(h + H)] + wh -
(1 - a) (f ) (I - P) (h + H).
3. Ranges of Conflict
Thus far we have developed two sets of conditions. The first set of conditions,
those for minimal acceptability, were derived by comparing a given offer with the
option of going to judgment. The second set of conditions, those for acceptance,
were derived by comparing the given offer with the option of taking one's chances
on future offers. The latter derivation was linked to the former by the quantity a,
which involved the concept of minimal acceptability. As both derivations show, the
conditions of lawyer and client differ with respect to both minimal acceptability
and acceptance. We can examine the extent to which the economic interests of
lawyer and client differ by analyzing these differences. We can simplify this
analysis by observing that, for both lawyer and client, the threshold of minimal
acceptability is lower than the threshold of acceptance. 7 6 Thus, if an offer meets
276 A proof of this assertion may be outlined as follows. Let mc and mL represent the
client's and the lawyer's respective thresholds of minimal acceptability, and let Sc and SL
represent their respective thresholds of acceptance. For the contingent percentage fee, we
found that mc = PA (see p. 609 supra) and sc = ci + (1 - c)PA (see p. 614 supra). If mc
were greater than Sc, then PA > ds + (1 - a)PA, which can happen only if < PA. But by
definition 3 must be greater than mc, because 3 is the expected value of s(h + 1), given that
s(h + 1) > mc. Since mc = PA, 3 cannot be less than PA. Therefore, Sc > mc.
For the lawyer, ML = PA - wHir (see p. 610 supra), and SL = a(! - wir) + (1 - a) (PA
- wHir) (see p. 614 supra). If mr were greater than sL, then 3 - PA < (wlr) (1 - H). But
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the lawyer's condition of acceptance, it will also meet his condition of minimal
since 3 is approximately the same for lawyer and client (see note 277 infra), and since we
just showed that 3 cannot be less than PA for the client, . cannot be less than PA for the
lawyer. So, 3 - PA > 0, and unless H -- 1, we know 1 - H < 0. Thus, the condition 3 -
PA < (wir) (1 - H) cannot be met because the left side is positive and the right side is
negative. Hence, sL -- mL.
Similarly, for the proposed fee
mc = PA - Pw(h + H) + wh
(see p. 610 supra), and
sc = a[3 - w(h + 1)] + (1 - c)P[A - w(h + H)] + wh
(see p. 615 supra). If mc were greater than sc, then
PA - Pw(h + H) + wh > a[3 - w(h + 1)] + PA - Pw(h + H) + wh -
ctP[A - w(h + H)]
a[3 - w(h +1)] < aP[A - w(h + H)],
which can be true only if
() 1< _ P(h + H) + h.
Since w is the normal wage for only one hour's work, we can make the approximation that
S>> w, so that (1w) - I 1w. Using this approximation, the requirement for mc
> sc becomes
1 PA
- < (--A--) -P(h +H) +h.
But since 3 is, by definition, the conditional expected value of an offer that is minimally
acceptable (see text accompanying note 273 supra), 3 cannot be less than mc. Hence, 31w
mclw. Since MC PA
wE- = - P(h + H) + h,
it follows that 1w cannot be less than (PAIw) - P(h + H) + h. Hence, mc cannot be greater
than sc.
For the lawyer,
m = PA -Pw(h + H) + wh -()(1 -P)(h +H)
(see p. 610 supra), and
SL = a[ - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)P[A - w(h + H)] + wh - (1 -a)( ) (1 - P) (h + H)
(see p. 615 supra). If mL were greater than SL, then
PA - Pw(h + H) + wh -
(--) (1 -P) (h +H) >a[3 -w(h + 1)] +PA -Pw(h +H) -
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acceptability, and he will wish to accept it. Conversely, if the offer does not meet
the lawyer's condition of acceptance, he will reject the offer. The same is true of
the client. Consequently, we can analyze the potential for conflict of interest by
comparing the lawyer's and the client's conditions of acceptance.
Let sL represent the lawyer's threshold of acceptance, and let Sc represent the
client's threshold of acceptance. We can then express their conditions of accept-
ance as s(h) - sL and s(h) -_ sc. A conflict will arise when the offer in hand lies in
the range between sL and sc; the wider the range, the greater the potential for
conflict. To compare sL and sc, we first make the simplifying approximations that
the quantities a and 3 do not materially vary between lawyer and client.2 7 7 We can
now determine the size of the range of conflict by subtraction. 27 8
a. The Contingent Percentage Fee
The client's and the lawyer's thresholds of acceptance are
aP[A - w(h + H)] + wh -
(-v) (1 -P) (h +H) +
(- I - P) (h + H)
a[3- w(h + 1)] < aP[A - w(h + H)] - a(*) (I - P) (h + H).
If we use again the approximation (31w) - 1 (31w), the condition for mL > sL becomes
A P(h + H) + h (-) (1- P) (h +H).
But since 3 is minimally acceptable, it canlnot be less than mL; hence, 3/w > mjrw. Since
- = __) _ P(h + H) + h - (-) (1 - P) (h + H),
it follows that 1w cannot be less than (PAlw) - P(h + H) + h. Therefore, mrL cannot be
greater than sL.
277 These approximations are reasonable for the following reasons. The quantity (1 - a)
represents the probability that the defendant, after making a minimally acceptable offer,
will suddenly cease making such offers. Such a change of strategy would likely result from
the discovery of evidence not known to the defendant at time h, or perhaps from a change
in the defendant's attitude toward bargaining. Thus, we can expect (1 - a) to be small for
both lawyer and client, which means that a is close to 1. Moreover, in many cases where a
defendant's information or attitude has changed, he would not merely cease making mini-
mally acceptable offers, but would become unwilling to bargain at all, except perhaps for
making a nominal settlement offer. The probability of such an event is unrelated to the
lawyer's and the client's conditions of minimal acceptability, and that probability will there-
fore be equal for the lawyer and the client. Consequently, no great inaccuracy is intro-
duced by assuming that the value of a is approximately the same for lawyer and client.
Comparison of the two equations in note 273 supra indicates that if a does not materially
vary between lawyer and client, neither will 3.
278 Since the lawyer is indifferent under the certain hourly fee, he has no definable
threshold of acceptance; hence, no quantitative comparison is possible. But clearly there is
no alignment of economic interests under that fee. Cf. text accompanying note 57 supra.
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sc = as + (1 - a)PA,2 7 9
and
SL = a( ) + (1 - a) (PA - ).280
Thus, the lawyer's threshold is lower than the client's. The difference, or range of
conflict, under the contingent percentage fee is
Rqo Sc -sL
= r-Z +(1 -
b. The Proposed Fee
The client's and the lawyer's thresholds of acceptance are
Sc= a[ - w(h + 1)] + (1 - a)P[A - w(h + H)] + wh, 28 '
and
SL = a[3 - w(h + 1)] + (1- a)P[A - w(h + H)] + wh -
(I - a) (-w) (1 - P) (h + H). 282
Again, the lawyer's threshold is lower than the client's. The range of conflict
under the proposed fee is
R Sc -SL
=(1 w a) (1 - P) (h + H).
c. Comparison of Ranges of Conflict
For both the contingent percentage fee and the proposed fee, the size of the
range of conflict depends on the size of a. If a = 1-that is, if the lawyer feels
certain that he will receive or will be able to solicit another offer that is at least
minimally acceptable-then R. = 0, while Rq, = wir. Under these circumstances,
the proposed fee aligns the interests of lawyer and client perfectly, but the contin-
gent percentage fee does not.
In most cases, although a ' 1, we can expect the size of a to be close to 1, so
that (1 - a) will be small compared to a.283 The expression for Ro contains terms
proportional to both a and (1 - a), but the expression for R, contains only a term
proportional to (1 - a). Since this will cause R. to be closer to 0 than R9. in most
cases, the proposed fee compares favorably with the contingent percentage fee.
Nevertheless, it is possible that in some cases a will be significantly less than 1.
These are cases where the lawyer perceives a substantial likelihood that the defen-
2 9 See p. 614 supra.
280 See id.
281 See p. 615 supra.
282 See id.
283 See note 277 supra.
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dant will make no more minimally acceptable offers. To compare the sizes of R%
and R in such cases, let us assign reasonable values to the various parameters. Let
r = .33, x = .10, and P = 0.9.24 Then
R%= 3aw + 3(1 - a) wH
and
R,= (1 - alw(h + H).
Hence, R, < R% when
h<2H+ I3a1-a
Thus, in cases where a is significantly less than 1, the proposed fee compares
favorably with the contingent percentage fee for offers that are received early in
the litigation: At this stage of the litigation there is less potential for conflict
because the range of conflict is smaller under the proposed fee. While the oppo-
site is true for late offers in these cases, the potential for harm to the interests of
the client is probably greatest in the early stages, when some lawyers accept settle-
ment offers that are low compared with the judgment that could be obtained, but
high compared with the lawyer's opportunity cost for the small number of hours
expended.
APPENDIX F
EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY-JUDGMENT SITUATION
Let us consider a situation where the plaintiff's lawyer does not have in hand
a settlement offer minimally acceptable to either him or the plaintiff,2 5 and where
no such offer is later made. In such a case, although the lawyer does not face a
settlement decision, a conflict of interest can nevertheless arise: The lawyer must
decide how many hours to spend in going to judgment, but the number of hours
of work that best serves his economic interests may not serve the best interests of
his client.
Suppose that the lawyer has already worked h hours in preparing the case,
and is trying to decide whether to devote one additional hour to preparatory
work. Presumably he will devote additional time only if he feels that he will
thereby increase P (his estimate of the probability that judgment will eventually be
rendered for the plaintiff), A (his estimate of the size of the judgment that will be
awarded if the plaintiff wins), or both. Let P0 and A0 represent the values that P
and A would take if preparatory work were to cease at time h, the time at which
the decision is being made. Let P1 and A, be the values of P and A that the lawyer
284 See notes 178-79 and accompanying text supra. Since the expressions for R% and R.
both contain the term H, quantitative comparison requires that H take the same value in
both expressi6ns. Thus, we compare the ranges of conflict at points where the estimated
number of additional hours of work is the same under both fees.
285 The lawyer may have already rejected one or more offers, or he may have received
no offers at all.
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feels will result from an additional hour of preparatory work. Let T represent the
estimated number of hours that must be spent in reducing the case to judgment; T
can be thought of as a fixed wrap-up time.28 6 Then, for the client, the expected
value of the net recovery that will result from h hours of preparatory work is28 7
Co = PoAo - Poo,
where f, is the fee that will result if the lawyer devotes h hours to preparatory
work, expends T hours of wrap-up time, and wins an award of A0 . Similarly, the
expected value of the net recovery that will result from h + 1 hours of preparatory
work is
C1 = PIA1 - PJf1.
A risk-neutral client will want the lawyer to work the additional hour when C1 >
Co. For the lawyer, the expected values of the respective profits that will result
from h and h + 1 hours of preparatory work are
Lo = PQfo - w(h + T),
and
L, = Plfl - w(h + 1 + T).
A risk-neutral lawyer will want to work the additional hour when L, > L.
We can now show how the effect of the additional hour of preparatory work
depends on the fee arrangement.
1. The Contingent Percentage Fee
Under the contingent percentage fee,fo = rAo and f, = rAx. Hence, for the
client,
Co = PoA0 - PorAo
= (1 - r)PoAo,
and
C1 = (1 - r)P1A,.
286 To simplify the analysis, we assume that the litigation consists of two distinct
phases-preparatory work and wrap-up--and that the latter is a constant. In other words,
wrap-up time represents an unavoidable investment of time in finishing up a trial and in
handling any formalities.
287 We are concerned here only with contingent fee arrangements because under the
certain hourly fee the lawyer is theoretically indifferent to the number of hours he works.
See pp. 608-09 & 613-14 supra. Cf. text accompanying note 26 supra. This means that a
lawyer working for a certain hourly fee has no definable cut-off point for preparatory
work. Consequently, we can compare quantitatively only the contingent percentage fee and
the proposed contingent hourly-percentage fee. But clearly there is no alignment of
economic interests under the certain hourly fee. Cf. text accompanying note 57 supra.
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Thus, the client will want the lawyer to work the additional hour when
C, > Co
PIA1 - PoAo > 0.
For the lawyer,
Lo = PorAo - w(h + T),
and
L, = P1rA1 - w(h + 1 + T).
Thus, the lawyer will want to work the additional hour when
L1 >L 0
PIA, - PoAo > wr
Hence, under the contingent percentage fee, the additional hour serves the
client's interests whenever that hour causes even the slightest increase in the ex-
pected value of the judgment; the lawyer's interests, however, will not be served
unless the increase in the expected judgment exceeds wir. Thus, under the contin-
gent percentage fee, the lawyer will always tend to underwork. This substantial
conflict of interest takes a form very similar to the conflict found for the contin-
gent percentage fee under the economic model.
28s
2. The Proposed Fee2
9
Under the proposed fee,fo = w(h + T) + x[Ao - w(h + T)] andfi = w(h + 1 +
T) + x[Al - w(h + 1 + T)]. Hence, for the client,
Co = PoAo - Po [xlo + (1 - x)w(h + T)]
= (I - x) [PoAo - Pow(h + T)],
and
C1 = (1 - x) [PIAl - P1w(h + 1 + T)].
Thus, the client will want the lawyer to work the additional hour when
C > Co
PIA. - PoAo > (P1 - Po)w(h + T) + P1w.
28 We demonstrated in Appendix B the conflict under the economic model.
289 To simplify this analysis, we ignore the policy requirement (discussed in note 37
supra) that the client never receive a negative net recovery under the proposed fee.
Analysis similar to that in note 272 supra shows that taking into account this non-negativity
requirement would only strengthen our conclusions about the proposed fee's alignment of
interests.
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For the lawyer,
Lo = Pow(h + T) + Pox[Ao - w(h + T)] - w(h + T),
and
, = Plw(h + 1 + T) + Plx[A1 - w(h + 1 + T)] - w(h + 1 + T).
Thus, the lawyer will want to work the additional hour when
L1 >Lo
Pw(h + 1 + T) + Plx[A1 -
w(h + 1 + T)] - w(h + 1 + T) >Pow(h + T) + Pox[Ao-
w(h + T)] - w(h + T)
x[P1A1 - PoAo - (P1 - Po)w(h +
T) - P1w] + (P1 - Po)w(h + T) -
(1 -P)w > 0
x(P1A1 - P0A0) >x(P - Po)w(h + T) + xP1w -
(Pi - Po)w(h + T) + (1 - P)w
P, 1 - PoAo > (Pi - Po)w(h + T) + Piw +
-- I[(I - P) - (P1 - Po)(h + T)].
Comparison of the results for the lawyer and the client shows that the two
inequalities are identical except for the term (wlx) [(1 - P,) - (P1 - Po) (h + T)].
Thus, under the proposed fee, some misalignment of interests may occur.
In many cases the defendant's liability is clear, and the only real issue at trial is
the size of the award.290 In such cases, since P0 = P1 = 1, the above term equals
zero. At least here, then, the proposed fee aligns the lawyer's and the client's
interests perfectly, while the contingent percentage fee does not.
In cases where the defendant's liability is not clear, the size of the misalign-
ment term becomes difficult to predict. The first of the two terms in brackets
depends only on the probability P. The second term, however, depends on both
the time of the decision and the amount of change in probability that will result
from one hour's additional preparatory work. Depending upon the relative sizes
of these variables, (1 - PI) may be greater than, equal to, or less than (P1 - Po)
(h + T). Therefore, in some cases the lawyer's and the client's interests may be
aligned under the proposed fee; in others, the lawyer may tend to underwork or
to overwork. 29 1
290 See Grady, supra note 5, at 24.
291 In the foregoing analysis we have assumed that the lawyer and the client are risk-
neutral. Analysis of risk-aversion in this judgment context is even more complicated than
the similar analysis in the settlement context. Cf. note 86 and accompanying text supra. In
that context, the choice was between a certain sum and a contingent one: The decision was
whether or not to take a risk. In the present context,- however, the choice is between two
uncertain sums. The lawyer and the client will be taking a risk whether or not the addi-
tional hour is expended. Because of this complexity one cannot predict as a general matter
whether risk-aversion will lead the decisionmaker to choose fewer hours of work or more.
For example, it may turn out that a risk-averse lawyer will hesitate to risk investing an
additional hour unless L, is substantially greater than Lo; on the other hand, even though
[Vol. 63:529
HeinOnline -- 63 Cornell L. Rev. 622 1977-78
IMPROVING ON THE CONTINGENT FEE
APPENDIX G
FORWARDING FEES
Suppose that one lawyer (the "forwarding lawyer") refers a case to a second
lawyer (the "working lawyer"), and that in return the forwarding lawyer is to
receive a fraction y of the ultimate feef. By analyzing the circumstances that make
it economically attractive for the working lawyer to accept the case on these terms,
we can examine the effect that a shift from the contingent percentage fee to the
proposed fee would have on the prevalence of fractional forwarding fees.
We can approach this problem by assuming that the second lawyer will accept
the case only if he feels that the total time H that he expects to devote to the case
will result in a fee at least as great as his opportunity cost. Then, his condition for
accepting the case is
(I - y)E(f) -- wH.
Let P represent the working lawyer's estimate of the probability that the plaintiff
will recover some amount greater than zero, whether by settlement or judgment,
and let R represent the conditional expected value of the recovery given that there
is a positive recovery.
Under the contingent percentage fee, E(f) = PrR. Hence, the condition for
accepting the case becomes (1 - y)PrR > wH, or
1
-- (1 -y)rq,
where q is the payoff ratio, 292 defined as RlwH.
Under the proposed fee, E(f) = P[wH + x(R - wH)].2 93 Hence, the condition
becomes
(1 -y)P[xR + (1 -x)wH] -- wH
I-- (1 -y) (xq + 1 -x).
P
To compare these conditions, let us assume that the working lawyer has
agreed to charge a contingent percentage fee of 33V3%, and has also agreed to pay
a third of that fee to the forwarding lawyer. The condition for accepting the case
under the contingent percentage fee then becomes
1 2
Hence, for any given value of q, the smallest value of P for which the working
lawyer will accept the case is the value of P that satisfies the following equation:
L1 < Lo, he might still wish to invest the hour because P1 > P0 and because his aversion to
risk causes him to place heavy emphasis on reducing the probability of losing the case. In
light of this complexity, we will not introduce risk attitudes here. Cf. note 89 supra.
292 See text accompanying note 189 supra.
293 We can safely assume that R -- wH, so that the formula for the proposed fee
cannot yield a negative net recovery to the client. See notes 37 & 272 supra.
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q
This equation is depicted by the broken curve in Figure 7. For example, if q = 9 in
a given case, the working lawyer will accept the case only if P is at least .5.
Now, with the same fractional forwarding fee arrangement, suppose that the
working lawyer has agreed to charge a contingent hourly-percentage fee with x set
at 5%. The condition for accepting the case becomes
1<2
p -- (.0 5q + .95).
Hence, for any given value of q, the smallest acceptable value of P is
1.5
.05q + .95
This equation is depicted by the uppermost solid curve in Figure 7. As that curve
shows, no case will be acceptable unless it has a very high probability of success
and a very high payoff ratio. Even if the working lawyer doubles x to 10%, the
number of acceptable cases will still be relatively small.2 94 As the lower solid curve
FIGURE 7
Effect of Forwarding Fees on Acceptability Boundaries
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PAYOFF RATIO (q)
8 9 10 11 12 13
'
9
' Cf. text accompanying note 178 supra.
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in Figure 7 shows, a case that the working lawyer estimates to have a 95% proba-
bility of success would still require a payoff ratio of at least seven to one.
Thus, under any particular fractional forwarding fee arrangement-that is,
for any given value of y-fewer cases will appear acceptable to the working lawyer
under the proposed fee than under the contingent percentage fee.2 95 To offset
this effect under the proposed fee, the forwarding lawyer would have to reduce
his fee, either by lowering y or by shifting from a fractional forwarding fee to a fee
based on work performed. Consequently, we can expect the substitution of the
proposed fee for the contingent percentage fee to reduce the prevalence of heavy
fractional forwarding fees.
APPENDIX H
COMPUTATION OF THE PARAMETER X
We can express the proposed contingent hourly-percentage fee by the formula
f(h) = xs(h) + (1 - x)wh, where x represents a percentage. 296 The computation of x
depends in part on whether x is to be fixed for all cases or left to negotiation in
individual cases.
1. Fixed x
For a representative group of lawyers handling contingent percentage cases,
let B represent the total time expended by these lawyers on all cases handled
during some period under a contingent percentage fee arrangement, including
cases where no recovery was obtained; let D represent the total amount recovered
in these cases, whether through settlement or judgment; let p represent the frac-
tion of these cases where there was a recovery; let r represent the average percent-
age rate charged by these lawyers for contingent percentage cases; 2 97 and let w
represent the average hourly wage charged by these lawyers for certain hourly
cases. The average hourly earnings w% on contingent percentage cases would
then be
295 For the purpose of quantitative comparison, we assume that P and q are indepen-
dent of the fee arrangement between the lawyer and the client. This assumption introduces
some inaccuracy. Under the proposed fee, a lawyer acting in his own economic interests
will tend to devote more time to any given case than he would devote under the contingent
percentage fee. See text accompanying note 246 supra. Hence, a shift from the contingent
percentage fee to the proposed fee will probably cause a slight increase in P and a slight
decrease in q. However, since the slope of the curves in Figure 7 is from upper left to
lower right, these changes in P and q will be mutually offsetting rather than cumulative. A
simultaneous increase in P and decrease in q will cause any given case to shift in a direction
roughly parallel to the curves. Hence, with respect to the regions depicted in Figure 7, any
given case will maintain its relative position as we shift from the contingent percentage fee
to the proposed fee. Therefore, the inaccuracy introduced by this assumption is not sig-
nificant.
'96 See text accompanying notes 171-72 supra.
297 More precisely, r is the ratio of the total fees charged to the total amount recovered
in all those cases handled under a contingent percentage fee arrangement.
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total amount charged under contingent percentage fee arrangement
W% = total hours spent on contingent percentage cases
rD
B
Now, let us suppose that the proposed fee replaces the contingent percentage
fee.2 8 The average hourly earnings w. would then be
total amount charged under proposed fee arrangement
W-n = total hours spent on proposed fee cases
11 [xD + p(1 
- x)wB]
xD + p(1 -x)w. 29 9
B
To compute the size of x, we must first choose a goal, because at least two
goals are possible: (1) to make lawyers' average hourly earnings under the pro-
posed fee the same as under the contingent percentage fee, or (2) to make their
average hourly earnings under the proposed fee the same as under the certain
hourly fee.
The first of these goals requires
xD Wn Wqy + p(1 - x)w = w%.
Since WTo = rDIB, the above equation becomes
x( -. "- -pw) = Wq - pw.
Now, if we let k = wqjw, then
k-p
k
298 We make the simplifying assumption that, despite the shift, p will remain un-
changed and that, for any given value of B, D will remain unchanged. Actually, a change
from the contingent percentage fee to the proposed fee would have some effect on the
number of hours worked and the size of the recovery in any particular case, as well as on
the mix of cases that lawyers would accept. See text accompanying notes 36, 47, & 189-96
supra. These changes would in turn alter somewhat the fraction of cases where there was a
recovery and the effectiveness of the hours worked (recovery per hour).
299 The quantity p appears in the formula for w. because B represents the hours spent
on all cases handled under a contingent arrangement, not just on those cases yielding a
recovery. Thus, the product of p and B will approximate the number of hours spent on the
cases yielding a recovery. This is an approximation because the number of hours spent on
the average recovery-yielding case may differ from the number of hours spent on the
average case yielding no recovery. If p were defined as the fraction of hours spent on cases
yielding a recovery, no approximation would be necessary. We define p as the fraction of
cases yielding a recovery because this fraction is more readily obtainable.
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The second goal requires
xDW n =WY  + p(l-x)W = w.
Again, since W, = rD/B,
Wqo
x(-- - pw) = w(1 - p)
'-p.
k
-P
Accordingly, if empirical data for p, r, and k can be obtained, x can be com-
puted.300
2. Negotiable x
Suppose that a lawyer wishes to select a value of x for a particular case. Let P
represent the lawyer's estimate of the probability that the plaintiff will recover
some amount greater than zero, whether by settlement or judgment; let R repre-
sent the conditional expected value of the recovery given that there is a positive
recovery; let H represent the total time that the lawyer expects to devote to the
case; and let w represent the lawyer's certain hourly wage. Then, the expected
value of his hourly earnings under the proposed fee will be
E(w) xREw)= P[- -+ (I - x)w].
Hence, by varying x, the lawyer can vary the size of E(w,). The selected value of x
will depend on the lawyer's goal. The lawyer's goal can be generally expressed as
E(w.) = Kw, where K can be any positive number.30' Then,
P [- + (1 -x)w] = Kw
x(R - wH) = wH(K  1)
K
P
x- q- 1
where q is the payoff ratio 3 0 2 defined as RlwH. Thus, the value of x will depend
300 See notes 178 & 179 supra. Once again we have simplified the analysis by ignoring
the non-negativity requirement on the client's net recovery. Cf. notes 37 & 272 supra. The
effect of accounting for the non-negativity requirement would be a slight increase in the
size of x, to compensate lawyers for the larger losses that they will suffer from cases where
the opportunity cost exceeds the recovery.
301 Thus, K = I would make the lawyer's expected hourly earnings equal w, his certain
hourly wage; K = wqjw would make his expected hourly earnings equal Wqo, his average
hourly earnings under the contingent percentage fee. K will vary from one lawyer to the
next according to such factors as relative bargaining power and attitude toward risk.
3
0 2 See text accompanying note 189 supra.
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on the lawyer's goal, and on his estimate of the probability of recovery and his
estimate of the payoff ratio for the individual case.303
APPENDIX I
EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED FEE ON CASE MIX
Suppose that a lawyer must decide whether or not to accept a given case. To
see how his fee arrangement will affect his decision, assume that he will accept the
case only if he feels that the total time H that he expects to devote to the case will
result in a fee f at least as great as his opportunity cost wH. The condition for
accepting the case can then be expressed as E(f) _- wH.30 4 Let P represent the
lawyer's estimate of the probability that the plaintiff will recover some amount
greater than zero, whether by settlement or judgment, and let R represent the
conditional expected value of the recovery given that there is a positive recovery.
Under the contingent percentage fee, E(f) = PrR, and the condition for
accepting the case becomes
PrR - wH.
Thus, for given values of P, R, and H, the minimum value of r that the lawyer
must charge to make the case economically acceptable is
wH
rmin =arnn PR
or, equivalently,
1
rmin pq=
where q is the payoff ratio, 305 defined as R/wH.
Under the proposed fee, E(f) = P[wH + x(R - wH)], 30° and the condition
becomes
P[wH + x(R - wH)] -- wH.
Thus, for given values of P, R, and H, the minimum value of x that will make a
case economically acceptable is
'1 - wH
P
Xmin 
- R - wH
303 Once again we have simplified the analysis by ignoring the non-negativity require-
ment. Cf. notes 37, 272, & 300 supra. The effect of this simplification in the context of
negotiated fees depends on the lawyer's estimate of the likelihood of a positive recovery
below his opportunity cost. A lawyer would be unlikely to accept a case on a contingent fee
basis if he thought there was a substantial likelihood of such a low recovery in the event of
victory. Hence, the non-negativity requirement would probably have little or no effect on
the negotiated fee in most cases.
304 E(f) represents the expected value of the fee. See note 267 supra.
30- See text accompanying note 189 supra.
306 See text accompanying note 40 supra; note 293 supra.
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1
P
Xmfn - q- 1
These formulas show that, within limits, cases can be made economically
acceptable by raising r or x. Suppose now that, because of restrictions imposed by
law or custom, these percentages cannot be raised above certain maximum levels,
r a, and xma. We can then determine and compare30 7 the conditions that make
cases economically acceptable.
Under the contingent percentage fee, if r cannot exceed rmax, a case will be
acceptable only if
Prma..R > wH1P I qa-''
The broken curve in Figure
r,.m = 33Y3%.308
6 represents the boundary for this condition when
FIGURE 6
Acceptability Boundaries
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
PAYOFF RATIO (q)
7 8 9 10
307 See note 295 supra.
3°8See notes 194-95 and accompanying text supra. For convenience, we reproduce
Figure 6 here.
629
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Similarly, under the proposed fee, if x cannot exceed Xmax, a case will be
acceptable only if
P[wH + Xmax(R - wH)] wH
1
qxmax - Xmaz + 1
The solid curve in Figure 6 represents the boundary for this condition when Xmax
= 15%.309
The two curves in Figure 6 cross in such a way that, relative to the contingent
percentage fee, the proposed fee encourages the acceptance of small, meritorious
cases and discourages the acceptance of large, dubious cases.310 It is important to
prove that this will always occur, no matter what values are chosen for Xmax and
ro. We will prove this proposition informally by showing (1) that when P = 1,
the solid curve must lie to the left of the broken curve, and (2) that as P decreases
and q increases, the two curves must cross.
The equation for the broken curve is
1
qra,
Hence, for any point on the broken curve,
1
q Prm.
Thus, when P = 1, q = 1/rm. Since 0 < rmx < 1, it follows that l/rmax > 1, and
q > 1. The equation for the solid curve is
qxma- Xmax + 1
Hence, for any point on the solid curve,
1 I Xma
q Pxm-a Xmax
Thus, when P = 1, q = 1. Therefore, when P = 1, the solid curve will lie to the left
of the broken curve.
To find the crossing point, we simply equate the broken curve and solid curve
expressions:
p=-=
qrmax qxmax - Xmax + 1
The curves will cross when
1 - Xmax
q = rmax - Xma
x
3'9 See id.
310 For definitions of the terms "large," "small," "meritorious," and "dubious," see text
accompanying note 189 supra.
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Since 0 <rmn, < 1 and 0 < xmo, < 1, we conclude that, as long as rma. > Xmax, the
curves will cross at a finite value of q greater than one.
3 1 1
APPENDIX J
EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED FEE ON SETTLEMENT RATE
In this Appendix we examine the effect of the plaintiff's fee arrangement on
the likelihood of settlement. In Appendix E we showed that the conditions under
which a given settlement offer will appear minimally acceptable to the plaintiff or
to his lawyer depend on the fee arrangement. Those thresholds of minimal accept-
ability represented the plaintiff's and his lawyer's lower bounds on the range of
offers that could result in settlement. We can now apply a similar analysis to the
defendant's 31 2 economic interests in order to derive an upper bound on the range
of offers that he could make. These upper and lower bounds will define a range
of possible settlements, and the size of that range will provide a rough measure of
the likelihood of settlement. 13 It follows that if a shift from the contingent per-
centage fee to the proposed fee affects the distance between the lower and upper
bounds of that range, such a shift will affect the likelihood of settlement, and
hence the settlement rate.
311 In Figure 6, where rma,, = 33Y3% and xm = 15%, the curves cross at q = 4.64.
312 For the purposes of this analysis, we do not distinguish between the economic in-
terests of the defendant and his lawyer. This absence of conflict of interest is quite realistic;
in the cases we consider, the defendant's lawyer is almost always paid on a certain hourly
basis (see Grady, supra note 5, at 23) and will therefore be theoretically indifferent to the
size of the settlement offer. Moreover, if any conflict between the defendant and his lawyer
does exist, it is very likely independent of the plaintiff's fee arrangement, and can there-
fore be ignored here. Other conflicts on the defendant's side, such as the conflict between
an inadequately insured defendant and his insurance company, are likewise not relevant to
the problem being considered here.
313 The relationship between the size of the range and the likelihood of settlement
arises from the uncertainty as to the size of the defendant's settlement offer. Let k(s) rep-
resent the probability density function of the defendant's offer. If we let M represent the
maximum offer that the defendant is willing to make, then 0(s) will be positive on the
interval 0 -_ s -_ M, and zero for all other values of s. If we let m represent the plaintiff's
threshold of minimal acceptability, and if 0 < m < M, then the probability '3 that the
defendant's offer will fall within the range of possible settlement is
If we assume that M does not depend on the plaintiff's fee arrangement, we can determine
the relationship between the size of the range and the probability of settlement by taking
the derivative of /3 with respect to m while holding M constant:
P -8 = a f " (s )d ,
= -0(m).
Since 0 < m < M, it follows that OPIam < 0. Hence, if 0 < m < M, then increasing the size
of the range of possible settlement will increase the likelihood of settlement. Of course, if m
_- M, the probability of settlement will be zero.
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The cost of a settlement or judgment to the defendant is the sum of two
quantities: (1) the amount of the settlement or judgment, and (2) the fee paid by
the defendant to his lawyer. At time h a risk-neutral defendant will be willing to
settle for a given amount s(h) only if the resulting certain cost to him does not
exceed the expected value of the cost that would result from going to judgment.
Let H represent the defendant's estimate of the number of additional hours
that his lawyer would have to work if the litigation were to continue through to
judgment. Let PA represent the defendant's estimate of the probability that judg-
ment will be rendered for the plaintiff. Let A A represent the defendant's estimate
of the size of the judgment that would be awarded if the plaintiff were to win.31 4
LetfA(h) represent the fee of the defendant's lawyer at time h. Then, the defen-
dant will be willing to settle only if
s(h) +fA(h) - PA/A +fA(h + H). 3 15
If we assume that the defendant is paying his lawyer a certain hourly fee 31 6 at a
rate of w, the above expression becomes
s(h) + wh -- PAAA + w(h + H).
Thus, the maximum offer MA that the defendant is willing to make is
MA = PAA + wH.
In Appendix E we calculated for each fee arrangement the plaintiff's
threshold of minimal acceptability, mc, and the threshold of minimal acceptability
for the plaintiff's lawyer, mL. If at time h the defendant makes an offer s(h), and if
the plaintiff's best interests control the settlement decision on the plaintiff's side,
the offer will be rejected unless s(h) -_ mc. However, the defendant will make the
offer only if s(h) -_ MA. Hence, if MA -- mc, there will exist a range of offers for
which settlement will be possible. Alternatively, if the best interests of the plain-
tiff's lawyer control, settlement will be possible only if MA - mL. We can now
examine how a shift from the contingent percentage fee to the proposed fee
would affect the possibility of settlement.
Consider first the case where the settlement decision on the plaintiff's side is
made in the best interests of the plaintiff. Under the contingent percentage fee,
mc = PA 'A.31 7 Therefore, settlement is possible when
314 The quantities H, PA, and AA are functions of h since they represent estimates made
at time h.
315 See Posner, supra note 19, at 417-20.
316 See Grady, supra note 5, at 23. To simplify the analysis, we also assume that w for
the defendant's lawyer is the same as for the plaintiff's lawyer under the proposed fee.
317 See text accompanying note 270 supra. The values P.r and A,, are equivalent to the
values P and A in Appendix E. The subscripts merely distinguish these estimates of the
plaintiff (or, more properly, of the plaintiff's lawyer) from those of the defendant. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that H is the same for the defendant as for the plaintiff.
See note 265 supra.
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Ma mc
Pa,4a + wH P A,
P A - PAA wH.
Under the proposed fee, mc = - P,zv(h + H) + wh. 3 18 Hence, settlement is
possible when
MA >t mc
PAAA + wH >PA - Pwi(h + H) + wh
PrA= - PAAA wH + P,,w(h + H) - wh.
Thus, under either fee, the possibility of settlement depends on the difference
between the plaintiff's and the defendant's estimates of the expected value of the
judgment for the plaintiff. More specifically, each fee imposes a limit on how far
the estimates of plaintiff and defendant may diverge before settlement becomes
impossible. As a rough measure, then, the fee that imposes the higher limit on the
size of PA, - PaAA carries with it the greater possibility-and hence the greater
likelihood-of settlement. 31 9 The limit on P,A - P&a is higher under the pro-
posed fee3 20 than under the contingent percentage fee when
wH + P,,w(h + H) - wh > wH
hPrh + H
Generally, then, if the settlement decision on the plaintiff's side is made in the best
interests of the plaintiff, a shift from the contingent percentage fee to the pro-
posed fee will encourage settlement when h is small or when P, is large-that is,
when the settlement offer comes early in the case, or when the plaintiff's estimate
of the probability of victory is large. The points lying inside regions A and C of
Figure 8 satisfy this condition.
Consider now the case where the plaintiff's lawyer makes the settlement deci-
sion in his own interests rather than in the best interests of his client. Under the
contingent percentage fee, mL = PAw - (wHir).3 2 1 Thus, settlement is possible
when
ma >mL
wH
PtA + wH P=A, -r
1
PwA, - PAAA (1 + T)wH.
Under the proposed fee, since mL = P,A,, - Pdw(h + H) + wh - [(,) (1 - P)
(h + H)],322 settlement is possible when
38 See text accompanying note 271 supra. We again ignore the requirement under the
proposed fee that the plaintiff never receive a negative net recovery. Cf. note 272 supra.
319 See note 313 supra.
320 Comparisons of the restrictions on P.A. - PAAA for the proposed fee and the
contingent percentage fee are made at equal values of H. Cf. note 284 supra.
321 See text accompanying note 270 supra.
322 See text accompanying note 272 supra.
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PAAA + wh >PA - Pw(h + H) + wh -
[(-:M) (1 - P,) (h + H)]
P A - Pd4A' w(H - h) + Pw(h + H) +
(--) (I - P,) (h + H).
This time, the limit on P,,A, - PAAA will be higher under the proposed fee than
under the contingent percentage fee when
w(H - h) + Pwg~(h + H) + ( w ) (I - P,) (h + H) > (I + -L)wH
1
Pr H+h l h+HP,,(h + H) 7 -- h-( + H) >
Hx
P (1- x)(h + H) < h +H- hx - Hx
h(1 x) + H(1- - -)
P < (1 -x)(h+H)
H(1 x) + H(x - + h(1 -x)
(1 -x)(h +H)
x
H r~P,< I + _H+ )
+H I1-x
h
P,< 1 - (I H ) ( _ ) 1 -rh -x r
Generally, then, if the settlement decision on the plaintiff's side is made in the best
interests of the plaintiff's lawyer, a shift from the contingent percentage fee to the
proposed fee will encourage settlement when h is large or when P. is small-that
is, when the settlement offer comes late in the case, or when the plaintiff's esti-
mate of the probability of victory is small. The points lying inside regions C and B
of Figure 8 satisfy this condition. 323
In sum, the three regions in Figure 8 depict the effect on settlement rate of
replacing the contingent percentage fee with the proposed fee. In region A, set-
tlement is encouraged if the decision is made in the plaintiff's best interests, but
discouraged if made in his lawyer's best interests. In region B, settlement is dis-
couraged if the decision is made in the plaintiff's best interests, but encouraged if
made in his lawyer's best interests. In region C, settlement is encouraged no
matter whose interests govern. To illustrate how this figure works for a typical
case, let P, = .9,"24 and let h vary to simulate the passage of time. If the plaintiff's
323 The boundary for this condition-the line separating regions A and C in Figure
8-is computed for x = .10 and r = .33.
324See note 76 supra.
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FiGuRE 8
Effect of the Proposed Fee on Settlement Rate
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interests control, the passage of time will cause such a case to go through regions
A and C, where settlement will be encouraged, and then to cross into region B,
where settlement will be discouraged. Alternatively, if the plaintiff's lawyer's in-
terests control, the case will go through region A, where settlement will be dis-
couraged, and then cross into regions C and B, where settlement will be encour-
aged. For the typical case, then, a shift from the contingent percentage fee to the
proposed fee means that the case will go through one phase where settlement is
encouraged and one phase where settlement is discouraged. We can therefore
surmise that such a shift in fee arrangements will not have a significant overall
effect on the settlement rate.
APPENDIX K
EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED FEE ON THE CLIENT'S NET RECOVERY
This Appendix addresses two questions: (1) whether clients as a group would
receive larger net recoveries under the proposed fee than under the contingent
percentage fee, and (2) whether a knowledgeable individual client would ever
prefer the contingent percentage fee to the proposed fee.
To answer the first question, consider the group of cases now handled under
a contingent percentage fee arrangement. Let s(h) represent the s-curve of an
average case in this group, and let hL represent the number of hours now worked
on this average case. Next, suppose that the proposed fee,fj, replaces the contin-
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gent percentage fee, f%, and that the number of hours worked becomes h*. The
change in the client's net recovery will depend on the value of x used in computing
the proposed fee. Assume that x is chosen so as to make lawyers' average hourly
earnings the same under both fees:
3 25
f. (h*) f%(hL)
h* hL
In calculating the value of x that would achieve this goal, we made the simplifying
assumption that the average recovery per hour would not vary from the contin-
gent percentage fee to the proposed fee.3 26 Thus, as an approximation,
s(h*) s(hL)
h* h
Combining the two equations, we have
s(h*) -f.(h*) s(hL) -f% (hL)
h* hL
Since the quantity [s(hL) -f%(hL)] is the average client's net recovery, Co, under
the contingent percentage fee, and the quantity [s(h*) - f.(h*)] is the average
client's net recovery, C., under the proposed fee,
h*
Cn = (T)c%.
If, as is very likely, removal of the incentive for lawyers under the contingent
percentage fee to cease working too soon leads to an increase in the number of
hours worked on the average case, then hL < h*. 327 Therefore, C, > C%. In sum, if
x is chosen so as to make lawyers' average hourly earnings the same under both
fees, the average client will receive a larger net recovery under the proposed fee
than under the contingent percentage fee.3 28
Consider now whether a client's net recovery in an individual case handled
under the proposed fee 32 9 can ever be greater if handled under the contingent
percentage fee. To answer this question, we return to the assumptions of the
original economic model, 330 and further assume that the lawyer decides in his own
325 In Appendix H we discussed the computation of x based on another possible goal:
making lawyers' average hourly earnings the same under the proposed fee as under the
certain hourly fee. The goal we have assumed here yields the smaller net recovery for the
client.
126 See note 298 supra.
3
2
1 See text accompanying note 246 supra.
2 If we chose x so as to make lawyers' average hourly earnings the same under
the proposed fee as under the certain hourly fee (see note 325 supra), x would be smaller.
See text accompanying notes 299-300 supra. Hence, the average client's net recovery would
be larger, and the conclusion that C, > C% would follow a fortiori.
329 In the world outside the economic model, some cases rejected by the lawyer under
the proposed fee might be accepted under the contingent percentage fee. See text accom-
panying note 195 supra. Cf. note 237 supra.
330 See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
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best interests how much time to devote to the case. Under the contingent per-
centage fee, the client's net recovery is
Cq = s(hL) - rs(hL).
Under the proposed fee, the client's net recovery is
C, = s(h*) - [wh* + x(s(h*) - wh*)].
Thus, Cq, > C,, when
(I r)s(hL) > (I - x) [s(h*) - wh*].
For a lawyer to accept a case under the contingent percentage fee, however, his
fee must equal or exceed his opportunity cost. That is,
rs(hL) > whL
s(hL) - whL > (1 - r)s(hL).
Therefore, a knowledgeable client will prefer the contingent percentage fee only
if the s-curve of his case meets the following conditions:
s(hL) - whL -- (1 - r)s(hL) > (1 - x) [s(h*) - wh*].
Presumably, only a minority of cases fall within this range.
33 1
331 For a case to fall within this range, the shape of its s-curve must be such that it
meets three conditions. First, the range must exist: s(hL) - whL > (1 - x)[s(h*) - wh*].
Second, C% must be less than or equal to the upper bound of that range: (1 - r)s(hL) -
s(hL) - whL. Third, C% must exceed the lower bound of the range: (1 - r)s(hL) > (1 -
x)[s(h*) - wh*]. To relate these three conditions to the shape of the s-curve, let t = h* - hL,
and let u = [s(h*) - s(hL)]It. Thus, t represents the time between hL and h*, and u represents
the average slope of the s-curve between hL and h*. Since the slope of the s-curve decreases
from wlr to w on the interval between hL and h* (see text accompanying note 246 supra), the
value of u for any s-curve lies somewhere between w and wir. We can now rewrite the first
and third conditions in terms of the new parameters u and t. The first condition becomes
s(hL) - whL > (1 - x)[s(hL) + ut - whL - wt].Simplifying, we get (u - w)t < [xI(l - x)][s(hL)
- whL]. Similarly, the third condition becomes (u - w)t < whL - [(r - x)I(1 - x)]s(hL). If we
let r = .33 and x = .10, the first condition becomes (u - w)t < .ll[s(hL) - whL]; the second
condition becomes s(hL) - 3whL; and the third condition becomes (u - w)t < whL -
.26s(hL). Thus, the first and third conditions place upper limits on the size of the quantity
(u - w)t. This quantity represents the amount by which the return (s(h) - wh) increases
when h increases from hL to h*. The improvement in the return must be small enough to
meet both conditions. The first condition means that the return cannot increase by more
than 11 % between hL and h*. Also, the combination of the second and third conditions can
be satisfied only if (u - w)t - .07 s(hL) and (u - w)t - .23whL; thus, the improvement in the
return cannot exceed 7% of the recovery at hL, nor can it exceed 23% of the opportunity
cost at hL. Moreover, these conditions place upper and lower bounds on the permissible
size of the recovery at hL. To meet the first condition, s(hL) > whL + 9(u - w)t. At the same
time, the second condition requires s(hL) _- 3whL. To meet the third condition, however,
s(hL) < 3.9whL - 3.9(u - w)t. The combination of these requirements mandates that at hL
the s-curve undergo a sharp decrease in slope and have a narrowly circumscribed height. It
seems unlikely that the s-curves of most cases will meet all these rather specialized require-
ments.
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We can also determine how much difference (D) there can be between the
client's net recoveries under the two fees:
D = (1 - r)s(hL) - (1 - x) [s(h*) - wh*].
When D > 0, the client does better under the contingent percentage fee; when
D < 0, the client does better under the proposed fee. Let t = h* - hL, and let u =
[s(h*) - s(hL)]It. Thus, t represents the number of hours between hL and h*, and u
represents the average slope of the s-curve between hL and h*. After rearranging
terms, we have
D = (1 - r)s(hL) - (1 - x) [s(hL) + Ut - whL - Wt].
For any fixed value of hL, then, we can see how the shape of the s-curve will affect
OD
= 
-(1 
-x)t,
tD = -(1 -x)(u -w),
and
OD
Os(hL) - -r - x).
Since h* > hL, 3 32 we know that t > 0; and since x < 1, we know that ODfOu < 0.
Since the slope of the s-curve between hL and h* varies from wir to w, 33 3 and since
0 < r < 1, we know that u (the average slope of the s-curve between hL and h*) must
be greater than w; hence aD/Ot < 0. Finally, as long as r > x, OD/Os(hL) < 0. Since
all three partial derivatives are negative, the client's net recovery under the con-
tingent percentage fee will exceed his net recovery under the proposed fee by the
maximum possible amount when u, t, and s(hL) become as small as possible. We
have seen that u cannot be smaller than w, and that t cannot be smaller than zero.
We also know that for the lawyer to accept the case on a contingent per-
centage basis, rs(hL) must be greater than or equal to whL. Hence, s(hL) cannot be
smaller than whL/r. Therefore, we can place an upper bound on D by substituting
u = w, t = 0, and s(hL) = whjLr into the expression forD:
(I r)whL whL
Dmax =- r (1 - x) [ n - whL].
For r = .33 and x = .10, Dma = 0.2whL. Thus, although in some cases the client
may find the contingent percentage fee advantageous, in no case can that advan-
tage exceed 0.2whL. By contrast, in the more common cases where the contingent
percentage fee will be disadvantageous to the client, there is no limit to the size of
the disadvantage: Although the size of u cannot exceed wir, the sizes oft and s(hL)
have no bound.
In sum, most clients will individually receive a larger net recovery under the
332 See text accompanying note 246 supra.
311 See note 21 and text accompanying note 246 supra.
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proposed fee than under the contingent percentage fee. For these clients the
relative advantage of the proposed fee can be very large. Although in a minority
of cases falling within a certain range clients will do better under the contingent
percentage fee, the relative advantage cannot exceed 0.2whL. Moreover, it would
be unrealistic to assume that any client can predict the shape of the s-curve with
sufficient accuracy to know whether his case falls within this range.
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